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Abstract
This thesis investigates the monetary transmission mechanism in the Euro area, for coun-
tries taken individually and as an aggregate. The focus of the thesis is on the effects of
monetary policy shocks on the area as a whole, across countries and over time during
the period of single monetary policy by the Eurosystem. Using the most-recent empirical
techniques such as factor-augmented vector autoregression (VAR), Bayesian Gibbs sam-
pling, rolling windows, data pre-screening and panel VAR, the thesis investigates a novel
(large) data set for the economies of the Euro area. According to our empirical analyses
utilising these techniques, the thesis reaches the following main conclusions:
First, time variation in the impulse responses of area-wide consumer prices and mon-
etary aggregates to monetary policy shocks is stronger than that of other key macroeco-
nomic indicators. The contractionary impact of the monetary tightening on real activity
is the strongest when it hits the economy during the global financial crisis period (Chapter
1). Second, although the effects of the policy shocks on national real activities and price
levels are homogeneous across countries, the transmission mechanism displays impor-
tant cross-country heterogeneity with the national monetary aggregates responding most
heterogeneously to common monetary policy shocks (Chapter 2). Finally, despite the
responses of the Eurosystem to the global financial crisis with unconventional monetary
measures, country-specific factors such as defaults risks and bailouts played a significant
role in disrupting the transmission of the policy actions to individual economic activities
(Chapter 3).
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INTRODUCTION
This thesis investigates the monetary transmission mechanism in countries of the Euro
area (EA), taken individually and as an aggregate. Our attention in particular focuses on
the impacts of monetary policy shocks on the area as a whole, across countries and over
time during the period of single monetary policy by the Eurosystem. More specifically,
in Chapter 1, we explore the area-wide and time-varying effects of the policy shocks in
a data-rich environment of factor-augmented vector autoregression (FAVAR) techniques,
proposed by Bernanke et al. (2005, henceforth BBE). In Chapter 2, we study the question
of heterogeneity in the effects of common monetary policy shocks across the four largest
Euro area economies using country-specific and panel FAVAR models. Finally, Chapter
3 applies the panel VAR approach of Gambacorta et al. (2012) to thirteen economies
of the Euro area in order to investigate the cross-country effects of the Eurosystem’s
unconventional monetary policy actions during the global financial crisis period.
The first chapter of the thesis constructs a novel large data set for the Euro area as an
aggregate, i.e. EA-17, spanning the period from January 1999 to December 2011. In order
to investigate the transmission of monetary policy shocks to area-wide macroeconomic
indicators and the question of time variation in the transmission mechanism, we employ
two distinct estimation methods of a FAVAR model. The methods differ in terms of
the estimation of “unobservable” components, i.e. factors, of the disaggregated data
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set under investigation. As described in Section 1.2.2, on the one hand, the two-step
principal components (PC) approach provides a nonparametric way of estimating the
factors (step 1) to be used in a VAR system (step 2) constructed of the factors and the
monetary policy variable, i.e. the European Central Bank’s (ECB) benchmark interest
rate. On the other hand, the one-step Bayesian approach jointly estimates the factors
and the VAR system using likelihood-based Gibbs sampling techniques. Both methods
employ Bernanke et al.’s (2005) scheme for identifying the contractionary shocks to the
policy variable in the system. Our essay contributes to the limited number of studies in
the literature investigating the EA with the FAVAR approach by being the first, to our
knowledge, to apply the Bayesian method to European data. Chapter 1 also employs the
technique of rolling windows in order to capture time-varying impacts of the policy shocks,
and the effects of the global financial crisis on the transmission mechanism in the EA as a
whole. Finally, we contribute to the literature by investigating the Boivin and Ng (2006)
pre-screening technique in a structural FAVAR context. In particular, we replicate our
one- and two-step FAVAR estimations and the rolling analysis with a parsimonious data
set pre-screened and minimised by the method. Technically, the approach is to examine
the cross-section correlation in the idiosyncratic errors of the data, and eliminate those
most correlated.
In Chapter 2, we construct identical and disaggregated large data sets for the four
largest EA economies1 spanning the period January 1999 - December 2011, as in the
first chapter of the thesis. The main focus of the chapter is on the heterogeneity in the
effects of common monetary policy shocks across the largest economies of the EA. In
line with the contribution of the previous chapter, this essay pioneers the investigation
1See Table 0.0.2 below for the list of countries studied.
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of the cross-country heterogeneity in the transmission of monetary policy shocks in the
EA using the Bayesian FAVAR approach. In addition to country-level estimations, we
construct a panel of the EA as an aggregate and the individual economies in order to test
the robustness of the findings to the incorporation of area-wide factors into the system.
We believe that our Bayesian panel approach contributes to the literature by providing
alternative methodological investigation of the question of cross-country heterogeneity in
the EA. The approach also links the first two chapters of the thesis where the total EA
information is incorporated either by the use of an aggregate data set (Chapter 1) or a
panel of individual data sets (Chapter 2). Similar to the structure of the previous chapter,
the essay further explores time variation in, and the impact of the crisis on cross-country
heterogeneity using the rolling windows approach. The impact of data size on the analysis
is also investigated by applying the pre-screening technique of Boivin and Ng (2006) to
country-specific data sets.
The last essay of the thesis (Chapter 3) focusses on the global financial crisis period
and the question of cross-country effects of unconventional monetary policy in the EA
using the panel VAR approach of Gambacorta et al. (2012). In particular, we estimate
a (low-dimensional) panel VAR model for thirteen member states of the EA2 for the
crisis period from January 2008 to September 2012. To our knowledge, this paper is the
first to investigate the effectiveness of unconventional monetary policy shocks across EA
economies, and to do so using a structural panel VAR technique. Using a mix of zero and
sign restrictions, we identify expansionary shocks to national central bank total assets and
their possible impacts on the area-wide and country-level economic activities and price
levels. Different from the previous chapters, here we investigate the area-wide effects
2See Table 0.0.2 below for the list of countries studied.
3
of the monetary policy shocks as the weighted average of the country-specific impulse
response functions. The essay finally studies the transmission channels of (un)conventional
monetary policies together with the developments in key macroeconomic indicators in
core and peripheral economies of the EA in order to identify possible disruptions in the
transmission of the policy actions across the regions of the area.
Table 0.0.2 presents a list of EA countries studied in each chapter of the thesis with
the dates they adopted the euro as their currency.
Table 0.0.2: List of Countries Studied
Country Year Chapter 1 Chapter 2 Chapter 3
Germany 1 January 1999 EA as an Germany All of the member
France 1 January 1999 aggregate France states which adopted
Italy 1 January 1999 Italy the euro before the
Spain 1 January 1999 Spain beginning of the esti-
Netherlands 1 January 1999 mation sample of the
Belgium 1 January 1999 chapter, i.e. Jan 2008.
Austria 1 January 1999
Finland 1 January 1999
Portugal 1 January 1999
Ireland 1 January 1999
Luxembourg 1 January 1999
Greece 1 January 2001
Slovenia 1 January 2007
Cyprus 1 January 2008
Malta 1 January 2008
Slovakia 1 January 2009
Estonia 1 January 2011
Source: ECB.
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CHAPTER 1
MONETARY TRANSMISSION MECHANISM AND
TIME VARIATION IN THE EURO AREA
1.1 Introduction
One of the major focuses of modern monetary economics has been quantifying and
analysing monetary disturbances in terms of their effects on various sectors of the econ-
omy. There is no doubt that measuring the interaction between monetary policy and the
evolution of the entire economy is of crucial importance for good policy-making. There-
fore, the study of monetary policy shocks has taken an important place in the modern
macroeconomics literature.
In the applied macroeconomic literature, VAR models, pioneered by Sims (1972,
1980a,b), have become the most widely implemented method of identifying monetary
policy shocks. We can attribute the popularity of these models to their ability to consider
all the variables in the system as endogenous, to the dynamic structure of the models, to
the practicality of impulse response and variance decomposition analyses, and last but not
least, to the possibility of using simple techniques such as ordinary least squares (OLS)
to estimate the models. Empirical results obtained from the early VAR models, however,
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were found to be misleading, and suggested puzzling dynamics in the behaviour of var-
ious macroeconomic variables, such as a rise in price levels in response to a monetary
contraction, the so called price puzzle phenomenon.
To remedy these puzzles, a number of researchers have proposed various alternative
methods such as (1) calculating monetary policy shocks as innovations to short-term
interest rates instead of to “high-order” monetary aggregates (Bernanke and Blinder,
1992), (2) extension of the standard VARs by variables representing inflationary pressure,
e.g. the commodity price index, (Sims, 1992), or (3) by variables capturing the foreign
sector of the economy (Cushman and Zha, 1997).
Investigation of these explanations and solutions to the puzzles sheds light not only on
the reasoning behind the puzzles but also on the crucial difficulty of the VAR models that
they are commonly “low-dimensional”.1 The majority of VARs in the literature rarely
employ more than five to eight variables due to the “curse of dimensionality”, such that
as the dimension of the system increases the number of parameters to be estimated grows
quadratically and quickly exhausts the available degrees of freedom, even for large data
sets.2 Moreover, considering the large information sets used by central banks it is not
possible to span these sets by low dimensional VAR systems.
According to BBE, two potential sets of problems emerge due to the use of the so
called “sparse information sets” in VAR models. Firstly, since the capacity of the models
employed by the econometricians and the span of information sets used by the policy
makers are significantly different, “the measurement of policy innovations is likely to
1Here we refer to generally used standard VAR models. Throughout the literature, however, some
studies, e.g. Leeper et al. (1996) and Ban´bura et al. (2008) managed to employ 13-18 and up to 130
variables, respectively, using Bayesian techniques.
2Sims (1980b).
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be contaminated”.3 As claimed by Mumtaz and Surico (2009, p.72), in this case “what
appears to the econometrician to be a policy shock is, in fact, the response of the monetary
authorities to the extra information not included in the VAR”. Secondly, the impulse
response functions (IRF) and forecast error variance decompositions can be obtained
only for the variables included in the investigations. However, as emphasised above, these
variables are known to “generally constitute only a small subset of the variables that the
researcher and policymakers care about” (BBE, p.389).
As a solution to these drawbacks of the VAR models, BBE highlight the literature on
dynamic factor models (DFM)4 which suggests that comovements of a large number of
macroeconomic time series can be summarised by a relatively small number of estimated
“factors” or “indices”. BBE claim that “if a small number of estimated factors effectively
summarise large amounts of information about the economy, then a natural solution to the
degrees-of-freedom problem in VAR analyses is to augment standard VARs with estimated
factors”.5 Building on this idea, the authors develop the factor augmented VAR (FAVAR)
model.
The key insight of the FAVAR approach is that, using the factors integrated into the
model, it is possible to take almost all potentially relevant information for policymakers
into account, and identify monetary policy shocks as simply as in standard VAR models.
The FAVAR framework outperforms the standard VARs by making it possible to observe
impulse responses for as many variables as we include in our large data sets.6 It is
an obvious fact that this feature of the model makes it possible to have a much more
3Bernanke et al. (2005, p.388).
4Introduced by Geweke (1977), and further studied by Sargent and Sims (1977), Stock and Watson
(1998, 1999, 2002a,b), Giannone et al. (2004), among others.
5Bernanke et al. (2005, p.390).
6For technical details see the Methodology section of the chapter.
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comprehensive picture of the effects of monetary policy shocks on the economy.
The FAVAR models have been widely implemented in the recent literature in the
context of identifying the effects of monetary policy shocks on the economy. Table 1.1.1
presents some of these studies with their estimation and identification techniques, and
countries studied.7 From the table it is clearly noticeable that a majority of the studies
apply the technique to United States (US) data, whereas only a few of them investigate
the EA.
Further investigation of the literature suggests that the gap concerns not only the
application of the approach for the EA in general, but also involves (i) the investigation
of the post-1999 period using a common monetary policy variable controlled by the ECB
only and (ii) the implementation of the Bayesian one-step estimation technique, details
of which are described in Section 1.2.2. As we can see in the fourth column of the table,
sample periods of the first three studies of the EA span both pre- and post-1999 periods.
These studies either use some countries’, e.g. Germany, short term interest rates as
a proxy for the common policy variable, or aggregate country-specific series in order to
obtain area-wide measures. As highlighted by McCallum and Smets (2007, p.10), however,
“the identified monetary policy shock (in these FAVAR models) may not be completely
homogenous across countries.”
In addition to the lack of application of FAVARs and Bayesian techniques to the EA,
we observe another important gap in the literature. As shown above, Boivin and Ng
(2006, p.171) highlight the fact that “a new strand of research has made it possible to
use information from a large number of variables while keeping the empirical framework
small.” Claiming that little is known in the literature about how data size and composition
7The details of the techniques employed in our study are described in Sections 1.2.2 and 1.2.3.
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Table 1.1.1: The Monetary FAVAR Literature
Study Estimation Identification Country
BBE Two-step PC Recursive ordering US
One-step Bayesian F St vs F
F
t 59:M1-01:M8
Ahmadi Bayesian Sign US
(2005) Restrictions 59:M1-01:M08
Stock and Watson Two-step Various US
(2005) PC Schemes 59:M1-03:M12
Belviso and Milani Bayesian Cholesky US
(2006) Decomposition 60:M1-98:M12
Ahmadi and Uhlig Bayesian Sign US
(2007) Restrictions 59:M1-01:M8
Boivin and Giannoni Two-step BBE US
(2007) PC 84:M1-05:M2
Boivin et al. Two-step BBE US
(2009) 76:M1-06:M6
Bork EM BBE US
(2009) Algorithm 59:M1-01:M8
Koop and Korobilis Bayesian BBE US
(2010) 53:Q1-06:Q3
Mumtaz et al. Bayesian Sign UK
(2011) Restrictions 77:Q1-06:Q3
McCallum and Smets Two-step BBE EAb
(2007) PC 86:Q1-05:Q4
Boivin et al. Two-step Boivin et al.a EAc
(2008) PC (2009) 80:Q1-07:Q3
Blaes (2009) Two-step BBE EAd
PC 86:Q4-06:Q4
Soares (2011) Two-step BBE EAd
PC 99:M1-09:M3
a Boivin et al. (2009) approach is very close to but slightly different than the BBE
scheme. For details see the original paper or Boivin et al. (2008). b Germany, France,
Italy, Spain, the Netherlands, Belgium, Finland, Portugal, Greece, Ireland. c Belgium,
France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain. d EA as a whole.
affect the factor estimates, the authors ask whether it could be that increasing the number
of observations in the cross-section “beyond a certain point is not even desirable.” By
investigating the cross-section correlation in the idiosyncratic errors of the data, and
eliminating those most correlated, Boivin and Ng find in a real time forecasting exercise
that factors estimated from as few as 40 pre-screened series often yield equally well or
9
even better forecasts than using all 147 series.8 In other words, their analysis suggests
that “expanding the sample size simply by adding data that bear little information about
the factor components does not necessarily improve forecasts.”9
There are similar approaches in the forecasting literature proposed by Grenouilleau
(2004), Marcellino (2006), Banerjee et al. (2008), Bai and Ng (2008a), Ban´bura and
Ru¨nstler (2011), among others, and surveyed by Eickmeier and Ziegler (2008) and Bai
and Ng (2008b). However, to our knowledge, structural analysis with pre-screening is yet
to be explored in the literature.
These observed gaps in the literature bring us to the key aims of this chapter which are
fourfold. First, we gather a novel data set consisting of 120 disaggregated macroeconomic
time series spanning the period 1999:M1 through 2011:M12, and identify the impacts of
monetary policy shocks in the EA as an aggregate.10 Second, in addition to the commonly
used two-step PC FAVAR approach, we employ the Bayesian joint estimation technique
and compare the results suggested by the two rather different methods, which produce
distinct factor estimates. Third, given our sample includes the global financial crisis
commencing in 2007-8, we use rolling windows to identify the changes created by the
crisis on the impact of the shocks in the economy. Finally, we replicate the analyses in
the first part of the chapter by using a rather parsimonious data set pre-screened and
minimised by the Boivin and Ng (2006) approach, and try to identify the impact of
screening from the perspective of structural analysis.
In brief, the main results of the chapter are as follow. Our FAVAR model suggests
estimates for the responses of a wide variety macroeconomic variables to monetary policy
8See Section 1.4.3 for further details of the approach.
9Bai and Ng (2008a).
10See Appendix A for details of the data set.
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shocks in the EA that are largely consistent with conventional wisdom. PC and Bayesian
estimation techniques applied to our model suggest broadly similar findings, yet also pro-
vide distinct results such as smoother impulse responses with tighter confidence intervals
from the latter technique. Our rolling windows approach shows that while a surprise
monetary tightening has a consistently negative impact on the real activity measures, the
global financial crisis leads to important variations in the responses of nominal variables
such as the price level and money supply to the policy shock. Consistent with the real
time forecasting exercise by Boivin and Ng (2006), finally, we find in a FAVAR context
that factors extracted from as few as 67 series might do no worse, and as our Bayesian
estimations suggest, better than ones extracted from 120 series.
The remainder of the chapter is organised as follows: Section 2 describes the method-
ology of the chapter which consists of the FAVAR framework, model estimation and iden-
tification, and Boivin and Ng pre-screening technique; preliminary analyses consisting of
the data, number of factors and lags, and interpolation of quarterly series are contained in
Section 3; Section 4 presents the empirical results of the chapter in three parts consisting
of (a) study of the monetary transmission mechanism in the EA; (b) time variation and
(c) Boivin and Ng analysis of impulse responses with screened data; Section 5 contains
the robustness checks of the results; and Section 6 concludes the chapter.
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1.2 Methodology
1.2.1 The FAVAR Model
Let Yt and Xt be two vectors of economic variables with dimensions M × 1 and N × 1,
respectively, and t be a time index; t = 1, 2, . . . , T , where N can be larger than T . We
can interpret Yt as a set of observable economic indicators, and Xt as a large data set
of economic indicators thought to be in central bank’s information set. Bernanke et al.
(2004a, pp.5-6) propose that the common dynamics of all variables in the economy, Xt, are
driven by some “pervasive forces” and idiosyncratic components. These forces are assumed
to consist of both “unobservable” and “observable” components. The unobservable ones
are summarised by a K × 1 vector of factors, Ft, while the policy variable, i.e. the ECB’s
benchmark interest rate, is assumed to be the only observable factor in the system. That
is to say, Yt is a one-dimensional vector. It is additionally assumed that the joint dynamics
of Yt and Ft are described by a VAR system, providing the FAVAR model by BBE.
We can summarise the FAVAR model in state-space representation as follows:11
Xit = Λ
f
i Ft + Λ
y
i Yt + et, E(e
′
tet) = R (1.2.1)
[
Ft
Yt
]
= Φ(L)
[
Ft−1
Yt−1
]
+ ut, E(u
′
tut) = Q (1.2.2)
where for i = 1, . . . , N , Λf is an N × K matrix of factor loadings, Λy is N ×M , et is
an N × 1 vector of error terms, which are mean zero and assumed to be either weakly
correlated or uncorrelated depending on the method of estimation of the model,12 Φ(L)
11For further details see Kim and Nelson (1999), BBE, Stock and Watson (2005), among others.
12See Section 1.2.2 for details.
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is a conformable lag polynomial of finite order d, and ut is a (K + M) × 1 error vector
that ut ∼ i.i.d.N(0, Q). The error terms of equations (1.2.1) and (1.2.2) are assumed to
be independent of each other, and R is diagonal. Using state-space terminologies, (1.2.1)
and (1.2.2) are the observation (or measurement) and the transition (or state) equations,
respectively.
Impulse Response Functions
It has been noted earlier that one of the advantages of the FAVAR methodology over
standard VARs is the possibility of conducting impulse response analysis on a larger
scale. Here we follow Blaes (2009) and briefly explain how these functions are obtained.
According to the moving average (MA) representation of the transition equation
(1.2.2), the impulse response functions of Fˆt and Yt are given by,
[
Fˆt
Yt
]
= Ψ(L)ut (1.2.3)
where Ψ(L) = [I − φ1L− . . .− φdLd]−1 = [I − Φ(L)]−1.
Combining equations (1.2.1) and (1.2.3) leads us to the following transformation:
XIRFit =
[
Λˆf Λˆy
] [
Fˆt
Yt
]
=
[
Λˆf Λˆy
]
[Ψ(L)ut] (1.2.4)
which allows us to construct the impulse responses for any element Xit of Xt.
It is important to note that equation (1.2.4) displays the impulse response functions
to shocks, i.e. innovations to ut. The main focus of a structural analysis, however,
is to investigate the responses of the variables of interest to structural, e.g. monetary
policy, shocks. As we describe in subsection 1.2.3 later in the chapter, it is necessary to
identify the relationship between the reduced form and structural shocks for this purpose.
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Identification of the system allows us to calculate, in the same manner in equation (1.2.4),
the responses of the variables in Xit to structural shocks.
13
1.2.2 Estimation
BBE propose two approaches to estimating the model. The first one is a two-step PC
approach, “which provides a nonparametric way of uncovering the common space spanned
by the factors of Xt”.
14 The second is a joint estimation approach of (1.2.1) and (1.2.2) by
likelihood-based Gibbs sampling techniques. BBE highlight that these approaches differ
in various dimensions, and there are no clear a priori reasoning favouring one approach
over the other. Therefore, as mentioned earlier, we employ both these approaches in this
chapter. Details of the techniques are described in the following subsections.
TWO-STEP PRINCIPAL COMPONENTS APPROACH
The two-step PC procedure estimates (1.2.1) and (1.2.2) separately. In the first step,
analogous to the forecasting exercises of Stock and Watson (2002b), PC analysis is ap-
plied to the observation equation (1.2.1) in order to estimate the space spanned by the
factors using the first K + M PC of Xt, denoted by Cˆ(Ft, Yt). Notice that the estima-
tion of this step does not impose the constraint that the observed factors, Yt, are among
the common components. That is to say, Yt is removed from the space covered by the
PC “by performing a transformation of the PC exploiting the different behaviour of (so
called) ‘slow-moving’ and ‘fast-moving’ variables, in the second step.”15,16 However, as
13See subsection 1.2.3, part ‘Identification of the Monetary Policy Shocks’ for details of the identifica-
tion scheme employed in the chapter.
14Bernanke et al. (2005, p.398).
15Boivin et al. (2008, p.6).
16See Section 1.2.3 for the specific identifying assumption used in the second step.
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highlighted by Bernanke et al. (2005, p.398), and shown in Stock and Watson (2002b),
the PC consistently recover the space spanned by both Ft and Yt in the case of N being
large and the number of PC used being at least as large as the true number of factors.
In other words, the first step of the approach employs the PC in order to estimate the
factors (Fˆ 1t , Fˆ
2
t , . . . , Fˆ
K
t ) from the measurement equation (1.2.1). Given the assumption
that R is diagonal in (1.2.1), the method estimates the model equation by equation using
OLS in order to obtain the estimates of factor loadings, i.e. (Λˆf1 , Λˆ
f
2 , . . . , Λˆ
f
K).
In the second step, we replace the unobserved factors in the transition equation (1.2.2)
by their PC estimates, and run a standard VAR

Fˆ 1t
Fˆ 2t
...
FˆKt
Yt
 = Φ(L)

Fˆ 1t−1
Fˆ 2t−1
...
FˆKt−1
Yt−1
+ et
in order to obtain Φˆ(L).
Computational simplicity, some degree of cross-correlation allowed in the idiosyncratic
term et, and the fact that it imposes only few distributional assumptions are the main ad-
vantageous features of the two-step estimation method.17 However, the approach implies
the presence of “generated regressors” in the second step, which makes it necessary to
implement a bootstrap procedure that accounts for the uncertainty in the factor estima-
tion in order to obtain accurate confidence intervals on the impulse response functions.18
Following BBE and the rest of the FAVAR literature, our analysis employs the bootstrap-
ping procedure proposed by Kilian (1998) in order to obtain confidence intervals on the
impulse response functions.
17See Stock and Watson (2005).
18See Bernanke et al. (2005, p.399).
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Furthermore, as discussed by Eliasz (2005), the factors estimated in the two-step
approach have unknown dynamic properties due to the fact that when the factors are
constructed in the model only the measurement equation (1.2.1) is taken into account,
and the dynamic structure of the model (1.2.2) is totally ignored.
BAYESIAN JOINT ESTIMATION APPROACH
In contrast with the two-step method, the likelihood-based Bayesian, i.e. multi-move
Gibbs sampling,19 approach takes the observation and the transition equations into ac-
count jointly, and also “allows us to incorporate prior information into (the) estimation
procedure and implies that (it is possible) to obtain relatively precise results.”20 The
results obtained from this approach may be considered relatively more precise due to
“an advantage of (the) approach that it facilitates the introduction of restrictions on the
loadings, thus facilitating also the economic interpretation of the factors.”21
Belviso and Milani (2006) evaluate the Bayesian estimation from a different perspec-
tive and state that the higher complexity of the approach is repaid with an easier and
theoretically clearer assessment of the uncertainty of the estimates, due to simplicity of
constructing and interpreting the error bands for those estimates.
Closely following BBE, we explain the details of the estimation procedure of the
Bayesian approach in the subsequent sections.
19Technique developed by Geman and Geman (1984), Gelman and Rubin (1992a), and Carter and
Kohn (1994), and surveyed in Kim and Nelson (1999).
20Mumtaz and Surico (2007, p.12).
21Belviso and Milani (2006)
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Estimation Procedure
In order to apply the likelihood methods to equations (1.2.1) and (1.2.2) jointly, let us
transform the model into the following state-space form:
[
Xt
Yt
]
=
[
Λf Λy
0 I
] [
Ft
Yt
]
+
[
et
0
]
(1.2.5)
[
Ft
Yt
]
= Φ(L)
[
Ft−1
Yt−1
]
+ ut (1.2.6)
As claimed by BBE, inclusion of the observable factor Yt in the measurement (1.2.5)
and the transition (1.2.6) equations “does not change the model but allows for both
notational and computational simplification.”22
Our main aim in the procedure is to estimate the parameters of the model, θ =
(Λf ,Λy, R, vec(Φ), Q), treated as random variables, and the factors {Ft}Tt=1, where vec(Φ)
is defined as a column vector of the elements of the stacked matrix Φ of the parameters
of the lag operator Φ(L). As proposed by Carter and Kohn (1994), likelihood-based
multi-move Gibbs sampling proceeds by alternately sampling the parameters θ and the
unobserved factors Ft. Further details of the procedure are as follows:
First, let us rewrite the model in the following way:
Xt = ΛFt + et (1.2.7)
Ft = Φ(L)Ft−1 + ut (1.2.8)
where Xt = (X
′
t, Y
′
t )
′, Ft = (F ′t , Y
′
t )
′, Λ =
(
Λf Λy
0 I
)
, et = (e
′
t, 0. . . . , 0)
′, et ∼
i.i.d. N(0,R), R is the covariance matrix of et augmented by zeros, and Φ(L) is a con-
22Bernanke et al. (2004a, pp.27-8).
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formable lag polynomial with finite order d.
In order to rewrite the transition equation (1.2.8) as a first-order Markov process, we
define F¯t = (F
′
t,F
′
t−1, . . . ,F
′
t−d+1)
′, u¯t = (ut, 0, . . . , 0)′, and
Φ¯ =

Φ1 Φ2 . . . Φd−1 Φd
I(K+M) 0 . . . 0 0
0 IK+M
. . . 0 0
... . . . . . .
. . .
...
0 0 . . . I(K+M) 0
 (1.2.9)
Using these definitions, we obtain the following Markov process:
F¯t = Φ¯F¯t−1 + u¯t
where u¯t is with covariance matrix Q¯ augmented by zeros.
By replacing Ft in the measurement equation (1.2.7) by newly defined F¯t, we also
obtain
Xt = Λ¯F¯t + et (1.2.10)
where Λ¯ = [Λ 0 . . . 0].
Consideration of all the definitions above brings us to the following system which is
to be estimated:
Xt = Λ¯F¯t + et (1.2.11)
F¯t = Φ¯F¯t−1 + u¯t (1.2.12)
As highlighted in Bayesian theory section in Appendix B, the Bayesian approach
requires the elements of the Bayes’ rule to be random variables. As such, all the pa-
rameters and the factors of the system (1.2.11 - 1.2.12) are treated as random variables.
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Furthermore, let us assume that X˜T and F˜T stand for the histories of X and F¯, respec-
tively, from period 1 through period T . That is to say, X˜T = (X1,X2, . . . ,XT ), and
F˜T = (F¯1, F¯2, . . . , F¯T ).
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Inference
In order to obtain the estimates of F˜T and θ, the Bayesian approach requires us to derive
the posterior densities as
p(F˜T ) =
∫
p(F˜T , θ)d(θ) (1.2.13)
p(θ) =
∫
p(F˜T , θ)d(F˜T ) (1.2.14)
where p(F˜T , θ) is the joint posterior distribution and the integrals are taken with respect
to the supports of θ and F˜T . Considering the posterior densities, the estimates of F˜T and
θ can be obtained as the means or the medians (quantiles) of the densities.
Since the true joint distribution is not known, multi-move Gibbs sampling is employed
so as to obtain an empirical approximation of it. The details of the approximation pro-
cedure are the following:
• Step 1 - Starting Values (θ0): First of all, we choose an initial set of values for
the parameter set θ. As highlighted by BBE, it is advantageous to try a dispersed set
of parameter values so as to check whether they generate similar empirical distributions.
This is so due to proposal of Gelman and Rubin (1992a) that a single sequence from the
Gibbs sampler, even if it has apparently converged, may give a “false sense of security”.
According to BBE and Eliasz (2005), using parameter estimates obtained from PC
23For simplicity, the “bar” notation is omitted.
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estimation of the observation equation (1.2.1) and vector autoregression of the transition
equation (1.2.2) leads to a reasonable guess on the choice of θ0. Robustness of this choice
is tested by BBE relative to some alternatives such as (i) vec(Φ) = 0, (ii) Q = I, (iii)
Λ = 0, (iv) OLS estimates of the factor loadings Λy from the regression of X on Y , and
(v) R = residual covariance matrix from the same regression.
In our empirical analysis, following the FAVAR literature, we stick to BBE’s choice of
PC and VAR estimates of the equations (1.2.1) and (1.2.2).
• Step 2 - Conditional Density of the Factors: The second step of the procedure
is to draw a set of values for F˜T , say F˜
1
T , from the conditional density of F˜T given the
initial values, θ0, and the data X˜T , i.e. p(F˜T |X˜T , θ).
It is possible to express the distribution of the whole factor history, p(F˜T |X˜T , θ), as
the product of conditional distributions of factors at each date t, relying on the Markov
property of state-space model that
p(Ft|Ft+1,Ft+2, . . . ,FT ,XT , θ) = p(Ft|Ft+1,Xt, θ)
That is to say24:
p(F˜T |X˜T , θ) = p(FT |X˜T , θ)
T−1∏
t=1
p(Ft|Ft+1, X˜t, θ)
where X˜t = (X1,X2, . . . ,Xt).
Due to linearity and Gaussian properties of the state-space model under investigation,
there are
FT |X˜T , θ ∼ N(FT |T ,PT |T )
Ft|Ft+1, X˜t, θ ∼ N(Ft|t,Ft+1 ,Pt|t,Ft+1)
(1.2.15)
24For details see Kim and Nelson (1999, p.191).
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where the first holds for the Kalman filter for t = 1, . . . , T , the second does so for the
Kalman smoother for t = T − 1, T − 2, . . . , 125, and
FT |T = E(FT |X˜T , θ)
PT |T = Cov(FT |X˜T , θ)
Ft|t,Ft+1 = E(Ft|Ft+1, X˜t, θ) = E(Ft,Ft+1,Ft|t, θ)
Pt|t,Ft+1 = Cov(Ft|Ft+1, X˜t, θ) = Cov(Ft|Ft+1,Ft|t, θ)
• Step 3 - Inference on the Parameters (θ): The final step of the Gibbs sam-
pling procedure is to draw from p(θ|X˜T , F˜T ). Given the data we observe and the factors
generated in the previous step, it is possible to draw values for θ. Since the factors are
considered as known variables, it is possible to estimate the equations (1.2.7 - 1.2.8) sep-
arately as standard regression equations. By doing so we can specify the distributions of
Λ and R with the measurement (1.2.7), and that of vec(Φ′) and Q with the transition
(1.2.8) equations.
It is known that Rˆii = eˆ
′eˆ/(T −Ki) where Ki is equal to the number of regressors in
equation i, Rij = 0 for i 6= j, and, like vec(Φˆ) and Qˆ, Rˆ and eˆ are the estimates obtained
from the standard regressions. At this point we can follow either Bernanke et al. (2005)
and assume a “proper (conjugate) but diffuse Inverse-Gamma (3, 0.001)” prior for Rii, or
Belviso and Milani (2006) and assume an “uninformative prior” that
Rii|X˜T , F˜T = (T −Ki)Rˆii
x
where x ∼ χ2(T −Ki)
If we follow the former, which we do in our empirical analysis, the prior is going to be;
Rii|X˜T , F˜T ∼ iG(R¯ii, T + 0.001)
25We skip the derivation of the Kalman filter and smoother. For these details see Eliasz (2005).
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where R¯ii = 3 + eˆ
′
ieˆi + Λˆ
′
i[M
−1
0 + (F˜
(i)′
T F˜
(i)
T )
−1Λˆi] and M−10 is the variance parameter in
the prior on the coefficients of the ith equation, Λi. Similarly, Mumtaz (2005) uses the
prior specification Rii ∼ IG(5, 0.001) in order “to reflect the high volatility of some of the
series in (his) panel” (p.17).26
According to BBE, we should draw values for Λi, given draws of Rii, from the posterior
N(Λ¯, RiiM¯
−1
i ) where Λ¯i = M¯
−1
i (F˜
(i)′
T F˜
(i)
T )Λˆi and M¯i = M0 + F˜
(i)′
T F˜
(i)
T .
After obtaining all the elements of θ explained above, the final draw is for Q and
vec(Φ). The way of obtaining Q and vec(Φ) suggested by Bernanke et al. (2005) is to,
first, impose a diffuse conjugate Normal-Wishart prior that
vec(Φ)|Q ∼ N(0, Q⊗ Ω0), Q ∼ iW (Q0, K +M + 2)
where vec(Φ) is as described above.
Then we can draw Q from iW (Q¯, T + K + M + 2), where Q¯ = Q0 + Vˆ
′Vˆ + Φˆ′[Ω0 +
(F˜′T−1F˜T−1)
−1]Φˆ, and Vˆ is the matrix containing OLS residuals.
Finally, conditional on the obtained Q, {Φijt} can be drawn from
vec(Φ) ∼ N (vec(Φ¯), Q⊗ Ω¯)
where Φ¯ = Ω¯(F˜′T−1F˜T−1)Φˆ and Ω¯ = (Ω
−1
0 + F˜
′
T−1F˜T−1)
−1.
In the Gibbs sampling procedure steps 2 and 3 explained above constitute one iteration
and are repeated for each iteration s. Then, inference obtained from the sampling of the
parameters θ is based on the distribution of (F˜sT , θ
s), for s ≥ B with large B proportion
of initial draws discarded so as to guarantee convergence of the algorithm. As shown
by Geman and Geman (1984), as the number of iterations approaches to infinity, i.e.
26We find that our empirical results are robust to this slightly higher specification.
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s → ∞, the marginal and joint distributions of the values obtained from iterations, F˜sT
and θs, converge to the true distributions (FT , θ) at an exponential rate. Depending
on the inference, estimates of factors, model parameters and the associated confidence
intervals are calculated as medians and percentiles27 of (F˜sT , θ
s) for s = B+ 1, . . . , S. The
procedure, finally, allows us to evaluate the impulse response functions for each draw with
their medians.
1.2.3 Identification
Along with the estimation of the system, another important aspect of the FAVAR model is
model identification. Contrary to the standard (structural) VAR literature, in a FAVAR
framework, the procedure requires not only identification of the structural shocks, but
also that of the factor space in the model. We describe these steps in the following parts.
IDENTIFICATION OF THE FACTORS
Options available for factor identification in FAVARs are to restrict either the observation
or the transition equations. BBE prefer not to restrict the VAR dynamics, and propose
that sufficient factor identification conditions for the two-step method is to restrict the
loadings by Λf ′Λf/N = I or to restrict the factors by F ′F/T = I. For joint estimation,
BBE suggest setting the upper K×K block of Λf to an identity matrix and the top K×M
block of Λy to zero. In other words, BBE propose these restrictions for the purpose of
normalising or re-basing the factor space. In our empirical analysis we follow BBE and
identify the factors in the same way.
27Different from the two-step method, confidence intervals of the median impulse responses are con-
structed in the one-step approach from the quantiles of the Gibbs draws.
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IDENTIFICATION OF THE MONETARY POLICY SHOCKS
Here we explain the problem of identification in (FA)VAR context first, then summarise
the BBE identification schemes we employ in the chapter.28
Broadly speaking, the problem of identification arises “since there is more than one
structure of economic interest which can give rise to the same statistical model for (a)
vector of variables.”29 In other words, we can draw no conclusions about the structural, i.e.
‘true’ model, parameters from the data as it is possible to obtain the same reduced-form
from different structural models.
The solution to the problem comes by imposing identifying restrictions on the structure
where the number of parameters is greater than that in the reduced form. How these
restrictions are imposed in the BBE approach is explained in the following subparts.
Before these details, let us consider the reduced-form FAVAR in equation (1.2.2):
[
Ft
Yt
]
= Φ(L)
[
Ft−1
Yt−1
]
+ ut, E(u
′
tut) = Q
Suppose an orthogonal and invertible matrix of dimension (K+M)× (K+M), called
A, represents the contemporaneous relationships between the variables in the FAVAR.
Therefore, the structural model can be obtained by premultiplying the reduced form
with the rotation matrix A. This gives us the following linear relationship between the
structural shocks (εt) and the reduced-form innovations (ut):
εt = Aut or ut = A
−1εt (1.2.16)
Parallel to equation (1.2.3), the MA representation of the structural form is:
28For further details on the issue of identification in general see Favero (2001, Chapters 3 and 6) and
Enders (2004, Chapter 5), among others.
29Favero (2001, p.85)
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[
Fˆt
Yt
]
= Ψ∗(L)ut (1.2.17)
where Ψ∗(L) = Ψ(L)A−1.
In these notations, the task of identification is to identify A or, if one is interested
in just one economic shock, like the monetary policy shock as in our case, only a row
of A. As Kilian (2012) highlights, without proper identification of the system, studying
the responses of the variables in the (FA)VAR to reduced-form innovations will tell us
nothing about that of the variables to the structural shocks. “It is the latter responses
that are of interest if we want to learn about the structure of the economy.”30
According to BBE and Kilian (2012), we can categorise the structural (FA)VAR
models in the literature as identified by (i) short-run restrictions (e.g. recursive, non-
recursive, and contemporaneous frameworks); (ii) long-run restrictions; (iii) sign restric-
tions; (iv) alternative approaches based on heteroskedasticity of the structural shocks, or
high-frequency financial markets data, and (v) mixture of contemporaneous and long-run
(or sign) restrictions.31,32
We mentioned earlier that the identification of the monetary policy shocks in our
empirical analysis depends on a scheme proposed by BBE. As shown by Stock and Watson
(2005), it is possible to categorise the BBE identification scheme, explained on p.27, into
the category of contemporaneous timing restrictions. Hence, in the following subpart we
30Kilian (2012, p.3).
31Among others, see Bernanke and Blinder (1992); Sims (1992); Strongin (1995); Christiano et al.
(1999) for recursive frameworks, Gordon and Leeper (1994); Leeper et al. (1996); Bernanke and Mihov
(1998) for contemporaneous, non-recursive restrictions, Blanchard and Quah (1989); Faust and Leeper
(1997); Pagan and Robertson (1998); Giannone et al. (2002) for long-run restrictions, Faust (1998);
Canova and de Nicolo´ (2002); Uhlig (2005); Mumtaz and Surico (2009); Kilian and Murphy (2012) for
sign restrictions, Rigobon (2003); Faust et al. (2004) for the alternative financial market approaches, and
Gali (1992); Bernanke and Mihov (1998) for the mixture approaches.
32In Chapter 3 of the thesis, we employ the mixture of zero and sign restrictions in order to identify
the unconventional monetary policy shocks in the EA. For details of the approach see Chapter 3, Section
3.3.3.
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briefly explain these restrictions according to Stock and Watson (2005) and Favero (2001,
Chapter 6).
Contemporaneous Timing Restrictions
The contemporaneous restrictions are exclusion restrictions stating that certain structural
shocks, e.g. monetary policy shocks, do not affect certain variables, e.g. prices or output,
contemporaneously, i.e. within the month or quarter depending on the frequency of
the data. As the pioneering study of identification of VAR systems using this type of
restrictions, Sims (1980b) proposed the following identification strategy, based on Wold
causal ordering of variables and Cholesky decomposition of the reduced form covariance
matrix, i.e. Q in equation (1.2.2). It is assumed by Sims (1980b) that A, i.e. the invertible
matrix in (1.2.16), is lower triangular as follows:
A =

1 0 . . . 0
a21 1
. . . 0
...
. . . . . . 0
aN1 . . . aNN−1 1
 (1.2.18)
where a’s denote an unrestricted non-zero element. The lower triangular structure of the
matrix “corresponds to a recursive economic structure, with the most endogenous variable
ordered last.”33 If we assume a (FA)VAR with N variables, the lower triangular structure
leads to N(N − 1)/2 exclusion restrictions in (1.2.18), which therefore means that A is
exactly identified.
Following Bernanke (1986), it is common in the literature to assume that the structural
shocks are orthogonal to each other34 and normalised to have a unit variance, i.e. E[εtε
′
t] =
33Favero (2001, p.165)
34According to Favero (2001, Chapter 6), this is the main assumption separating the traditional Cowles
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I. Considering the relationship between the reduce-form innovations and the structural
shocks in (1.2.16), we obtain the covariance matrix of the former as follows:
Qu = E[utu
′
t] = A
−1E[εtε′t]A
−1′ = A−1A−1′ (1.2.19)
Given (1.2.19), Stock and Watson (2005) and Kilian (2012), among others, show that
one possible solution for recovering εt is A
−1 = S where S is the Cholesky decomposition
of the covariance matrix Qu such that SS
′ = Qu. Because the lower triangular structure
of S provides N(N − 1)/2 free parameters, as in (1.2.16), the Cholesky approach exactly
identifies the system.
As a second example to contemporaneous timing restrictions, Stock and Watson (2005)
highlight the BBE scheme as “partial identification via block lower-triangular exclusion
restrictions” (p.18). We next describe this identification scheme which we employ in our
essay.
BBE Identification Scheme
In order to identify a single shock in a structural FAVAR, BBE introduced a scheme which
partitions the structural shocks and variables Xit into three groups as “slow-moving” vari-
ables, the monetary policy variable and “fast-moving” variables. As the authors explain,
whereas the slow-moving variables are assumed to be “largely predetermined as of the
current period”, e.g. output, employment, and prices, the “fast-moving” ones are those
known to be “highly sensitive to contemporaneous economic news or shocks”, e.g. interest
and exchange rates, share prices and monetary aggregates.
Commission and the VAR models as identification in the former models is obtained without assuming
orthogonality of the structural disturbances.
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Following the Cholesky decomposition explained above, BBE assume a recursive struc-
ture for the transition equation (1.2.2) ordering the policy instrument last after the slow-
moving factors. The main assumption here is that the slow-moving factors do not re-
spond contemporaneously to the innovations in the policy variable, which are treated as
the monetary policy shocks. BBE also assume that the “fast-moving” factors follow the
movements in the policy instrument very closely, and, in order to prevent collinearity in
the system, they exclude these factors from their recursive structure.
In order to briefly show the scheme algebraically,35 let Ψ∗0 be the coefficient matrix
that is the leading (zero-lag) term of Ψ∗(L) in equation (1.2.17). Additionally suppose
that the structural shocks are ζt = (ζ
S
t
′, ζRt )
′, where S stands for slow-moving, R is the
policy variable, ζSt is KS × 1, and ζRt is a scalar.
The contemporaneous timing restrictions of the identification explained above lead to
the following block lower triangular structure for Ψ∗0:
36
Ψ∗0 =
[
Ψ∗0,SS 0
Ψ∗0,RS Ψ
∗
0,RR
]
(1.2.20)
where Ψ∗0,SS is KS × qS, Ψ0,RS is 1× qS, and Ψ∗0,RR is a scalar.
Following Stock and Watson (2005), finally, the block triangular restrictions in (1.2.20)
identify ζRt (the shock of interest), and the space spanned by the ζ
S
t . Identification of ζ
R
t
means that “the column of [Ψ∗(L)] associated with ζRt is [also] identified and thus the
structural impulse responses of Xt with respect to ζ
R
t is identified” (p.18).
35See Stock and Watson (2005, pp.18-20) for further details of this part.
36Stock and Watson (2005) include the “fast” variables in this expression. However, due to our
explanation of the scheme above, these variables are excluded here.
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One-step FAVAR: Regarding the implementation of this scheme in the Bayesian joint
estimation methodology, BBE propose that the only requirement is that we select the
first K variables in the data from the set of slow-moving variables and then impose
the recursive structure between the (slow-moving) factors and the policy variable in the
transition equation accordingly.
Two-step FAVAR: Implementation of the scheme in the two-step FAVAR model, how-
ever, requires further adjustments such as controlling for the part of the space spanned
by the factors, i.e. Cˆ(Ft, Yt), that corresponds to the monetary policy variable, Yt. BBE
suggest the following way in order to achieve this:
First, we estimate slow-moving factors, F st , as the first K PC of the slow-moving
variables in Xt. Second, estimating the following regression,
Cˆt = βF sFˆ
s
t + βY Yt + et (1.2.21)
we construct Fˆt from Cˆt − βˆY Yt. Notice that as Fˆ st and Yt are correlated, so are Fˆt and
Yt. Finally, we estimate the FAVAR in Fˆt and Yt, and, as explained above, identify the
monetary policy shocks recursively using this ordering.
Monetary Policy Shocks in the Euro Area
Monetary policy shocks are considered as “unanticipated/surprise” changes in the mon-
etary policy. In other words, we may say that they “arise as errors of assessment of the
economic situation”37 by the central banks.
On the one hand, identification and investigation of the impact of the shocks take a
considerable part in the literature. It is important to note, on the other hand, that this
37Uhlig (2005, p.398)
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is not because, as Boivin et al. (2008, p.2) point out, “we believe that monetary policy
shocks constitute an important source of business cycle fluctuations that we are interested
in documenting the effects of such shocks.” On the contrary, there is a consensus in the
literature that contribution of the monetary policy shocks to business cycle fluctuations is
relatively small38, and monetary policy mainly affects the economy through its systematic
reaction to changes in economic conditions. The main reason is that, as Boivin et al.
(2008) highlighted:
The impulse response functions to monetary policy shocks provide a useful
description of the effects of a systematic monetary policy rule, by tracing out
the responses of various macroeconomic variables following a surprise interest-
change, and assuming that policy is conducted subsequently according to that
particular policy rule. (p.2)
Although the investigation of unanticipated monetary policy shocks is predominant
in the literature, the distinction between unanticipated and anticipated shocks is also
important.39 In line with Cochrane (1998); Hoover and Jorda´ (2001); Romer and Romer
(2004); Matsumoto and Rebucci (2008), Milani and Treadwell (2012) incorporate news
about future monetary policy actions of the Federal Reserve in order to disentangle the an-
ticipated and unanticipated components of policy shocks. Milani and Treadwell conclude
that “credible policy announcements by policymakers are likely to yield larger effects
than attempts to surprise the markets through unexpected monetary policy decisions”
(p.1682).
We do not deal here with the issue of anticipated policy shocks. Instead, as we
highlighted earlier, one of the main contributions of the chapter is the application of the
Bayesian FAVAR method to the EA to study unanticipated monetary policy shocks.
38See Uhlig (2005) and Sims and Zha (2006).
39See Milani and Treadwell (2012, p.1670).
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In particular, we use the BBE scheme described above and identify the impacts of
contractionary unanticipated monetary policy shocks in the EA. The shock is standardised
to correspond to a 25-basis-point increase in the ECB official refinancing operation rate
(REFI). Unless otherwise stated, all the results presented below are the impulse response
functions of the variables to a one-off policy shock in the economy.
1.2.4 Pre-screening Analysis
We highlighted in the Introduction of the chapter that there is a gap in the literature to
implement the Boivin and Ng (2006) pre-screening technique in a structural context. We
believe that the technique is of importance for our thesis in the sense that it not only fills
the aforementioned gap in the literature but also it provides the chapter with robustness
checks for the main empirical findings. This subsection describes details of the technique
relevant to our structural FAVAR analysis.40
Boivin and Ng (2006, p.171) argue that “using more data to estimate the factors might
not be desirable.” There are two assumptions in the asymptotic theory, which the method
of PC depends on, that (i) the cross-correlation in the errors is not too large, and (ii)
the variability of the common component is not too small. As suggested by the variables
investigated above and summarised in the literature, we typically draw our data from
a small number of broad categories such as industrial production (IP), prices, interest
rates and monetary aggregates. Think of a data set consisting of some series chosen from
each category according to rank of importance of their common components. Then let
us expand the data set by adding the lower ranked, or ‘noisy’ series. As Boivin and Ng
clearly highlight, two things will happen:
40See the original paper for further details beyond the scope of our thesis.
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The average size of the common component will fall as more series are added,
and the possibility of correlated errors will increase as more series from the
same category are included. When enough of the ‘noisy’ series are added,
the average common component will be smaller, and/or the residual cross-
correlation will eventually be larger than that warranted by theory, creating
a situation where more data might not be desirable. (p.171)
Therefore, the authors propose the following procedure for pre-screening the data for
these ‘noisy’ series: First, we fit a standard factor model to our complete data set in order
to obtain τˆij, i.e. the correlation coefficient between the residuals for series i and j. For
each series i, we then identify
τˆ ∗1 (i) = max
j
|τˆij| = τˆij1i .
where j1i is the series whose idiosyncratic error is most correlated with series i, and the
correlation between series i and j1i is τˆ
∗
1 (i).
We construct a set of series, j∗ = j1i , j
2
i , . . ., whose error is most correlated with some
other series, and following the Rule 1 in Boivin and Ng (2006, p.185), we drop all the
series in j∗. This way, finally, we obtain a parsimonious version of our data set used to
identify the impact of BN in a structural context.41
1.3 Preliminary Analyses
Having explained the methodological details, this section of the chapter lists the prelim-
inary analyses conducted prior to estimating the empirical results, which we present in
Section 1.4. We first explain the data, then report how the number of factors and lags
in the FAVAR are determined. Following these, we discuss the reasons and techniques
41Note that Boivin and Ng also suggest Rule 2 where the second most correlated series are dropped,
leading to even smaller data sets.
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for interpolation of some of the quarterly series. Finally, the details of Boivin and Ng
pre-screening technique and the results it suggests for our data conclude the section.
1.3.1 Data
The data set analysed in the chapter is a balanced panel of 120 monthly macroeconomic
time series for the EA as an aggregate, and spans the period from 1999:1 through 2011:12.
Following the FAVAR literature, the series are chosen from the following categories:
real output and income, industrial new orders and turnover, retail sales and turnover,
building permits, employment, consumption, price indices, exchange rates, short- and
long-term interest rates, share price indices, money and credit quantity aggregates, bal-
ance of payments and external trade, confidence indicators, and some foreign variables
such as output, prices, interest rates, and stock markets for the US, UK and Japan used
as proxies for external real, nominal and monetary influences. For detailed description of
the series and data sources see Appendix A. We process the data as follows:
Firstly, we correct the series for missing observations and outliers using the Demetra+
package developed by the Eurostat.42,43 Using the same package, secondly, we seasonally
adjust the data by the method of TramoSeats with the proper type of additive or log-
additive models being automatically chosen by the software.
Although the majority of the series in our data set are in monthly frequency, some
series are not available in this frequency for the EA, i.e. capacity utilisation, consumption
expenditures, employment and unit labour cost indicators. In order to maximise the
42See Depoutot et al. (1998) for details of the software.
43When either the first or the last observation of a series is missing Demetra+ does not provide any
estimations. For this kind of occasional observations, using a MATLAB code obtained from Ban´bura and
Modugno (2010), we replaced the missing values by the median of the series and then applied a centred
MA(3) to the replaced observations. We thank the authors for kindly sharing the replication files of their
paper.
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information used in our FAVAR analysis, we, thirdly, apply the most commonly used
interpolation technique, i.e. Chow and Lin (1971), to the quarterly observations of these
series in order to obtain their monthly estimates.44,45
Finally, as explained in Appendix A, we transform the data in order to induce station-
arity. Those series of which first difference of natural logarithms is taken are multiplied
by 100 in order to have the same scale between the transformed and other series which are
already in percentages. We observed that this scaling is important to have readable im-
pulse responses when the model is estimated with the Bayesian joint estimation technique
whilst it does not make any difference with the two-step approach.46
1.3.2 Number of Factors
Determining the number of factors for large dimensional factor models takes a considerable
place in the literature.47 It is possible to highlight studies by Lewbel (1991) and Donald
(1997) who tested the number of factors using the rank of a matrix; Cragg and Donald
(1997) where the use of information criteria is considered for the models with factors being
functions of a set of observable explanatory variables; Connor and Korajczyk (1993) who
developed a test for determining the number of factors for large dimensional panels of
asset returns; Forni and Reichlin (1998) suggesting a graphical approach to the problem;
Stock and Watson (1998) who showed that we can use a modification to the Bayesian
information criterion (BIC) to determine the number of factors optimal for forecasting a
44For comparison of the empirical results with and without these interpolated series see Section 1.3.4,
and for details of the Chow and Lin (1971) technique see Appendix C.
45Alternatively, mixed data sampling (MIDAS) models, mixed-frequency VARs, and approaches em-
ploying EM algorithms are available in the literature to deal with mixed frequencies. Among others, see
Stock and Watson (2002b); Ghysels et al. (2004); Kuzin et al. (2011).
46We thank Fabio Canova for suggesting this scaling during the presentation of the paper at 2011
Royal Economic Society Easter School held at the University of Birmingham.
47See Appendix D for details of the factor models and the determination of their number of factors.
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single series; and Forni et al. (2000) where a multivariate variant of the Akaike information
criterion (AIC) is suggested. Following these studies, the seminal paper by Bai and Ng
(2002) transformed the task of determining the number of (static) factors into a problem
of model selection. Bai and Ng (2007) also adapted their work to the restricted dynamic
framework. We can finally highlight a more recent work by Kapetanios (2010) which
proposes an alternative method to information criteria based on random matrix theory.
When it comes to FAVAR models in practice, however, a different picture emerges. As
claimed by BBE, the most commonly used criterion by Bai and Ng (2002) “does not nec-
essarily address the question of how many factors should be included in the VAR” (p.407).
Given their main results with 3 (static) factors, therefore, BBE explore the sensitivity of
the results to the use of 5 factors and observe that “the qualitative conclusions on the
effect of monetary policy are not altered by the use of five (static) factors” (pp.408-9).
It is worth highlighting here that the discussion above and our tests as follow focus
on static factors only. Following Sargent and Sims (1977); Forni et al. (2000); Forni and
Lippi (2001), dynamic factors have also taken an important place in the literature on the
so called generalised dynamic factor models, also known as dynamic PCs. BBE, on the
other hand, note Stock and Watson (1998) and claim that we can interpret the (static)
factors, i.e. Ft in the measurement equation (1.2.1), as including arbitrary lags of the
fundamental factors. Therefore, although our focus is on static factors, we can consider
the model as (indirectly) allowing for dynamic factors. In particular, we think, in the one-
step method where the dynamic structure of the state-space model is taken into account
explicitly.
We follow the following procedure in order to determine the number of (static) factors
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to be used in our empirical analysis. First, we test the number of static factors in our
data using (i) all the panel and information criteria proposed by Bai and Ng (2002),
and (ii) BIC.48 According to our tests with the criteria, whereas all Bai and Ng (2002)
criteria suggest 9-10 factors when we allow maximum of 10 factors in the estimations,
BIC estimates a more parsimonious specification, i.e. 4 factors.
Second, we calculate the R2 statistics which measures the proportion of the total
variation in the variables explained by that in the common components of the model.
In other words, R2 stands for the explanatory power of Λˆf Fˆt + Λˆ
yYt in the observation
equation (1.2.1) of the FAVAR system. We compute the R2 statistics for two sets of
variables: (i) all 120 variables in the data set, (ii) 20 main variables which our empirical
findings will be based on. Figures 1.3.1 and 1.3.2 present, respectively, the statistics for
the sets i and ii. We find that marginal gain of having 9 factors (Bai and Ng (2002), IC2)
instead of 4 (BIC) is less then 20% for both sets of variables.
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Figure 1.3.1: Number of Factors: R2 Statistics - All Variables
48We thank Schumacher and Breitung (2008) for making the replication files of their paper publicly
available, and also thank Christian Schumacher for sharing the files and his comments with us. Our tests
are based on the replication files of the paper.
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Figure 1.3.2: Number of Factors: R2 Statistics - Main Variables
Given that (a) BIC criterion estimates 4 factors in our data set; and (b) 4 factors
account for more than 50% of the variations of the main variables and almost 45% of that
of the whole data set, we prefer to use 4 factors in our empirical analyses. Our choice is
supported by the literature which suggests “that four to six static factors explain between
37% and 55% of the total variance in euro area macroeconomic [data sets].”49 We also
test the robustness of our empirical results to the factor specification in Section 1.5.1.
1.3.3 Lag Length
Similar to the issue of the choice of the number of factors, the lag length of the transition
equation (1.2.2) is another specification which needs to be determined. The importance of
the specification is demonstrated by Braun and Mittnik (1993) who show that estimates
of and impulse response functions and variance decompositions obtained from a VAR
are inconsistent when lag length used in the model is different from the true lag length.
49Eickmeier (2009, p.939). See also Marcellino et al. (2000); Altissimo et al. (2001); Eickmeier and
Breitung (2006); Altissimo et al. (2011).
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Lu¨tkepohl (2005) also indicates that whereas over-fitting a VAR causes an increase in the
mean-square-forecast errors, under-fitting the lag length often generates autocorrelated
errors.
The lag lengths are frequently selected in the VAR literature using a statistical criterion
such as AIC, BIC, final prediction error (FPE) and Hannan-Quinn (HQ). In the FAVAR
literature, however, no specific criterion is used, to our knowledge. To illustrate, on the
one hand, BBE and Belviso and Milani (2006) use 13 lags in order to “allow sufficient
dynamics”50 in their models analysing similar monthly data sets. Stock and Watson
(2005), on the other hand, fit a 2-lag FAVAR model to an updated version of also monthly
Stock and Watson (2002b) data set.
In order to select lag length of our model, we replicate a FAVAR by extracting four
“slow-moving” static factors from our data set and having the ECB’s benchmark interest
rate as the only observable factor in the model. Then, using JMulti v-4.2451 we test the
lag length in this FAVAR with all the selection criteria listed above. We find that only a
few lags, i.e. 1 or 2, are enough to account for the variations in our data set.
Given the results above, and the fact that we have only 13 years of data and a number
of parameters being estimated in the models, we prefer to be as parsimonious as possible
and use 2 lags in our empirical analyses. The sensitivity of our empirical findings to the
lag length of the system is tested in Section 1.5.1.
50Belviso and Milani (2006, p.8).
51For software details see Lu¨tkepohl and Kra¨tzig (2004).
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1.3.4 Interpolation
We reported in Section 1.3.1 that the Chow and Lin (1971) interpolation technique is
employed in our study in order to obtain monthly observations of some series available only
in quarterly and annual frequencies. These interpolated indicators are from important
areas of the economy such as real activity,52 labour market,53 earnings54 and balance
of payments.55 Appendix E presents preliminary impulse response functions of selective
variables with and without the interpolated series.
We find that inclusion of extra information into the data set not only keeps the ma-
jority of the responses unchanged but also eliminates some puzzles such as increase in
IP, construction, exports, imports, and monetary aggregates following a contractionary
monetary policy shock. Considering the interpolated variables and the importance of the
information they have brought into the model, our results support the idea of “condi-
tion(ing) VAR analyses of monetary policy on richer information sets.”5657
As we reported in Section 1.2.4, following Boivin and Ng (2006), we might need to be
cautious about whether or not the extra information brought into the factor models are
“noisy”. However, because the interpolated variables in our analysis bring information
from the areas of the economy which would otherwise be missing in the model, e.g. labour
market and investment, we believe that our interpolation exercise as a whole is important
and necessary. This is also supported by the results of our Boivin and Ng analysis which
52Capacity utilisation rate, gross domestic product, final consumption expenditure, gross fixed capital
formation.
53Total employment, total employees, total self-employed, real labour productivity per person em-
ployed, real unit labour cost.
54Earnings per employee, wages and salaries.
55Current, capital and financial accounts.
56Bernanke et al. (2005, p.389).
57A similar approach has been used by Soares (2011) for the EA in order to have a panel of monthly
macroeconomic time series consisting of the variables we have interpolated for our own data set.
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eliminates only a few of these interpolated variables.58
1.4 Results
In three parts, this section presents the empirical findings of the chapter. First, we
estimate a FAVAR model by one- (Bayesian) and two-step (PC) methods, and compare
the monetary transmission mechanisms estimated by these methods. The comparison is
based on the impulse response functions of 20 macroeconomic variables to a 25-basis-
point contractionary monetary policy shock. Second, we investigate variations in the
transmission of the shock over time using the approach of rolling windows. In this part,
we specifically examine the changes, if there are any, in the impact of the policy shocks
due to the 2007-8 global financial crisis. Finally, we replicate these analyses with a smaller
data set obtained by Boivin and Ng (2006) pre-screening technique applied to the original
120-variable data set.
1.4.1 Baseline Results
Our main results obtained from the estimation of the one- and two-step FAVAR models
are shown, respectively, in Figures 1.4.1 and 1.4.2 below. The impulse responses of a set
of key macroeconomic variables to a monetary policy shock are displayed in the figures
for a horizon of up to four years with 68% confidence intervals (dashed lines) based on
8,000 Gibbs samplings (Figure 1.4.1) and 1,000 bootstraps (Figure 1.4.2). As explained
above, the FAVAR models are estimated with 4 factors and 2 lags. Bayesian estimates
in Figure 1.4.1 employ 10,000 Gibbs sampling iterations, of which the first 2,000 were
58Earnings per employee, total employees, GDP, real labour productivity per person employed. See
Appendix A for further details.
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discarded in order to minimise the impact of initial conditions, i.e. the starting values in
Section 1.2.2.59 All results are reported in standard deviation (SD) units.
First of all, the estimated monetary transmission mechanisms in Figures 1.4.1 and 1.4.2
are largely consistent with conventional wisdom: following a contractionary monetary
policy shock, real activity measures such as IP, consumption, employment etc. all decline,
prices eventually go down, despite some liquidity puzzles in M1, monetary aggregates
decline, and the real effective exchange rate (REER) appreciates.
One clear distinction between the one- and two-step model estimates is that the lat-
ter method suggests impulse responses with much wider confidence intervals, e.g. real
unit labour cost (ULC), consumer price index (CPI), REER, and monetary aggregates.
Another difference is that the impact of the shock is estimated to be more transitory
by the one-step method. To illustrate, whereas, despite being relatively persistent, the
response of IP estimated with one-step method returns towards zero after reaching its
minimum of -0.55 SD in period 25 following the shock, that with the two-step is con-
siderably more persistent. The same difference between the methods is also present in
responses of consumption, employment, real ULC, wages, CPI, and trade variables.
Our FAVAR methods suggest the following common findings. Regarding real activ-
ity, we find that the most affected indicators are real investment, in line with Smets and
Wouters (2003); McCallum and Smets (2007), and total employment. Both methods cap-
ture the medium and long-term statistically significant decline in these variables. Despite
a statistically significant decrease in nominal wages in the economy, decreases in the (real)
output and prices lead the real ULC to increase, statistically significantly in only one-step
59See Section 1.5 for robustness check for the Gibbs iterations.
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Figure 1.4.1: Baseline Results - One-step FAVAR
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Figure 1.4.2: Baseline Results - Two-step FAVAR
Notes: - Consumption: Final Consumption Expenditure; Construction: Construction Production Index; Investment: Gross Fixed Capital Formation;
Euribor: The Euro Interbank Offered Rate; Deposits: Total Deposits of Residents Held at Monetary Financial Institutions (MFI); Credits: Credits to
Total Residents Granted by MFI; Confidence: Consumer Confidence Indicator. - The dashed lines indicate 68% confidence intervals based on 8,000 Gibbs
samplings (one-step) and 1,000 bootstraps (two-step).
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FAVAR model.60
While there are slightly positive responses of prices in the first five (two-step) and ten
(one-step) months following the shock, our results61 suggest that our data set and the
model properly capture the information that Sims (1992) argued could be missing from
the standard VARs. It is also important to note the similarity between the shape and
statistical significance of our, especially, one-step and BBE’s two-step CPI results. That
is to say, our findings support BBE that even with the FAVAR approach, it is possible to
observe the price level initially increasing, statistically insignificantly though, following a
contractionary monetary policy shock, before it decreases statistically significantly. An-
other similarity is that the two-step method tends to estimate the impact of the shock on
prices to be persistent. Our one-step method, however, suggests more transitory responses
of prices, turning towards zero after reaching the minimum in year 3 following the shock.
Comparing our results with those obtained by Boivin et al. (2008), where the impact of
the creation of the EA is studied using a two-step FAVAR approach, the following remarks
may be made. One of the findings of the Boivin et al. paper, for the period from 1999
to 2007, is strong responses of trade and the effective real exchange rate to a 100 basis-
point contractionary monetary policy shock in the EA. Whereas the strong REER results
suggested by our two-step approach are qualitatively quite consistent with Boivin et al.’s,
our one-step approach highlights that this finding might be an approach-dependent one.
That is to say, as our one-step estimation results also suggest an appreciation in the euro62
for 30 months following the shock, the impulse responses are not as strong as suggested
60Here we consider the definitions of nominal and real ULC which are, respectively, the ratio of total
labour cost to real output, and that of nominal ULC to a price index, e.g. GDP deflator according to
OECD glossary.
61i.e. CPI and statistically significantly PPI.
62According to the definition of the real effective exchange rate series, a rise in the index means loss
of competitiveness of the home country (EA).
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by our and Boivin et al.’s two-step approaches. Given the decline in prices reaching its
minimum in period 30, our one-step approach even suggests, statistically insignificantly
though, depreciation in the currency from period 30 onwards. We observe from the two-
step approach that during the same period euro continues to appreciate but at a decreasing
rate. Also consistent with Boivin et al. (2008), we observe that given the appreciation
in euro and decline in real activity and consumption in the economy, trade also responds
negatively to the monetary tightening. Similar to the REER case above, however, our
one-step Bayesian approach estimates a smaller impact than the two-step.
In line with the decline in real activity and investment, both short- and long-term
interest rates are found to respond statistically significantly and positively to the contrac-
tionary monetary policy shock in the economy for 10-20 months following the shock.63
As of period 20, we observe the short-term interest rates turn negative, i.e. decrease
below the pre-shock level.64 We explain below that a qualitatively similar behaviour is
also observed from the responses of the benchmark monetary policy rate in Figure 1.4.3,
estimated by the one- and two-step approaches.65 Considering the interaction between
the interest rates and the benchmark policy rates, we believe that our explanation below
for the negative responses of the later applies to that of the former as well.
There is a common finding in the (FA)VAR literature that after the initial jump for
1-2 years, the monetary policy variables respond negatively to their own shocks.66 Given
the fact that the “impulse responses contain the endogenous reaction of monetary policy
63Surprisingly, the positive response of the 10-year bond yield is estimated by the one-step approach
to last more than 4 years.
64Long-term interest rate too by the two-step approach.
65If we recall, the policy variable is the only observable factor in the transition equation (1.2.2), and
its impulse responses can also be calculated in standard ways.
66To illustrate, see BBE, Uhlig (2005), Belviso and Milani (2006), McCallum and Smets (2007),
Ahmadi and Uhlig (2007), Boivin et al. (2008), Blaes (2009), Bork (2009), among others.
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Figure 1.4.3: Impulse Responses of the Monetary Policy Variable
i.e. ECB Official Refinancing Operation Rate
The dashed lines indicate one-SD confidence intervals.
to its own shocks”, Uhlig (2005) explains the negative responses of the policy variables
by proposing two possible reasons:
First, this may reflect that monetary policy shocks really arise as errors of
assessment of the economic situation by the (central bank). (The bank) may
typically try to keep the steering wheel steady: should they accidentally make
an error and shock the economy, they will try to reverse course soon afterwards.
Second, this may reflect a reversal from a liquidity effect to a Fisherian effect:
with inflation declining, a decline in the nominal rate may nonetheless indicate
a rise in the real rate. (pp.397-8)
Regarding the impact of the shock on monetary aggregates, furthermore, we obtain
the following findings: First of all, consistent with BBE for the US, and Boivin et al.
(2008) and Blaes (2009) for the EA, we observe the responses of narrow (M1) and broad
(M3) money stocks to be statistically insignificant. To our knowledge, there is no clear
explanation on the issue of statistical insignificance in the FAVAR literature. Our point
estimates suggest, on the one hand, that where there is hike in the interest rates due to
the shock (period 0-20), M1 unsurprisingly responds negatively before showing positive
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responses during the decline in the interest rates (period 20 onwards). On the other
hand, broader monetary aggregates display some liquidity puzzles.67 In Blaes (2009),
where similar puzzling M3 responses are observed for the EA as an aggregate, ‘temporary
portfolio shifts’ are proposed as a possible explanation to the findings. Blaes claims that
“higher short-term interest rates at first render the short-term assets contained in M3
more attractive than longer-term investments, leading to a temporary increase in money
stock M3” (p.11).
Furthermore, we find that the contractionary shock leads to decreases in the total de-
posits held at monetary financial institutions (MFI), while total credits granted by them
also decline as a result of the shock. These responses except the deposits, in periods 25
onwards, estimated by the one-step approach, are found to be statistically insignificant.
Similar to Boivin et al. (2008), our estimations suggest that except for the contemporane-
ous response, stock markets fall persistently due to the monetary tightening. Surprisingly,
despite the negative impacts of the shock on real activity, mainly employment, consumer
confidence is found to display statistically significantly positive responses for 8-10 months
following the shock. Whereas, according to one-step estimation, the confidence indica-
tor first declines and then increases again, similar to BBE this variable always declines
according to the results of the estimations by the two-step method.
As a final remark on the impulse responses above, we observe that the impact of a
‘surprise’ change in the monetary policy on the economy is estimated by both methods
to reach its maximum between one and two years.68
67The failure of the negative correlations between nominal interest rates and the money stock expected
to be created by monetary policy disturbances. See Kelly et al. (2011).
68Consistent with ECB (2010).
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Forecast Error Variance Decomposition and R2 Statistics
Apart from impulse response functions, it is a common exercise in the (FA)VAR context
to report forecast error variance decompositions (FEVD). In other words, “the fraction of
the forecasting error of a variable, at a given horizon, that is attributable to a particular
shock.”69,70 Specific to the FAVAR approach, additionally, R2 statistics are another tool
used to analyse the estimation results. The statistics are calculated as the fraction of the
variance of a variable accounted for by the common components of the FAVAR system,
i.e. Λˆf Fˆt + Λˆ
yYt in the observation equation (1.2.1).
We report in Table 1.4.1 below the variance decomposition and R2 results for the same
twenty macroeconomic indicators analysed in the previous figures. Following BBE, and
the FAVAR literature in general, the results are based only on the two-step estimation
method.
First of all, although it is expected for the monetary policy shock to explain “a rel-
atively small fraction of the forecast error of real activity measures or inflation”71, our
results show that the policy shock accounts for very little of even the variations in the
monetary aggregates, 1.05% of M1 and 0.74% of M3.72 As we can see from the table, apart
from the interest rates, the contribution of the policy shock varies from 0.07%, construc-
tion, to 1.76%, investment. According to our estimations, respectively, 17.5% and 13.07%
of the variations in 3-month Euribor and 10-year government bond yield are accounted
for by that in the policy shock at the horizon of 5 years. Although the FEVD results here
and in the literature suggest that the shock has little effect on the economy in the horizon
69Bernanke et al. (2005, p.413).
70For technical details see Appendix F.
71Bernanke et al. (2005, p.413)
72In BBE, these rates are 0.5% for the US monetary base and M2 aggregates.
47
Table 1.4.1: Variance Decomposition and R2 Statistics (%)
Variables FEVD R2
IP 0.31 71.0
Consumption 1.19 23.0
Construction 0.07 10 .2
Investment 1.76 56.4
Employment 1.21 73.7
Real ULC 0.05 42 .1
Wages 0.73 44.6
CPI 0.35 51.6
PPI 0.95 70.3
REER 0.57 15.0
Exports 0.24 41.8
Imports 0.57 46.5
3M Euribor 17.50 98.7
10Y Yield 13.07 45.8
M1 1.05 35.4
M3 0.74 57.1
Deposits 0.91 48.4
Credits 0.72 51.6
Stock Market 0.61 66.8
Confidence 1.43 76.6
At the horizon of 5 years.
of 5 years, as we discussed in Section 1.2.373, we still believe in the practical aspects of
the identification of monetary policy shocks in terms of providing a useful description of
the effects of a systematic monetary policy rule on various macroeconomic variables.
Looking at the R2 decompositions, we note the following. A sizeable fraction of the
variables is explained by the factors in the model. To illustrate from real activity mea-
sures: IP (71%), gross fixed capital formation (56.4%), employment (73.7%). Moreover,
the variation in the factors explain 51.6% of the consumer and 70.3% of the producer
prices. Regarding the monetary aggregates, on average almost 50% of the variations
of the indicators are accounted for by the factors: M1 (35.4%), M3 (57.1%), deposits
(48.4%), and credits (51.6%). Interestingly, whereas almost entire variations in the short-
73Part: Monetary Policy Shocks in the Euro Area.
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term interest rates are explained by the common components (98.7%), only less than 50%
of the long-term interest rates (45.8%) can be explained in the model. Bernanke et al.
(2005, p.414), present low levels of their R2 estimations for the monetary base (10.3%)
and M2 (5.2%), and highlight the necessity of being less confident in the impulse response
estimates for those variables. In light of this conclusion of BBE, finally, we consider our
impulse responses as relatively reliable point estimates.
1.4.2 Time Variation
Here in the second part of our empirical results, we investigate the impact of the global
financial crisis of 2007-8 on the monetary policy transmission mechanism in the EA. As
mentioned before, a simple technique of rolling windows is employed in this analysis. This
approach will “allow us to use relatively standard techniques to study the nature of the
time variations ... while keeping computational costs manageable.”74
Given the fact that our study employs the highly computational intensive Bayesian
FAVAR approach, relative to some alternatives such as time-varying parameter (TVP)
FAVAR models, the method of rolling windows is an effective option for the purpose of
investigation of time variations in our data set. Additionally, and more importantly, given
the short history of the EA and the number of parameters to be estimated in a standard
TVP-FAVAR model, we were not able to work with too many detailed restrictions on the
model, e.g. the form of covariance matrix.75,76 We believe that this is the main reason why
74Canova et al. (2012, p.48)
75We thank Gary Koop for valuable discussions and comments during the presentation of the paper
in 2011 at the 6th annual Bayesian econometrics workshop organised by the Rimini Centre for Economic
Analysis in Italy.
76Additionally, despite many and quite long trials with the replication files of Koop and Korobilis
(2009) to fit both one- and two-step TVP-FAVAR models to our relatively short data set, we could not
obtain any reasonable results. We anyway thank the authors for making the files available to the public.
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TVP-FAVAR models are yet to be applied to the EA whilst there are already a number of
studies employing the technique to investigate the issue of time variation in the monetary
transmission mechanisms in the US and the UK.77
Basically, the rolling windows approach estimates the same model over samples of fixed
length in order to assess its stability over time. As explained by Zivot and Wang (2006,
Chapter 9), if the parameters of the model are truly constant over the entire sample, then
one should expect the estimates over the rolling windows not to be too different. “If the
parameters change at some point during the sample, then the rolling estimates should
capture this instability” (p.313).
We estimate our FAVAR model78 by the one-step and two-step estimation methods
over fixed length samples rolled by twelve, six and three months.79 The estimation results
are then compared by plotting together the impulse response functions of the main twenty
macroeconomic indicators calculated in each sample.
Initial Rolling Window
There is no doubt that the growing turmoil in the global financial markets in late 2007
turned into a global financial crisis following the collapse of Lehman Brothers in September
2008. As such, we should separate our rolling windows as pre- and post-Sep08 referring
to before and after the crisis periods. Instead of setting Sep08 as the end of the initial
window, which will provide us with only one impulse response function for the pre-crisis
period, we determine the initial window according to the peaks of the financial markets
and real activity in the EA before the crisis period. In other words, as we can see from
77See Korobilis (2012), Barnett et al. (2012), and references therein.
78Still with 4 factors and 2 lags.
79Only six-month rolling is estimated by the one-step method. For details see below.
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Figure 1.4.4, the European financial markets peak in June 2007 prior to the turmoil and
beginning of the crisis.
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Figure 1.4.4: Initial Rolling Window: Financial Markets
Euro Stoxx 50 (Points, SA)
Therefore, we set the initial window as March 1999 - June 2007, inclusive.80 This
approach provides us with multiple impulse response functions for the pre- and post-
crisis periods depending on the frequency of rolling augmentations, i.e. twelve, six, three
months. As we explain in Section 1.5.4, we test the robustness of our estimations to an
alternative initial window specification.
Crisis in the Euro Area Economies
Before the findings of the chapter, it is important to note the following. There is no doubt
that the EA economies are still struggling with the aftermaths of the global financial and
the European sovereign debt crises even when this thesis is being written in 2012-3.
Therefore, when we discuss our empirical results in the following parts of the section,
we refer all the years following September 2008 until the end of our whole sample, i.e.
December 2011, as the crisis period for the EA.
80First three observations are lost due to data transformations explained above in Section 1.3.1.
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Two-step Rolling Estimations
Due to its computational simplicity, we start the analysis with the two-step estimation
method. We do so in order to be able to investigate the question of time variation in
as detailed a way as possible, i.e. alternative rolling augmentations. Following the set
of results with the two-step method, we then replicate on p.59 below the limited version
of the exercise with the one-step estimation method. Due to computational intensity
of the one-step method and given the two-step results, we estimate the former method
according to 6-month rollings only. We summarise the details of the results obtained with
the two-step method as follows.
Our rolling estimation results are presented in Figures 1.4.5 - 1.4.7, with windows
reported below the figure. For the sake of comparability across windows, the impulse
responses are plotted without their confidence intervals. Due to having a number of
variables and windows, we present statistical significance of the four main variables such
as IP, CPI, M1 and M3 in Appendix G.1.
Looking at the results, we note the following points which turn out to be robust to the
rolling augmentations. First of all, there is little sign of any variation in some of the real
variables such as consumption, investment and employment. That is to say, the monetary
policy shocks hitting the economy either before or after the crisis periods have almost
identical contractionary impacts on these measures of the real economy.81 Regarding IP,
we observe from the results that there are differences in the speed of the impact of the
monetary policy shock pre- and post-Sep08. Whereas the contemporaneous impact of the
shock is mixed across windows, it is clear from the results that IP declines, unsurprisingly,
81Estimating our FAVAR model window by window means identification of a new 25 basis-point shock
specific to that particular sample.
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Figure 1.4.5: Rolling Windows, Two-step, 12M
much faster when hit by a contractionary monetary policy shock during the crisis period.
For some of the windows spanning the period 1999 - June 2008, we find that it takes
IP 20 or more periods to reach its minimum point. By contrast this is reached within
half this time, i.e. by 10 months, when the economy is hit by a shock during the crisis
period. Similar results are also obtained for construction, wages, trade, stock markets,
and producer prices.82
Furthermore, we do not observe much variation in the impulse responses of the interest
rates. With some signs of time variation, REER also does not show clear-cut time vari-
82Despite not being as clear for construction and trade indicators estimated with 3M and 6M rollings,
respectively.
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Figure 1.4.6: Rolling Windows, Two-step, 6M
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Figure 1.4.7: Rolling Windows, Two-step, 3M
Note: In order to be able to present other windows clearly, sample Sep00-Dec08 is eliminated from the figures due to very strange impact of Sep-Dec 2008,
we believe, on the impulse responses. Some of the results from this window can be observed from Appendix G.1.
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ation pre- and post-crisis periods. Consumer confidence, however, is observed to display
quite opposite responses. Whereas the confidence indicator responds first positively then
negatively to the shock in the rolling sample between 1999 and June 2008, its responses
are the other way around for the samples onwards. Another interesting result is obtained
with the measure for real ULC. Consistent with the sudden drops in the output explained
above, the cost of labour seems to increase faster and higher when there is a contrac-
tionary shock in the post-crisis period. Prior to the crisis, we still observe increases in the
cost, but the contractions are more gradual and less steep.
In addition to the results above, our two-step FAVAR rolling analysis suggests two sets
of very interesting findings about the variations in the impact of monetary tightening on
the monetary aggregates and consumer prices. Again similar to the other results above,
these observations are also robust to different rolling frequencies:
Starting with the monetary aggregates, our rolling estimations repeatedly suggest
that the more observations from the post-crisis period, i.e. September 2008 onwards,
are included in the samples, the stronger a liquidity puzzle is observed as a result of
the contractionary policy shock. When there is a shock prior to the crisis, however, the
indicators respond negatively in almost all windows. We investigate in Chapter 3 of
the thesis the response of the Eurosystem83 to the global financial crisis with “extreme”
unconventional monetary measures. Given the unprecedented amount of liquidity injected
to the financial markets of the EA, we believe that our findings of the liquidity puzzles
for the post-crisis period might be related to the unconventional policy actions.
We believe that a cautious approach to the findings on the monetary aggregates is of
83i.e. the monetary authority of the EA which consists of the ECB and national central banks of the
countries in the monetary union.
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importance due to potential issues of endogeneity, state contingency, and contamination
in these variables caused by the portfolio shifts and cross-border movements in the EA,
especially from 2008.84 This also suggests the importance of incorporating more detailed
unconventional monetary measures into data sets investigated with the FAVAR approach.
Regarding this, it is also important to consider the differences in the composition of the
central banks’ balance sheet policies, which we discuss in the Introduction of Chapter 3.
We believe that this practice is of importance for our analysis in order to test whether
the liquidity puzzles would disappear should we were to include more information in our
data set on the central bank and/or financial institutions’ balance sheets and cross-border
movements in the EA.
Secondly, our rolling analysis raises an important point about puzzling CPI responses
in the literature. We summarised in the Introduction of the chapter that solving the issue
of price puzzles has largely been the main focus of the (FA)VAR literature. As our results
in Section 1.4.1 and that of other studies frequently cited throughout the chapter suggest,
despite the issue of statistical significance we highlighted before, the FAVAR approach
does capture important dimensions of the business cycle movements. Given this merit
of the approach, therefore, it estimates negative responses of prices to a contractionary
monetary policy shock in the economy. Our rolling estimations with the same FAVAR
approach, however, propose that it might not be the case that prices must always respond
negatively following a monetary tightening. As we can clearly see from Figures 1.4.5 -
1.4.7, our FAVAR model, estimated with constant specifications among the windows,
suggests that whilst prices respond persistently negatively to the shocks in the post-crisis
84See Chapter 3 for details of the global financial crisis period and unconventional monetary actions
of the Eurosystem.
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period, they strongly puzzle when the shock occurs prior to the crisis. That is to say,
as the dashed-line impulse responses in Figures 1.4.5 - 1.4.7 report, the prices increase
strongly following a contractionary monetary policy shock during the pre-crisis period.
We also find the puzzling responses to be transitory but most of the time lasting for
almost four years following the shock. We consider this finding another type of a price
puzzle for the (FA)VAR literature.
Interpolation of the Crisis Period (2008Q4)
Before moving to the one-step rolling estimation results, we further analyse the impact
of the crisis on the overall time variation results summarised above. We observed from
the rolling estimations that there are considerable changes in the impact of the shocks
on mainly prices and monetary aggregates prior to and after September 2008. We also
highlighted on p.54 that window Sep00-Dec08 is eliminated from Figures 1.4.6 - 1.4.7
due to very strange impact of the period September - December 2008 on the impulse
responses. According to these findings, we believe that the fourth quarter of 2008 is the
period when the economy is most severely hit by the crisis. Therefore, we want to test
possible changes in the results had all the series in our data set continued in their normal
trends during this period.
Using the replication files of the study by Ban´bura and Modugno (2010) cited previ-
ously, we replace all of the 360 observations, i.e. 3*120, of the data spanning the fourth
quarter of 2008 with their estimates calculated according to their “relatively normal”
trending.85 Then we replicate the rolling analysis in Figure 1.4.6.86 The results of the
85We still prefer to be cautious about the estimates being normal trend of the series due to the fact
that both financial markets and the real economy are to some extent hit by the crisis until the fourth
quarter of 2008.
86We limit the exercise to 6M-rollings for the sake of simplicity.
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short exercise are displayed in Figure 1.4.8.
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Figure 1.4.8: Interpolation of the Crisis Period
First, given the financial nature of the crisis, unsurprisingly the estimations for the
impulse responses of monetary aggregates and stock markets change significantly. To
illustrate, we observe, on the one hand, that almost all the strong increases in M1, M3,
deposits, and credits in Figure 1.4.6 disappear in rolling estimations with the interpolated
data in Figure 1.4.8. On the other hand, instead of permanent decrease in stock markets
following a contractionary shock (Figure 1.4.6), interpolated data suggest that a shock
hitting the economy in the post-crisis period might strongly increase the markets after 20
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months (Figure 1.4.8). These findings suggest that (strong) liquidity puzzles in the whole
(Figure 1.4.2) or rolling samples (Figure 1.4.6) are quite likely due to occurrence of the
crisis in the sample period investigated. In addition, significant increases in real ULC and
REER during the crisis period seem to disappear, making a clearer distinction between
the results pre- and post-crisis periods. Finally, and more importantly, the results on the
impact of the shock on prices explained in the subsection above are found to be robust to
the inclusion and exclusion of the severe crisis observations in the data. In other words,
the persistent and negative responses of prices in Figure 1.4.6 are not because of the
severe impact of the crisis in the fourth quarter of 2008. Similar to the prices, the time
variation in real activity measures are also found to be robust to the interpolation of the
observations of the fourth quarter of 2008.
One-step Rolling Estimations
Consistent with the Section 1.4.1, we carry out the rolling analysis not only with the
two-step method but also the one-step Bayesian approach.87 However, due to the compu-
tational intensity of the method, and the previous finding that the general findings of the
two-step estimations are robust to rolling augmentations, we apply the Bayesian rolling
analysis to the initial window of 1999 - June 2007 with 6-month rollings only. We present
the estimation results in Figure 1.4.9. Comparison of the methods in the rolling analysis
context highlights the following points.
We firstly observe that the Bayesian approach is not affected by the severe observations
of the crisis period. As we can see from the plot labels below, the estimations results for
87Slightly differently, due to the computational intensity of the approach, and given the robustness
results in Section 1.5, we base the estimation results here on 5,000 iterations, first 2,000 of which are
discarded.
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Figure 1.4.9: Rolling Windows, One-step, 6M
the window Sep00-Dec08 are obtained normally by the one-step method. Additionally,
the Bayesian rolling approach presents smoother impulse responses for the post-crisis
period.88
Besides these general differences between the approaches, one-step rolling analysis
qualitatively supports almost all the findings we explained above. To name a few, we still
observe (i) few or no variations in the impact of the shock on the real variables relative
to the nominal ones, (ii) no serious variations in the impact of the monetary tightening
88The only exception is the stock markets, impulse responses of which are quite identical across the
methods.
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on the interest rates, and (iii) relative to the period before crisis, greater increases in the
real ULC when the economy is hit by the shock during the crisis period. Furthermore,
all the main findings of the two-step analysis are present in the results by the one-step:
i.e. liquidity and price puzzles. In other words, our Bayesian rolling analysis also suggests
that while the impulse responses of the prices puzzle prior to the crisis period, the puzzles
in the monetary aggregates take place only in the post-crisis period in line with our
hypothesis of the liquidity effects of the unconventional monetary measures during the
global financial crisis period.
Regarding the statistical significance of the findings summarised in this section, it
is important to note the following. We discussed in Section 1.4.1 the difference in the
estimation of confidence intervals by the one- and two-step methods. The main reason
why statistical (in)significance of the results has not been mentioned previously in the
section is due to bad performance of the two-step method in terms of estimating reliable
error bands. As we can see in Section G.1, however, our one-step approach performs
relatively very well in terms of estimating statistically significant impulse responses. On
the one hand, Figure G.1.5 shows that the Bayesian technique estimates the sharper
output responses during the crisis period to be statistically significant. On the other
hand, the estimations in Figure G.1.1 clearly show that the more the rolling samples
encompass the crisis period, the more explosive estimations the two-step PC method
suggests for the same findings.
Finally, in light of (i) the (in)sensitivity of the two-step (one-step) method to the
observations from the crisis period, and (ii) the superiority of the one-step method over
the two-step in terms of statistical significance of the estimations, our empirical analysis
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concludes that the one-step FAVAR approach turns out to be the more-credible method-
ology of the chapter. This finding therefore highlights the importance of our study for
the limited FAVAR literature applied to the EA.
1.4.3 Pre-screening Analysis
Having explained the main and time-varying estimation results, we now move to inves-
tigation of a limited version of our data set constructed using the Boivin and Ng (2006)
pre-screening analysis (henceforth BN), described in Section 1.2.4.
According to our BN analysis, we find the idiosyncratic errors of 57 series to be most
correlated with other series in our data set. These variables dropped from the data set
are listed in Appendix A. For example, total IP and IP - intermediate goods errors are
both most correlated with IP - manufacturing, with correlation coefficients of 0.91 and
0.64, respectively. Note that when any of our main twenty macroeconomic variables are
suggested by the analysis to be dropped from the data set, instead of these variables we
eliminated the ones their error is most correlated with our main variables. In case of two
main series being most correlated with each other, we make no eliminations. Table 1.4.2
displays the variables eliminated instead of the main ones.
Similar to the previous subsections, we present the empirical results of our BN analysis
in two parts as the baseline and time variation.
Post-BN Baseline Results
The transmission mechanism of a 25-basis-point contractionary monetary policy shock
estimated with one- and two-step FAVAR methods using the new data set is presented
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Table 1.4.2: Pre-screening Exclusions Instead of the Main Variables
Variables Most Correlated
IP IP-Manufacturing
Consumption -
Construction -
Investment -
Employment Total Employees
Real ULC -
Wages Earnings per Employee
CPI HICP-Goods
PPI PPI-Manufacturing
REER US Dollar-Euro
Exports *
Imports *
3M Euribor 6M Euribor
10Y Yield 5Y Gov. Bond Yield
M1 Overnight Deposits
M3 M2
Deposits 10Y Bond Yield USA
Credits -
Stock Market Stock Market-Industrials
Confidence Economic Sentiment Indicator
- Not suggested, * No elimination.
in Figures 1.4.10 and 1.4.11, with 68% confidence intervals based on, respectively, 8,000
Gibbs samplings and 1,000 bootstraps. Comparing these results to those in Figures 1.4.1
and 1.4.2 suggests the following findings.
First of all, and of significant importance, exclusion of the information carried by
the variables dropped from the data set does not change the estimated impact of the
shock on the real activity measures,89 prices, trade, and stock markets. The results
obtained with the one-step method are even better in terms of statistical significance.
To illustrate, despite being statistically marginally significant in the full data set case,
the eventual negative impact of the shock on prices, i.e. period 20 onwards, is estimated
89Except employment responses estimated by two-step method.
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Figure 1.4.10: Post-BN - Baseline Results - One-step
0 10 20 30 40
−0.8
−0.6
−0.4
−0.2
0
0.2
Ind. Prod.
0 10 20 30 40
−0.5
0
0.5
1
Consumption
0 10 20 30 40
−0.5
0
0.5
1
Construction
0 10 20 30 40
−0.8
−0.6
−0.4
−0.2
0
Investment
0 10 20 30 40
0
2
4
Employment
0 10 20 30 40
0
5
10
Real ULC
0 10 20 30 40
0
2
4
6
Wages
0 10 20 30 40
−0.5
0
0.5
1
1.5
CPI
0 10 20 30 40
−0.8−0.6
−0.4−0.2
00.2
0.4
PPI
0 10 20 30 40
0
5
10
REER
0 10 20 30 40
−0.8−0.6
−0.4−0.2
00.2
Exports
0 10 20 30 40
−0.8
−0.6
−0.4
−0.2
0
0.2
Imports
0 10 20 30 40
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
3M Euribor
0 10 20 30 40
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
10Y Bond Yield
0 10 20 30 40
−0.5
0
0.5
M1
0 10 20 30 40
0
20
40
M3
0 10 20 30 40
0
2
4
6
8
Deposits
0 10 20 30 40
0
2
4
6
8
Credits
0 10 20 30 40
−0.8
−0.6
−0.4
−0.2
0
Stock Market
0 10 20 30 40
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
Confidence
Figure 1.4.11: Post-BN - Baseline Results - Two-step
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to be statistically significant with the new data set. Similar findings are present for
consumption, real ULC, and REER. As in the pre-BN case, on the other hand, statistical
significance of the impulse responses estimated by the two-method is still quite weak, e.g.
CPI, employment, among others.
We observe the only significant change in the results to be with the impulse responses
of deposits and credits. Instead of persistent negative responses as in Figures 1.4.1 and
1.4.2, both methods estimate that these indicators respond positively and statistically
significantly, according to the one-step only, following the monetary tightening.
Regarding the monetary aggregates, our results suggest almost no change in M1 re-
sponses pre- and post-BN (one-step), full horizon increase in M3 first 20 periods of which
are statistically significant (one-step)90, no puzzle in M1 but a stronger one in M3 (two-
step).
Consistent with long-lasting interest rate responses, we observe that two-step estimates
with BN are almost always stronger than those reported in the pre-BN case previously.
For example, output, REER, stock markets, and other monetary aggregates show such
stronger impulse responses to contractionary monetary policy shocks.
Post-BN Time Variation
Following the whole sample BN results above, here we test the impact of the analysis on
time variation findings previously reported in Figures 1.4.6 and 1.4.9. Our BN rolling
estimation results are presented in Figures 1.4.12 - 1.4.13.
Briefly, and very importantly, according to our BN analysis, the very same rolling
estimation results 1.4.6 and 1.4.9 are obtainable with a more parsimonious data set.
90Note M3 in Figure 1.4.1 which responds negatively to the shock between periods 20-48.
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Figure 1.4.13: Post-BN - Rolling Windows, Two-step, 6M
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The main advantage of this finding is, of course, with the computer intensive Bayesian
approach as the pre-screening reduces its estimation time.
1.5 Robustness
This section contains the robustness checks of the chapter. First, following from the
preferred specifications explained in Section 1.3, we test the sensitivity of our estimations
to model specifications in two parts as the number of factors and lag length. Second,
we test the robustness of our Bayesian estimation results by looking at convergence and
Gibbs iterations.
1.5.1 Model Specifications
Number of Factors: We determined the preferred factor specification in Section 1.3.2
according to the information criteria and the explanatory power of the factors. In addition
to these tests, we investigated our FAVAR model with number of factors varying from
1 to 9, and tested how the choice of number of factors in the model affects the impulse
response functions. We present these robustness estimations in Appendix H.1.
We notice from the robustness estimations that with some exceptions the results are
qualitatively robust to the choice of the number of factors. Some variables, however,
display divergence from the general behaviour of the responses when either very few (1-2)
or a large number of (7-9) factors are used in the model. To illustrate real ULC, monetary
aggregates, and stock market are some of these variables. When we vary the number of
factors within the middle range, however, our results turn out to be robust to factor
specification.
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Lag Length: Similar to the factor specification, we estimate our FAVAR model with
the preferred number of factors (4) and different lag lengths of 1, 2, 4, 7, and 13. In
addition to those suggested by the information criteria in Section 1.3.3, we also consider
other lag lengths intentionally in order to test whether having more interaction between
quarters, semi-years, and years provides us with “better” results. Figure H.2.1 displays
the test results.
It is clear from the results that, on the one hand, having 1 lag or increasing the lag
length beyond 4 in the model creates extra volatility and makes the results explosive.
On the other hand, our preferred specification, i.e. FAVAR(2), suggests the smoothest
impulse responses.
1.5.2 Convergence
Convergence of Gibbs sampling is an important issue in Bayesian analyses. As such, here
we test whether the single factor chains of the Gibbs iterations converge in our pre- and
post-BN main and rolling estimations.
In order to test the convergence of the algorithm there are a number of criteria that
could be employed. To illustrate, Gelman and Rubin (1992b), Raftery and Lewis (1992,
1996), and McCulloch and Rossi (1994) are some of the widely used ones in the literature.
Instead of going with formal and relatively more difficult implementation of convergence
diagnostics, we prefer to choose a less formal and easy-to-implement method. Following
Ahmadi (2005), we basically take last 8000 of the total Gibbs sampling draws91 of each
factor, and plot the first half of the median of the draws against the second half. The
91Remember first 2,000 iterations are discarded in order to eliminate the influence of our choice of
starting values.
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idea is that if there is no significant deviation between the first and the second halves of
the draws, we conclude that this single chain of the factor has converged.
Appendix I presents the results of the convergence tests for the main and rolling
estimations results with and without the BN analysis. Overall the results suggest that
our Gibbs algorithms do converge in all one-step estimations. In Figures I.1.2 - I.1.3 and
I.2.2 - I.2.3, convergence test results are presented for only the first and the last rolling
samples. The results not reported are qualitatively very similar to the ones in these
figures, and convergence is also obtained in these estimations.
1.5.3 Gibbs Iterations
In addition to convergence of the Gibbs algorithms, we also test the robustness of our
main estimation results to the number of Gibbs iterations. As we can see from Figure
J.0.1 in Appendix J, using either 10,000 or 20,000 iterations92 essentially give the same
results. Bayesian time variation (pre- and post-BN) and post-BN main estimation results
are also robust to the number of Gibbs iterations.93
1.5.4 Initial Rolling Window
We based our time variation analysis in Section 1.4.2 on the initial window with the
upper bound June 2007, when the European stock markets peaked before the turmoil
in the global financial markets. In order to test the robustness of our findings to this
specification, we replicate our rolling estimations with the initial window 1999 - March
2008. Similar to the main rolling analysis, March 2008 is determined according to the
92First 20% of which are discarded to minimise the effects of starting values.
93The test results are not reported due to being very similar to those in Figure J.0.1.
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date when real activity in the EA peaked before the global crisis.
Our robustness estimations are displayed in Appendix G.2. Figures G.2.1 - G.2.3
clearly suggest that our empirical findings summarised in Section 1.4.2 are robust to the
initial window specification.
1.6 Conclusion
In this chapter, we have provided a broad empirical analysis of the monetary transmis-
sion mechanism in the EA as an aggregate. Whilst the FAVAR models have been the
main methodology, the analyses based on rolling windows and Boivin and Ng (2006) pre-
screening technique have also been used in the chapter in order to examine the issues of
time variation and data size.
Analysing a novel data set of 120 macroeconomic time series, spanning the period
1999-2011, we estimate a transmission mechanism of a contractionary monetary policy
shock in the EA largely consistent with conventional wisdom. In addition to the two-step
principal component method, i.e. the only FAVAR method used for the EA, we have em-
ployed a computationally burdensome Bayesian joint estimation technique. Comparison
of the results estimated by these two distinct methods suggests that despite qualitative
similarities between the results, there are considerable gains from implementation of the
one-step technique such as smoother impulse responses and statistical significance of the
estimates. Our findings highlight the fact that there is room for future research on the
EA implementing not only the PC but also the Bayesian FAVAR technique. For example,
alternative identification schemes, e.g. sign restrictions, may help us to test robustness
of the results to identification of monetary policy shocks in the EA. Investigation of
70
cross-country heterogeneity in the EA with a FAVAR model estimated with the Bayesian
methodology, i.e. the main focus of the following chapter, is another interesting direction.
We highlighted that, according to the rolling estimations, the main time-varying re-
sponses to monetary policy shocks are for consumer prices and monetary aggregates. As
our exercise of interpolation of the fourth quarter of 2008 suggests, whereas the puzzling
responses of monetary aggregates might have something to do with the most severe im-
pact of the global financial crisis in this period, the finding that prices puzzle prior to
but decrease during the crisis period following a contractionary monetary policy shock
seems to be what we have in the data itself. Regarding future research, as more data be-
come available for the EA, we believe that application of time-varying parameter FAVAR
models will be possible and bring good source of comparison to our simple time variation
analysis.
Looking at a new set of impulse responses and rolling windows obtained with a limited
data set determined by the pre-screening technique of Boivin and Ng (2006), we tried to
contribute to the question of whether more data are always better for factor analysis as well
as the estimation of structural FAVAR models. Consistent with the real time forecasting
exercise by Boivin and Ng, we observed in a FAVAR context that when factors in a FAVAR
are extracted from as few as 67 series, they might do no worse, and as our Bayesian
estimations suggest, better than ones extracted from 120 series. Given that almost half
of the data set is eliminated in our case, and significant gains obtained accordingly in
terms of speed of estimation of the Bayesian approach in a structural context, we believe
that not only the PC aspects of the pre-screening technique must be studied, but also the
Bayesian properties and extensions should be investigated. It would also be interesting to
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analyse the impact of the technique in a different structural context such as cross-country
heterogeneity in the EA. This is the topic we turn to next in the second chapter of the
thesis.
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APPENDIX A
DATA DESCRIPTION
Details of our EA data set are as below. The transformation (Tr.) codes are 1 - no
transformation; 2 - first difference; 5 - first difference of logarithm. The variables denoted
as “1” (“0”) in column 4 are assumed to be slow- (fast-) moving. Data details in brackets
apply to the following same category series unless otherwise stated. Following our BN pre-
screening analysis, column τˆ ∗1 presents the correlation coefficients between the residuals
of the series and the ones listed in column j1.
No. Description Tr. S/F Source τˆ ∗1 j1
1 IP Total (2005=100) 5 1 OECD 0.91 8
2 IP-Intermediate Goods 5 1 Eurostat 0.64 8
3 IP-Energy 5 1 Eurostat 0.54 7
4 IP-Capital Goods 5 1 Eurostat 0.70 8
5 IP-Durable Consumer Goods 5 1 Eurostat 0.43 8
6 IP-Non-Durable Consumer Goods 5 1 Eurostat 0.32 5
7 IP-Mining And Quarrying 5 1 Eurostat 0.54 3
8 IP-Manufacturing 5 1 Eurostat 0.91 1
9 IP-New Orders 5 1 Eurostat 0.77 8
10 Construction Production Index 5 1 Eurostat 0.29 2
11 Unemployment Rate (%) 1 1 Eurostat 0.79 12
12 Youth Unemployment Rate 1 1 Eurostat 0.79 11
13 Unemployment Total (1000 persons) 5 1 Eurostat 0.41 39
14 Retail Sale of Food, Bev. & Tobacco a 5 1 Eurostat 0.52 17
15 Retail Sale of Non-Food Products 5 1 Eurostat 0.72 17
16 Retail Sale of Textiles 5 1 Eurostat 0.68 15
17 Retail Trade 5 1 Eurostat 0.72 15
18 Passenger Car Registration (2005=100) 5 1 OECD 0.24 113
19 Exports Totalb 5 1 Eurostat 0.67 20
20 Imports Total 5 1 Eurostat 0.67 19
21 Total Reserves inc. Gold (Mil. Euro) 5 1 ECB 0.56 60
22 HICP All-Items (2005=100) 5 1 Eurostat 0.83 26
23 Overall exc. Energy & Unp. Food 5 1 Eurostat 0.53 27
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No. Description Tr. S/F Source τˆ ∗1 j1
24 HICP-Energy And Unprocessed Food 5 1 Eurostat 0.89 25
25 HICP-Liquid Fuels 5 1 Eurostat 0.89 24
26 HICP-Goods 5 1 Eurostat 0.83 22
27 HICP-Services 5 1 Eurostat 0.53 23
28 HICP-Non-Energy Ind. Goods, Durable 5 1 Eurostat 0.25 85
29 HICP-Non-Energy Ind. G., Non-durable 5 1 Eurostat 0.22 22
30 PPI-Industry 5 1 Eurostat 0.79 35
31 PPI-Intermediate and Capital Goods 5 1 Eurostat 0.37 83
32 PPI-Durable Consumer Goods 5 1 Eurostat 0.40 95
33 PPI-Non-Durable Consumer Goods 5 1 Eurostat 0.35 25
34 PPI-Mining and Quarrying 5 1 Eurostat 0.29 31
35 PPI-Manufacturing 5 1 Eurostat 0.79 30
36 Crude Oil (West Texas Int., $/BBL) 5 0 WSJ 0.53 25
37 CRBc Spot Index (1967=100) 5 0 CRB 0.34 49
38 ECB Commodity Price Ind. (2000=100) 5 0 ECB 0.57 105
39 3M Euribor (%) 1 0 Datastream 0.98 40
40 6M Euribor 1 0 Datastream 0.98 39
41 1Y Euribor 1 0 Datastream 0.96 40
42 5Y Government Bond Yield 1 0 Datastream 0.83 43
43 10Y Government Bond Yield 1 0 OECD 0.83 42
44 Spread 3M-REFI 1 0 Calculated 0.91 45
45 Spread 6M-REFI 1 0 Calculated 0.95 46
46 Spread 1Y-REFI 1 0 Calculated 0.95 45
47 Spread 5Y-REFI 1 0 Calculated 0.82 48
48 Spread 10Y-REFI 1 0 Calculated 0.82 47
49 Euro Stoxx 50 (Points) 5 0 Eurostat 0.58 51
50 Share Price Index-Basic Materials 5 0 Datastream 0.44 56
51 Share Price Index-Industrials 5 0 Datastream 0.71 54
52 Share Price Index-Consumer Goods 5 0 Datastream 0.42 50
53 Share Price Index-Health Care 5 0 Datastream 0.33 56
54 Share Price Index-Consumer Services 5 0 Datastream 0.71 51
55 Share Price Index-Telecommunication 5 0 Datastream 0.51 54
56 Share Price Index-Financials 5 0 Datastream 0.52 51
57 Share Price Index-Technology 5 0 Datastream 0.54 49
58 Share Price Index-Utilities 5 0 Datastream 0.57 49
59 Currency in Circulation (Mil. Euro) 5 0 Eurostat 0.41 85
60 Capital And Reserves 5 0 Eurostat 0.56 21
61 Money Stock: M1 5 0 ECB 0.72 68
62 Money Stock: M2 5 0 ECB 0.82 63
63 Money Stock: M3 5 0 ECB 0.82 62
64 Deposits with Agreed Mat. up to 2Y 5 0 Eurostat 0.54 95
65 External Assets 5 0 Eurostat 0.83 66
66 External Liabilities 5 0 Eurostat 0.83 65
67 Total Deposits of Residents Held at MFI 5 0 Eurostat 0.55 95
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No. Description Tr. S/F Source τˆ ∗1 j1
68 Overnight Deposits 5 0 Eurostat 0.72 61
69 Repurchase Agreements 5 0 Eurostat 0.37 93
70 Credit to Total Residents g.by MFI 5 0 Eurostat 0.49 71
71 Loans to General Gov. Gran. by MFI 5 0 Eurostat 0.54 67
72 Loans to Other Residents Granted MFI 5 0 Eurostat 0.50 120
73 Debt Securities of EA Residents 5 0 Eurostat 0.66 20
74 Central Bank Claims on Banking Ins. 5 0 Eurostat 0.35 66
75 Economic Sentiment Indicator (Index) 5 0 Eurostat 0.83 80
76 Construction Confidence Indicator (%) 1 0 Eurostat 0.94 84
77 Industrial Confidence Indicator 1 0 Eurostat 0.82 82
78 Retail Confidence Indicator 1 0 Eurostat 0.60 93
79 Consumer Confidence Ind. (2005=100) 5 0 OECD 0.70 75
80 Services Confidence Indicator 1 0 Eurostat 0.83 75
81 Employment Expec., Months Ahead 1 0 Eurostat 0.78 77
82 Production Expec. Months Ahead 1 0 Eurostat 0.82 77
83 Selling Price Expec. Months Ahead 1 0 Eurostat 0.78 77
84 Assessment of Order Books 1 0 Eurostat 0.94 76
85 Price Trends Over The Next 12 Months 1 0 Eurostat 0.52 81
86 IP-USA (2005=100) 5 1 OECD 0.26 40
87 IP-UK 5 1 OECD 0.24 69
88 IP-JP 5 1 OECD 0.33 23
89 CPI-USA 5 1 OECD 0.54 25
90 CPI-UK 5 1 OECD 0.38 79
91 CPI-JP 5 1 OECD 0.26 79
92 US Federal Funds Target Rate % 1 0 FED 0.54 80
93 UK Bank Of England Base Rate 1 0 BoE 0.68 76
94 JP Overnight Call Money Rate 1 0 BoJ 0.50 95
95 10Y Bond Yield USA 1 0 OECD 0.78 96
96 10Y Bond Yield UK 1 0 OECD 0.78 95
97 10Y Bond Yield JP 1 0 OECD 0.48 46
98 Share Price Ind.-USA (Dow 30, Points) 5 0 Reuters 0.86 99
99 Share Price Ind.-UK (FTSE 100) 5 0 Reuters 0.86 98
100 Share Price Ind.-JP (Nikkei 225) 5 0 Reuters 0.56 98
101 US Dollar-Euro (Monthly average) 5 0 Eurostat 0.93 105
102 Pound Sterling-Euro 5 0 Eurostat 0.64 105
103 Swiss Franc-Euro 5 0 Eurostat 0.32 99
104 Japanese Yen-Euro 5 0 Eurostat 0.66 105
105 REER (1999=100) 5 0 Eurostat 0.93 101
106 Capacity Utilisation Rate%∗ 1 1 ECB 0.50 77
107 GDP at Market Pricesd∗ 5 1 Eurostat 0.91 113
108 Final Consumption Expenditure∗ 5 1 Eurostat 0.79 107
109 Gross Fixed Capital Formation∗ 5 1 Eurostat 0.70 107
110 Employment Total (1000 persons)∗ 5 1 Eurostat 0.97 111
111 Employees Total∗ 5 1 Eurostat 0.97 110
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No. Description Tr. S/F Source τˆ ∗1 j1
112 Self Employed Total∗ 5 1 Eurostat 0.45 110
113 Real Labour Prod./Person Emplyde∗ 5 1 ECB 0.91 107
114 Real Unit Labour Cost∗ 5 1 Eurostat 0.69 116
115 Earnings/Employee (Current, Euro)∗ 5 1 Oxford Econ. 0.91 116
116 Wages & Salaries (Current, Bil. Euro)∗ 5 1 Oxford Econ. 0.91 115
117 Current Account (Net,Mil.Euro,World)∗ 2 1 OECD 0.39 116
118 Capital Account∗ 2 1 OECD 0.44 51
119 Financial Account∗ 2 1 OECD 0.52 21
120 ECB Official Refi. Operation Rate (%) 1 0 Eurostat 0.90 39
a (2005=100), b (vis-a-vis World, Trade value, Mil. Euro), c Commodity Research Bureau, d (Chained
at Market Prices, Mil. 2000 Euro), e (2000=100). An asterisk (*) denotes the variable is originally
available in quarterly frequency.
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APPENDIX B
BAYESIAN THEORY
In order to provide some basic details related to likelihood-based joint estimation tech-
niques, here we briefly explain the Bayesian theory.
First of all, the theory is fundamentally follows the simple probability rule that
p(A,B) = p(A|B) p(B)
where A and B are considered to be two random variables, p(A,B) is the joint probability1
of the occurring of A and B, p(A|B) is the probability of A occurring on the condition of
B having occurred, and p(B) is the marginal probability of B. By reversing the roles of
A and B, the joint probability can also be expressed as
p(A,B) = p(B|A) p(B)
Rearranging these two expressions brings us to the Bayes’ rule that
p(B|A) = p(A|B) p(B)
p(A)
Considering the Bayes’ rule, assume that we are interested in estimating a parameter
1As highlighted by Koop (2003), “probability density” and “probability function” terminologies
should be used if the random variable is continuous and discrete, respectively.
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matrix θ based on the information we obtain from the data y. As such, Bayes’ rule is
modified as follows:
p(θ|y) = p(y|θ) p(θ)
p(y)
Since our fundamental interest is learning about θ, in other words “because [p(y)] has no
operational significance”2, p(y) can be ignored from the rule above. Hence, it could be
written that
p(θ|y) ∝ p(y|θ) p(θ) (B.0.1)
where p(θ|y), p(y|θ) and p(θ) are respectively referred to as the posterior density, the
likelihood function, and the prior density. According to Koop (2003), this relationship is
often stated as “posterior is proportional to likelihood times prior”.
In order to briefly explain these terms technically the following are worth mentioning.
The prior density, p(θ), contains what we know about the parameters prior to seeing the
data. That is to say it summarises the non-data information available to the researcher
about the parameters. The likelihood function, p(y|θ) is the data generating process
considered as the density of the data conditional on the model parameters. If we imagine,
for example, a linear regression model with the errors normally distributed, p(y|θ) is a
Normal density depending upon the regression coefficients and the error variance. Finally,
the posterior, p(θ|y), is the summary of all we have learned about the parameters after
(posterior to) observing the data. In light of these, the equation (B.0.1) is named by Koop
(2003) as the “updating rule” as “the data allows us to update our prior views about θ”.
The result obtained from the Bayes’ rule is then the posterior which combines both the
data and non-data information.
2Kim and Nelson (1999, p.179)
78
APPENDIX C
CHOW-LIN INTERPOLATION TECHNIQUE
As mentioned in text, because some series commonly used in the FAVAR literature are
available only in quarterly frequency for the eurozone countries, monthly observations are
estimated for these series using Chow and Lin (1971). Here we summarise the details of
the technique.
In this process we apply “interpolation” to the stock variables and “distribution” (or
temporal disaggregation) to the flows aggregates and time averages of stock variables
(indices). The terminologies differ such that the monthly estimates corresponding to the
observed quarters (i.e. months 3, 6, 9, 12) are equal to these observations in interpolation
while the sum of the three monthly estimates for each quarter ought to equal the observed
value for the quarter in the process of distribution.
The main assumption of the Chow and Lin (1971) technique is that the “monthly
observations . . . of the series to be estimated satisfy a multiple regression relationship
with some related series. In our analysis we follow Angelini et al. (2006) and use the
static factors extracted from the monthly data sets as related series. Angelini et al. (2006)
concludes that the this type of factor model disaggregation outperforms more standard
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methods when there is (1) a large number of explanatory variables for the variable to be
interpolated or backdated, (2) a limited idiosyncratic component for the set of variables
to be used for factor extraction, (3) a limited measurement error for both the variable to
be interpolated and the set of factor extraction variables.
Once the related series (factors) are constructed the Chow and Lin (1971) procedure
proceed as follows:1
First, depending on whether the series are being interpolated or distributed an n× 3n
matrix is constructed to convert the 3n monthly observations into n quarterly observa-
tions. For interpolation, with end of period values, the matrix takes the form:
CI =

0 0 . . . 1 0 0 . . . 1 . . . 0 0 . . . 0
0 0 . . . 0 0 0 . . . 1 . . . 0 0 . . . 0
...
...
. . .
...
...
...
. . .
...
. . .
...
...
. . .
...
0 0 . . . 0 0 0 . . . 0 . . . 0 0 . . . 1
 (C.0.1)
and in the case of distribution we have:
CD =
1
3

1 1 . . . 1 0 0 . . . 0 . . . 0 0 . . . 0
0 0 . . . 0 1 1 . . . 1 . . . 0 0 . . . 0
...
...
. . .
...
...
...
. . .
...
. . .
...
...
. . .
...
0 0 . . . 0 0 0 . . . 0 . . . 1 1 . . . 1
 (C.0.2)
Then it is assumed that the vector of n quarterly observations of the series to be
disaggregated will satisfy the regression model
y. = Cy = CXβ + Cu = X.β + u., Eu.u.′ = V.CV C ′ (C.0.3)
1Here we follow Chow and Lin (1971).
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where y is the vector of monthly observations of the series to be estimated, X is the vector
of related series, and dots refer to the series’ being quarterly.
Chow and Lin (1971) explain the problem as to estimate a vector z of m observations
on the dependent variables, where z would be identical with y, and propose that a linear
unbiased estimator zˆ of z satisfies, for some m× n matrix A,
zˆ = Ay. = A(X.β + u.) (C.0.4)
In order to find the best linear unbiased estimator of zˆ, the trace of the covariance
matrix of (zˆ − z) is minimised w.r.t. A, and subject to the m × p matrix equation
AX −Xz = 0. The solution for A and the resulting estimator are, respectively,
A = Xz(X.
′V.−1X.)−1X.′V.−1 + Vz.V.−1[I −X.(X.′V.−1X.)−1X.′V.−1]
zˆ = Ay. = Xzβˆ + (Vz.V.
−1)uˆ. (C.0.5)
where, Xz and Vz denote variables in the regression model for z (equation C.0.4),
2 and
β = (X.′V.−1X.)−1X.′V.−1y (C.0.6)
Finally, regarding the knowledge of the covariance matrix V , Chow and Lin (1971)
suggest (1) the simple case where the monthly regression residuals are assumed to be seri-
ally uncorrelated, each with variance σ2, (2) to assume that the monthly residuals follow
a first order autoregression3, and (3) the assumption that the monthly residuals are seri-
ally uncorrelated, but have variances proportional to a known function of an explanatory
variable or a certain linear combination (possibly the PC) of the explanatory variables.
2It is highlighted by Chow and Lin (1971) that Xz is identical with X in the case of interpolation
and distribution, relative to extrapolation.
3The case implemented in our analysis.
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APPENDIX D
FACTOR ANALYSIS
As highlighted by Bai and Ng (2002), “central to both the theoretical and the empirical
validity of factor models is the correct specification of the number of factors”. Here we
first describe a factor model and its estimation,1 then summarise the procedure proposed
by Bai and Ng (2002) to determine the number of factors in these models.2
Factor Model
Consider the following model:
Xit = λ
′
iFt + eit (D.0.1)
where, for i = 1, . . . , N , and t = 1, . . . , T , Xit is a vector of the observed data for the ith
cross-section unit at a time t, Ft is a vector of common factors, λi consists of the factor
loadings associated with Ft, and eit is the idiosyncratic component of Xit. The product
λ′iFt is called the common component of the data.
One of the superiorities of the Bai-Ng method is the fact that their estimation results
1Further details of these models and their estimation could be obtained from Stock and Watson (1998,
1999, 2002a,b), among others.
2Here we closely follow the original paper.
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hold under weak serial and cross-section dependence in the idiosyncratic components.
Therefore, we could consider the model in equation (D.0.1) to have an approximate factor
structure.
In order to estimate common factors in large panels like equation (D.0.1), Bai and
Ng (2002) use the method of asymptotic PC. They claim that the number of factors
that can be estimated by this non-parametric method is min{N, T}, much larger than
permitted by estimation of state space models. In order to determine which of these
factors are statistically important, Bai and Ng (2002) highlight the necessity to first
establish consistency of all the estimated factors when both N and T are large, and
consider an arbitrary number k, k < min{N, T}, to start with.
Estimates of λk and F k are obtained by solving the following optimisation problem:
V (k) = min
Λ,Fk
1
NT
N∑
i=1
T∑
t=1
(Xit − λk′i F ki )2 (D.0.2)
subject to the normalisation of either Λk
′
Λk/N = Ik or F
k′F k/T = Ik.
Concentrating Λk out and using the latter normalisation leads the optimisation prob-
lem to be identical to maximising tr(F k
′
(XX ′)F k). Bai and Ng list two solutions to the
minimisation problem above as (1) where the estimated factor matrix, F˜ k, is
√
T times
the eigenvectors corresponding to the k largest eigenvalues of the T ×T matrix XX ′, and
given F˜ k, the corresponding matrix of factor loadings is Λ˜k
′
= (F˜ k
′
F˜ k)−1F˜ k
′
X = F˜ k
′
X/T ,
(2) by (F¯ k, Λ¯k), where Λ¯k is constructed as
√
N times the eigenvectors corresponding to
the k largest eigenvalues of the N×N matrix X ′X. The normalisation that Λk′Λk/N = Ik,
employed in the second solution, implies F¯ k = XΛ¯k/N . It is important to note here that
adding the second solution is crucial due to the fact that “the (former) solution . . . is not
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unique, even though the sum of squared residuals V (k) is unique”. Regarding computa-
tional intensity of the solutions, finally, we could say the second set of calculations is less
costly when T > N , while the first is less intensive when T < N .
Estimating the Number of Factors
Having the model and its estimation described, we move to determining the number of
static factors in the model.
Thanks to linearity of the model and the factors being observable, λi can be estimated
by applying OLS to each equation. Therefore, Bai and Ng describe the case as a classical
model selection problem.
If we assume F k to be a matrix of k factors, then we can show the sum of squared
residuals (divided by NT ) from time-series regressions of X i
3 on the k factor for all i as
V (k, F k) = min
Λ
1
NT
N∑
i=1
T∑
t=1
(Xit − λk′i F ki )2 (D.0.3)
Then the purpose is to find penalty functions, g(N, T ), such that criteria of the form
PC(k) = V (k, Fˆ k) + kg(N, T ) (D.0.4)
can consistently estimate the true common factors (r).4
Following Theorem 25 of the paper, Bai and Ng propose another class of criteria defined
by
IC(k) = ln(V (k, Fˆ k)) + kg(N, T ) (D.0.5)
3A T vector of time-series observations for the ith cross-section unit.
4Note that V (k, F˜ k) = V (k, F¯ k) = V (k, Fˆ k) as F span the same vector space.
5See (Bai and Ng, 2002, p.199).
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which also estimate r consistently.
Under the assumption that the factors are estimated by the method of PC, the authors
propose the following formulations of g(N, T ) in PC(k) and IC(k):
PCp1(k) = V (k, Fˆ
k) + kσˆ2
(
N + T
NT
)
ln
(
NT
N + T
)
(D.0.6)
PCp2(k) = V (k, Fˆ
k) + kσˆ2
(
N + T
NT
)
ln C2NT (D.0.7)
PCp3(k) = V (k, Fˆ
k) + kσˆ2
(
ln C2NT
C2NT
)
(D.0.8)
ICp1(k) = ln(V (k, Fˆ
k)) + k
(
N + T
NT
)
ln
(
NT
N + T
)
(D.0.9)
ICp2(k) = ln(V (k, Fˆ
k)) + k
(
N + T
NT
)
ln C2NT (D.0.10)
ICp3(k) = ln(V (k, Fˆ
k)) + k
(
ln C2NT
C2NT
)
(D.0.11)
In addition to being a superior theory in the literature due to allowing weak serial and
cross-section dependence, the technique is also advantageous due to the fact that (1) it
does not rely on sequential limits, (2) it does not impose any restrictions between N and
T , (3) the results hold under heteroskedasticity in both the time and the cross-section
dimensions, and (4) simulations run by the authors show that the criteria have good
finite sample properties. Finally, regarding the information criterion used in our analysis
Bai and Ng claim that the main advantage of it and other panel information criteria
(ICp) is that they do not depend on the choice of kmax through σ
2, where V (k, Fˆ k) =
N−1
∑N
i=1 σˆ
2
i , and σˆ
2
i = eˆ
′
ieˆi/T from equation (D.0.1).
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APPENDIX E
INTERPOLATION
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Figure E.0.1: Interpolation of the Quarterly Series
Note: The impulse responses are obtained with a FAVAR(2) with 4 factors estimated for the full sample
with the two-step method.
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APPENDIX F
FORECAST ERROR VARIANCE
DECOMPOSITION
In addition to the IR function analysis, that of FEVD is another useful tool widely used
in S(FA)VAR literature in order to uncover interrelationships among the variables in the
system. According to Enders (2004, p.278), the variance decomposition of a sequence
{yt} can be summarised as follows:
First, if we assume that the {yt} sequence is affected by, for simplicity, only two shocks
(ey and ex), the n-step-ahead forecast error of the sequence is
yt+n − Etyy+n = ψ11(0)ey,t+n + ψ11(1)ey,t+n−1 + . . .+ ψ11(n− 1)ey,t+1
+ ψ12(0)ex,t+n + ψ12(1)ex,t+n−1 + . . .+ ψ12(n− 1)ex,t+1
(F.0.1)
If we denote the n-step-ahead forecast error variance of sequence as σy(n)
2, (F.0.1) can
be written as
σy(n)
2 = σ2y[ψ11(0)
2 + ψ11(1)
2 + . . .+ ψ11(n− 1)2]
+ σ2x[ψ12(0)
2 + ψ12(1)
2 + . . .+ ψ12(n− 1)2]
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It is important to note that it is possible to decompose the n-step-ahead forecast error
variance into the proportions due to each shock. As such, this decomposition of σy(n)
2
for the shocks in {ey,t} and {ex,t} can be represented as follows:
{ey,t} ⇒
σ2y[ψ11(0)
2 + ψ11(1)
2 + . . .+ ψ11(n− 1)2]
σy(n)2
{ex,t} ⇒ σ
2
x[ψ12(0)
2 + ψ12(1)
2 + . . .+ ψ12(n− 1)2]
σy(n)2
The forecast error variance decomposition tells us the proportion of the move-
ments in a sequence due to its “own” shocks versus shocks to the other variable.
If ex,t shocks explain none of the forecast error variance of {yt} at all forecast
horizons, we can say that the {yt} sequence is exogenous. . . . At the other
extreme, ex,t shocks could explain all of the forecast error variance in the {yt}
sequence at all forecast horizons, so that {yt} would be entirely endogenous.1
1Enders (2004, p.280)
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APPENDIX G
ROLLING WINDOWS ANALYSIS
G.1 Confidence Intervals
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G.1.1 Two-step Estimations
6M Rollings
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Figure G.1.1: Rolling Windows, Two-step: IP
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Figure G.1.2: Rolling Windows, Two-step: CPI
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Figure G.1.3: Rolling Windows, Two-step: M1
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Figure G.1.4: Rolling Windows, Two-step: M3
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G.1.2 One-step Estimations
6M Rollings
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Figure G.1.5: Rolling Windows, One-step: IP
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Figure G.1.6: Rolling Windows, One-step: CPI
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Figure G.1.7: Rolling Windows, One-step: M1
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Figure G.1.8: Rolling Windows, One-step: M3
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G.1.3 Post-BN - Two-step Estimations
6M Rollings
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Figure G.1.9: Post-BN Rollings, Two-step: IP
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Figure G.1.10: Post-BN Rollings, Two-step: CPI
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Figure G.1.11: Post-BN Rollings, Two-step: M1
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Figure G.1.12: Post-BN Rollings, Two-step: M3
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G.1.4 Post-BN - One-step Estimations
6M Rollings
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Figure G.1.13: Post-BN Rollings, One-step: IP
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Figure G.1.14: Post-BN Rollings, One-step: CPI
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Figure G.1.15: Post-BN Rollings, One-step: M1
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Figure G.1.16: Post-BN Rollings, One-step: M3
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G.2 Robustness to the Initial Window
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Figure G.2.1: Rolling Windows, Two-step, Robustness, 12M
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Figure G.2.2: Rolling Windows, Two-step, 1999-Mar2008, 6M
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Figure G.2.3: Rolling Windows, Two-step, 1999-Mar2008, 3M
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APPENDIX H
ALTERNATIVE MODEL SPECIFICATIONS
H.1 Number of Factors
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Figure H.1.1: Alternative Model Specifications: Number of Factors
Note: The impulse responses are obtained with the two-step method estimated with two lags. Two-step
approach is chosen here only because of its computational simplicity.
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H.2 Lag Length
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Figure H.2.1: Alternative Model Specifications: Lag Length
Note: The impulse responses are obtained with the two-step method estimated with four factors.
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APPENDIX I
CONVERGENCE OF GIBBS SAMPLINGS
I.1 Pre-BN Analysis
I.1.1 Baseline Results
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Figure I.1.1: Convergence - Baseline Results
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I.1.2 Time Variation
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Figure I.1.2: Rolling Windows, 6M, Window:1
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Figure I.1.3: Rolling Windows, 6M, Window:10
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I.2 Post-BN Analysis
I.2.1 Baseline Results
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Figure I.2.1: Baseline Results, Post-BN
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I.2.2 Time Variation
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Figure I.2.2: Rolling Windows, Post-BN, 6M, Window:1
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Figure I.2.3: Rolling Windows, Post-BN, 6M, Window:10
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APPENDIX J
GIBBS ITERATIONS
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Figure J.0.1: Gibbs Iterations
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CHAPTER 2
MONETARY POLICY SHOCKS AND
CROSS-COUNTRY HETEROGENEITY IN THE
EURO AREA
2.1 Introduction
In June 1988, the European Council confirmed the objective of the three-stage progressive
realisation of Economic and Monetary Union (EMU).1 Stage one, beginning on 1 July
1990, brought Europe ‘complete freedom for capital transactions’, ‘increased co-operation
between central banks’, ‘free use of the ECU (European Currency Unit, forerunner of the
euro)’, and ‘improvement of economic convergence’.2 The establishment of the European
Monetary Institute (EMI) on 1 January 1994 marked the start of the second stage of EMU.
It was aimed in this stage to ban ‘the granting of central bank credit to the public sector’;
to increase ‘co-ordination of monetary policies’; to strengthen ‘economic convergence’;
and to complete the process of the independence of the national central banks ‘latest by
the date of establishment of the European Systems of Central Banks’ in 1998. On January
1See ECB (2012b).
2With the recent Cypriot banking crisis as of March 2013, however, ‘complete freedom for capital
transactions’ has been violated in the Union.
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1st, 1999, the third and final stage of EMU commenced with the euro officially becoming
the common currency for 11 Member States initially participating in Monetary Union,
and with the conduct of a single monetary policy under the authority of the ECB.
In the period summarised above, Europe experienced the theoretical steps of economic
integration and convergence. In practice, however, as Giovannetti and Marimon (1998)
highlighted very importantly just before the beginning of the third stage:
Despite the implementation of the single market from 1992, despite all the
changes brought about by deregulation, capital liberalisation and technological
innovation in the last two decades, the financial systems of European countries
are still characterised by a high degree of heterogeneity. Furthermore, their
convergence over time has been quite limited and some of the fundamental
differences existing in the 1980s have survived all the changes. (p.5)
That is mainly why there has been extensive empirical work in the literature, since the
creation of the EA, on cross-country asymmetries and time variation in the transmission
mechanism of the single monetary policy. Table 2.1.1 provides a selective overview of this
literature.3
The overall conclusion of the empirical evidence obtained in the literature on cross-
country heterogeneity and time variation in the monetary policy transmission mechanism
is quite mixed. To illustrate, if we consider Barran et al. (1996) and Ramaswamy and
Sloek (1998), i.e. two studies investigating the same countries for very similar periods
using the same estimation technique, while we observe, on the one hand, European Union
(EU) countries being “similar in the sense of responses and lags”4 to a monetary policy
shock, on the other hand, “there appear to be marked differences in the real effects of
monetary policy among (the same) EU countries.”5 In particular, Ramaswamy and Sloek
3The table is based on the overview by Georgiadis (2012, p.47) in addition to our own literature
review.
4Barran et al. (1996, p.21).
5Ramaswamy and Sloek (1998, p.383).
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Table 2.1.1: The Literature on Cross-Country Heterogeneity and Time Variation in Monetary Transmission
Study Approach Country/Sample
Gerlach and Smets (1995) Country-specific VAR models with long- DE, CA, FR, IT, JP, UK, US
and short-term identification restrictions 1979Q1-1993Q4
Barran et al. (1996) Identical, country-specific VAR models with AT, DE, DK, ES, FI, IT, NL, UK
recursive identification 1976Q1-1994Q4
Dornbusch et al. (1998) Country-specific monetary policy reaction DE, ES, FR, IT, SE, UK
functions and dynamic output equations 1985M5-1996M7
Giovannetti and Marimon (1998) Dynamic equilibrium and VAR models DE, FR, IT, UK - 1973Q1-1997Q4
Kieler and Saarenheimo (1998) Identical, country-specific VAR models DE, FR, UK - 1970Q1-1997Q3
Ramaswamy and Sloek (1998) Country-specific VAR models with AT, DE, BE, DK, ES, FI, FR, IT,
recursive identification NL, PT, SE, UK - 1972Q1-1995Q4
Kim (1999) Identical, country-specific structural VAR DE, CA, FR, IT, JP, UK, US
models 1961M3-1997M5
Ehrmann (2000) Country-specific and varying VAR models AT, DE, BE, DK, ES, FI, FR, IE, IT,
NL, PT, SE, UK - 1984Q1-1997Q4
Clements et al. (2001) Country-specific VAR models with AT, DE, BE, FI, FR, ES, IE, IT,
recursive identification NL, PT - 1983Q1-1998Q4
Mihov (2001) Country-specific VAR models with AU, AT, DE, CA, FR, IT,
recursive identification JP, NL, UK, US - 1979Q3-1998Q4
Mojon and Peersman (2001) Country-specific, structural VAR models AT, DE, BE, FI, FR, GR, ES, IE,
IT, NL - 1970Q1-1998Q4
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Study Approach Country/Sample
Hughes Hallett and Piscitelli (2002) IMF MULTIMOD MARK III model DE, FR, UK, IT + (CA, JP, US)
(MULTI-region econometric MODel) Simulation for the period 1999-2020
Sala (2002) Dynamic factor model AU, DE, BE, ES, FR, IT, NL, PT
1985M1-1998M12
Dedola and Lippi (2005) Country-specific VAR models with DE, FR, IT, UK, US
recursive identification 1975M1-1997M3
Ciccarelli and Rebucci (2006) Approach similar to Dornbusch et al. (1998) DE, ES, FR, IT
with time-varying coefficients 1980M1-1998M12
Hofmann (2006) Equations of lending rates in error DE, FR, IT, ES
correction form 1984M1-1998M12
McCallum and Smets (2007) Two-step FAVAR model with BE, DE, ES, FI, FR, IT, NL
BBE identification scheme PT, GR, IE, US - 1986Q1-2005Q4
Boivin et al. (2008) Two-step FAVAR model with DE, BE, ES, FR, IT, NL, EA
Boivin et al. (2009) identification scheme as an aggregate - 1980Q1-2007Q3
Setzer et al. (2010) Money demand equation specified in AT, DE, BE, EA, ES, FI, FR, IE,
a panel model IT, NL, PT - 1999Q1-2008Q4
Cecioni and Neri (2011) Bayesian structural VAR and dynamic EA
stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) models 1989Q1-2009Q2 / 1994M1-2009M9
Weber et al. (2011) VAR model with recursive identification EA - 1980Q1-2006Q4
Darvas (2012) Time-varying coefficient VAR model CZ, HU, PL - 1993Q1-2011Q4
Abbreviations: AT-Austria, AU-Australia, BE-Belgium, CA-Canada, CZ-Czech Republic, DE-Germany, DK-Denmark, GR-Greece, ES-Spain, FI-Finland
FR-France, HU-Hungary, IE-Ireland, IT-Italy, JP-Japan, NL-Netherlands, PL - Poland, PT-Portugal, SE-Sweden, UK-United Kingdom, US-United States.
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(1998) state, according to their three-variable VAR6 estimations, that EU countries fall
into two broad groups. Whereas the response of output to monetary policy shocks in one
group7 is stronger, more persistent and “typically bottoms out (relative to baseline) about
11 to 12 quarters”8 following a contractionary shock, the impact of the shock on output
in the other group9 is less, transitory and “typically bottoms out about 5 to 6 quarters
after a contractionary monetary policy shock”.10
Furthermore, the estimates of the effects of monetary policy obtained by Gerlach and
Smets (1995) and Dornbusch et al. (1998) (a) “provide little evidence of large differences
in the monetary transmission between (G-7) countries, particularly not when estimated
confidence bands are taken into account” (the former, p.39); (b) suggest that “the impact
effect on output is always significant, but different across countries” (the latter, p.40). Us-
ing structural VAR models, however, Kim (1999) finds for almost the same set of countries
studied by Dornbusch et al. (1998)11 that “the output responses (to a monetary policy
shock) are very similar across (the) countries” (p.399). Moreover, whereas we have Kieler
and Saarenheimo (1998), Mojon and Peersman (2001), Dedola and Lippi (2005), and
Hofmann (2006) on the “homogeneity” side of the literature, Ehrmann (2000), Clements
et al. (2001), Mihov (2001), and Sala (2002) are among those suggesting heterogeneous
monetary transmission mechanism in Europe.
Ciccarelli and Rebucci (2006) highlight “the presence of significant differences across
countries in the transmission mechanism of monetary policy in Europe” (p.738), and claim
that “cross-country heterogeneity ... have not decreased over time” (p.739) among the
6i.e. output, prices and short-term interest rate.
7Austria, Belgium, Finland, Germany, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom.
8Ramaswamy and Sloek (1998, p.380).
9Denmark, France, Italy, Portugal, Spain, and Sweden.
10Ramaswamy and Sloek (1998, p.380).
11The only exclusion from the sample of Dornbusch et al. (1998) is Sweden.
111
largest four EA economies12 during the period of their supposed ‘economic convergence’
in the process of EMU. By estimating a fixed-parameter VAR model and endogenously
searching for breaks in the data, Weber et al. (2011) conclude that dynamics of the EA
monetary transmission are statistically indistinguishable in the split samples, i.e. 1980-
1996 and 1999-2006. The authors argue that this interim period could be responsible for
the conflicting findings on time variation in the monetary transmission in the EA.
According to a FAVAR model estimated by Boivin et al. (2008) for the EA as an
aggregate and for the six largest economies of the area,13 the creation of the euro in the
final stage of EMU has brought some changes to the transmission mechanism of common
monetary policy shocks. In particular, Boivin et al. find that the third-stage of EMU has
led to a widespread reduction in the effect of the shocks on output, inflation and long-
term interest rates, and an increase in the effects on the exchange rate. Using a structural
open-economy model, the authors also argue that these empirical findings observed in
the data can be attributed to the combination of the elimination of an exchange-rate
risk through the monetary union, and having “a central bank more decisively focused on
inflation and output stabilisation” (p.118). Despite these changes, however, Boivin et al.
(2008) highlight the responses of several macroeconomic variables, especially the monetary
aggregates, which remain heterogeneous across the EA economies in the post-1999 period.
Cecioni and Neri (2011) obtain two conclusions from their estimations of Bayesian VAR
and DSGE models for the pre- and post-1999 periods. First, the monetary transmission in
the EA has not significantly changed over time according to the empirical evidence from
their VAR analysis. “If anything, (the authors claim,) monetary policy has become slightly
12Germany, France, Italy, Spain.
13Germany, France, Italy, Spain, Belgium and the Netherlands.
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more effective in stabilising the economy” (p.8). Cecioni and Neri mean by effectiveness
of the monetary policy that “both output and prices are more responsive to an exogenous
change of the nominal interest rate” (Ibid.).14 Second, according to their DSGE model
estimations, they observe more clear differences across the two samples as a result of “a
reduction in the degree of nominal rigidities and to an increase in the strength of the
systematic reaction of monetary policy to inflation” (Ibid.).
Overall, investigation of Table 2.1.1 and the findings of the studies reported therein,
suggests the following important points. First, a significant number of the reported studies
deals with the period before the start of the third-stage of EMU, at which time there was
no single monetary policy. As a result, “the identified (common) monetary policy shock
may not be completely homogeneous across countries.”15
This, therefore, raises the question of whether what we observe in the literature is “that
the euro area monetary transmission process is (genuinely) uneven across countries”,16 or
a reflection of the fact that the shocks considered to be common are heterogeneous in
nature, and, therefore, they have different effects across European economies. There is
no doubt that the former could complicate the conduct of the single monetary policy in
the area.
Second, with the passage of time, the impact of common monetary policy across
countries is likely to get less heterogeneous due to forces of convergence. However, as
summarised above, the empirical literature is also inconclusive on whether or not the
EA monetary transmission mechanism and its impact across countries have changed over
14Note the contradiction between the conclusions of Boivin et al. (2008) and Cecioni and Neri (2011)
on the changes in the effectiveness of the monetary policy in the EA.
15McCallum and Smets (2007, p.10).
16Angeloni and Ehrmann (2003, p.6).
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time.
Third, as shown by Kieler and Saarenheimo (1998), Guiso et al. (1999) and Angeloni
and Mojon (2003), the findings are not robust to changes in empirical methodology and
data. Guiso et al. (1999) claim that, for example, “models with a similar structure tend
to yield small differences in the transmission mechanism, whereas models with a more
idiosyncratic structure tend to show larger differences” (p.61).
Fourth, there are a few studies employing the FAVAR approach in the context of
cross-country heterogeneity in the transmission of the EA monetary policy shocks. We
highlighted in Chapter 1 the merits of the FAVAR models in terms of covering the infor-
mation set of the central banks, identifying the exogenous monetary policy shocks, and
estimating their effects on various macroeconomic indicators. Therefore, we believe that
more and detailed investigation of the effects of monetary policy shocks across the EA
countries with the FAVAR approach is of significant importance.
Finally, these few FAVAR studies on the EA methodologically focus only on the
two-step estimation technique, which makes the Bayesian joint estimation, i.e. one-step
FAVAR, yet to be explored. Given our conclusion in Chapter 1 that there are considerable
gains from implementation of the one-step technique such as smoother impulse responses
and statistical significance of the estimates, we believe that this is an important gap in
the literature.
In light of the points highlighted above and the fact that there are now “sufficient
data to potentially observe effects of the monetary union on business cycle dynamics”17
in the EA, the key aims of this chapter are fourfold. First, we follow the recent literature
and use the FAVAR approach in order to investigate the cross-country heterogeneity in
17Boivin et al. (2008, p.77).
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the transmission of common monetary policy shocks in the EA. In order to contribute
to the literature, contrary to McCallum and Smets (2007) and Boivin et al. (2008),18 we
estimate our FAVAR model with the one-step Bayesian approach.19 Second, we expand
the data set used in the previous chapter for the four largest EA economies, i.e. Germany,
France, Italy, Spain. Our novel data set spans the post-launch-of-euro period only, i.e.
1999:M1 through 2011:M12, and consists of 5×120 disaggregated monthly macroeconomic
time series for the individual countries and the EA as an aggregate. Different from the
previously summarised studies, our common monetary policy shocks are identified for
each country from the same benchmark policy variable of the ECB. Third, similar to the
previous chapter, we employ rolling windows analysis in order to empirically investigate
the expected convergence of the responses and the impact of the 2007-8 global financial
crisis on the transmission of the common policy shocks across countries. Finally, given the
gains obtained from Boivin and Ng (2006) pre-screening technique (BN) in the previous
chapter, we investigate the impact of the size of the data on our conclusions on cross-
country heterogeneity.
In summary, the main findings of the study are the following. First and foremost,
although the effects of single monetary policy shocks on national real activities and price
levels are homogeneous across the four largest EA economies, the transmission mechanism
displays important cross-country heterogeneity with the national monetary aggregates
responding more heterogeneously to the shocks relative to most other macroeconomic
indicators. Second, according to our analysis based on rolling windows, the monetary
18Which are the only studies, to our knowledge, applying the technique to the question of cross-country
heterogeneity in the EA.
19As in Chapter 1, we also estimate the model with two-step method. However, given the focus of the
chapter on the cross-country heterogeneity, instead of the differences between the estimation methods,
two-step estimation results are omitted from the chapter. The results are available upon request.
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aggregates turn out to be most heterogeneous not only across countries but also over time
in the era of single monetary policy of the EMU. In Chapter 3 of the thesis, we investigate
the cross-country effects of the unconventional monetary actions in the EA during the
global financial crisis period. In light of that analysis, the first two main findings of
the present chapter importantly highlight the possibility of heterogeneous transmission
of the unconventional policy actions across the EA economies through (heterogeneous)
channels. Finally, in addition to our contribution in Chapter 1, our cross-country pre-
screening analysis also shows that this technique provides the same full-data results with
reduced computational burden of the one-step Bayesian FAVAR approach.
The remainder of the chapter is organised as follows. In Section 2, we summarise
the empirical methodologies of the chapter which consists of the estimation of one-step
FAVAR models with country-level and area-wide factors, rolling windows, and the BN
technique; Section 3 contains the results of a preliminary analysis of the data and the
estimation of the number of factors and lags; Section 4 presents the empirical results of
the chapter on (a) cross-country heterogeneity in the transmission of common monetary
policy shocks; (b) time variation and (c) BN analysis; in Section 5 we test robustness of
the results by looking at convergence and confidence intervals; Section 6 summarises and
concludes the chapter.
2.2 Empirical Methodologies
The FAVAR framework, model estimation and identification are described in the previous
chapter.20 Because the same methodology is used in the present chapter, we summarise
20For technical details of the FAVAR approach, see Section 1.2.
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in this section how the question of cross-country heterogeneity is analysed.
2.2.1 Country-Level and Panel Approaches
As mentioned earlier, we estimate our FAVAR model with the one-step Bayesian method,
and, specific to this chapter, with country-level and area-wide factors. That is to say, we
construct country-level (XCLt ) and area-wide (X
AW
t ) data sets, from which the factors are
extracted to be used in the transition equation of our FAVAR model.21,22 In this approach,
while we extract the country-level factors from the individual data sets constructed for
each country under investigation, we combine country-level variables into a balanced panel
in order to obtain the area-wide factors.23 Given the panel approach of Boivin et al. (2008)
applied to the economies of the EA with the two-step FAVAR technique, we believe that
our panel analysis conducted with the one-step FAVAR technique will provide important
contributions to the empirical results available in the literature.
Technically, we apply the one-step estimation method to the following state-space
representations:
Country-Level Estimation
X
CL(j)
it = Λ
fCL
i F
CL
t + Λ
yCL
i Yt + e
CL
t (2.2.1)
[
FˆCLt
Yt
]
= ΦCL(L)
[
FˆCLt−1
Yt−1
]
+ uCLt (2.2.2)
where X
CL(j)
it contains 120 country-specific variables (i = 1, . . . , 120), t = 1, . . . , 156, and
j = EA,DE,FR, IT,ES.
21See equations 2.2.2 and 2.2.4 below.
22For details of the data sets, see Section 2.3.1.
23For graphical comparison of the estimated factors, see Section 2.5.1.
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Area-Wide Panel Approach
XAWit = Λ
fAW
i F
AW
t + Λ
yAW
i Yt + e
AW
t (2.2.3)
[
FˆAWt
Yt
]
= ΦAW (L)
[
FˆAWt−1
Yt−1
]
+ uAWt (2.2.4)
where XAWit is a panel of 508 variables (i) and 156 observations (t).
24,25 The country-level
data sets enter the panel in an order according to the size of the economies from the
largest to smallest, i.e. EA as an aggregate, Germany, France, Italy, Spain.26
2.2.2 Time Variation
As we have done in the previous chapter, in order to investigate time variation in, and
the impact of the 2007-8 global financial crisis on cross-country heterogeneity in the EA,
we utilise the technique of rolling regressions. Due to the computational intensity of the
one-step technique and the size of the panel data investigated in the present chapter, we
base our analysis of rolling regressions on the country-level data sets only.27
We found in Chapter 1 that the empirical results of rolling estimations for the EA
as an aggregate (henceforth EA-17) are robust to the initial windows and the frequency
of the rolling augmentations. Considering this conclusion and the number of estimations
needed to be undertaken, we base our time variation analysis in this chapter on the rolling
estimations of our FAVAR model with the initial window of 1999 - June 2007 and rollings
24For the number of factors and lag lengths of the estimations, see Sections 2.3.2 and 2.3.3, respectively.
25As highlighted earlier in the chapter, note that we obtain 508 series in the panel when we exclude
duplicated variables in the country-specific data sets such as commodity indices, exchange rates, interest
rates, and international indicators.
26Our robustness checks suggest that the estimation results are independent of the order of the country-
level data sets in the panel. We thank Aris Spanos for highlighting this check during the presentation
of the poster version of the chapter in Birmingham Econometrics and Macroeconomics Conference, May
2-3, 2012, held at the University of Birmingham.
27The two-step panel rolling regressions are available upon request.
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by 6 months, only.
Estimation of a FAVAR model by the Bayesian one-step method is quite time con-
suming. Given the number of parameters need to be estimated for several data sets, for
various variables, and over 10 rolling samples, we base our empirical results in Section
2.4.3 below on 5,000 Gibbs iterations, initial 2,000 of which are discarded.
2.2.3 Pre-screening Analysis
Having investigated the question of cross-country heterogeneity in the transmission of
common European monetary policy shocks using constant and rolling samples, we follow
the structure of Chapter 1 and analyse the impact of data size on our empirical findings
using Boivin and Ng (2006) pre-screening technique.28
2.2.4 Common Monetary Policy Shocks
We noted earlier that monetary policy shocks identified in the literature for the EA might
not be completely homogeneous across countries. We explained the main reason of this
conclusion by referring to the combination of the sample periods of the studies covering
both pre- and post-1999 periods, and the use of German interest rates as the common
policy variable before the creation of the euro.
In our analysis, however, in order to minimise the cross-country heterogeneity in the
policy shocks, we focus not only on the post-1999 period but also on the ECB’s bench-
mark policy rate in both country-level and panel estimations.29 Despite these features
of the analysis, it is important to note that the monetary policy shocks identified in our
28For details of the technique, see Chapter 1, Section 1.2.4.
29i.e. Yt in equations 2.2.1 - 2.2.4.
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country-level FAVARs might still show some heterogeneity across countries. This is due
to the fact that the factors estimated from the country-level data sets will give rise to
different country-specific sequences of monetary policy shocks because in each country-
level FAVAR, factors will be different and the identified shock may thus be different.
When it comes to our panel FAVAR approach, however, we believe that there is complete
cross-country homogeneity in the shocks identified in the analysis. Given the consistency
in the findings of the country-level and panel approaches, summarised in Section 2.4 be-
low, we conclude that there is no concern of heterogeneity in the shocks identified in the
country-level approach of the chapter.
In order to have consistency with the previous chapter, the shocks are also standardised
here to correspond to a 25-basis-point increase in the policy variable. In addition, the
results presented in Section 2.4 below are impulse response functions of the particular
variables to a one-off policy shock in the EA.
In line with Chapter 1 and the FAVAR literature on the cross-country heterogeneity
in the EA, finally, the focus of the analysis in this chapter is on the unanticipated part of
the monetary policy shocks.30
2.3 Preliminary Analyses
In this section we present the preliminary analyses conducted prior to the estimation of
the empirical results. After explaining the data, we report the selection process of the
number of factors and lags in the model.
30See Chapter 1, p.30 for details on the (un)anticipated aspects of the monetary policy shocks.
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2.3.1 Data
The country-level data sets analysed in the chapter are identical to the one used for the
EA in Chapter 1.31 That is to say, there are 120 monthly macroeconomic time series for
five country-level data sets for Germany, France, Italy, Spain and the EA-17. Regarding
the area-wide panel data set, on the other hand, we exclude the international variables
duplicated in the first four data sets,32 and combine these country-level data sets with
the one for the EA-17. Therefore, we have 508 variables in the panel data set spanning
the period from 1999:1 through 2011:12. We highlighted earlier the contribution of our
one-step panel approach to the panel findings of Boivin et al. (2008) on the EA economies.
We believe that our panel analysis employing a larger and higher-frequency data set and
a different estimation technique is of importance to test the robustness of the findings
presented by Boivin et al. (2008).
As explained in detail in Chapter 1, Section 1.3.1, we process the data to (i) correct
for a few missing observations; (ii) adjust for seasonality and outliers; (iii) interpolate 14
series per data set from quarterly to monthly frequency; and (iv) induce stationarity.
2.3.2 Number of Factors
In order to determine the number of factors to be used in the model, we follow the
procedure of Chapter 1. First, we test the number of static factors in our data sets using
BIC and Bai and Ng (2002) information criteria.
Second, we calculate the R2 statistics, i.e. the share of variance of the data accounted
31See Appendix K for country-level data descriptions.
32Exchange rates, and IP, consumer price index, policy variables, long-term interest rates, and stock
markets of US, UK and Japan.
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for by the common components in the observation equations (2.2.1) - (2.2.3). As we have
done in Chapter 1, we compute the statistic for all the variables in the data sets as well
as 20 main variables on which our empirical analyses are based. Figures L.1.1 to L.1.4
present the statistics calculated for these sets of variables.
Finally, we obtain a set of estimation results of a two-step FAVAR model33 with number
of factors varying from 1 to 9 in order to test how the choice of number of factors in the
model affects the impulse response functions.34
We observe from our tests that Bai and Ng (2002) information criteria suggest twice
as many factors as estimated by BIC, similar to the case in Chapter 1. In addition,
Figures L.1.1 to L.1.4 display that the marginal gain, in terms of accounting for the
variation in either all or the main variables, obtained from including double the number
of factors suggested by BIC criterion in the model is less that 20% in country-level and
panel approaches. In other words, a parsimonious specification in terms of the number
of factors in the model leads to 30-45% of the variables being explained by the common
components. Finally, our sensitivity tests suggest that the overall qualitative nature
of the results are similar when we estimate the country-level or panel models with 2-6
factors. Parsimonious specification of the model also provides relatively smoother impulse
responses. The same approach has been applied for determining the number of factors
for rolling windows and post-BN estimations.
As a result of these tests, we prefer to use 2-4 factors in the empirical analyses of the
chapter. Our choice is supported by Forni et al. (2000) and Favero et al. (2005) who show
that “a small number of factors provide an efficient information summary of the main
33As in Chapter 1, the two-step approach is chosen only because of its computational simplicity.
34Number of lags is kept at 2 in all models. For details of determination of lag length in the model
see Chapter 1, Section 1.3.3.
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economic time series both at the EA level and for the four largest countries of the EA.”35
The specification details of our empirical analyses are as in Table 2.3.1 below.
Table 2.3.1: Model Specifications: Number of Factors
Estimations DE FR IT ES Panel
Pre - Boivin-Ng
Whole Sample 4 2 3 3 4
Rolling Windows 2-3a 2 2-3a 2-3a -
Post - Boivin-Ng
Whole Sample 2 2 2 2 2
Rolling Windows 2 2 2 2 -
a Changes from window to window.
2.3.3 Lag Length
We explained in Chapter 1, Section 1.3.3 how we choose a parsimonious specification for
the lag length in our FAVARs estimated for the EA as an aggregate. For the country-level
and panel estimations here, we follow the same procedure as follows. First, as previously,
we test the lag length using the selection criteria AIC, BIC, FPE, HQ applied to our
country-level and panel FAVARs. Second, as in the case for determining the number of
factors, we test the sensitivity of the impulse responses to the lag length of the model by
estimating a two-step FAVAR for each country and the panel.
Given that (i) the selection criteria suggest either 1 or 2 lags are sufficient to account
for the variations in our data, and (ii) as in the EA case in Chapter 1, FAVAR(2) displays
the smoothest impulse responses, we prefer to use 2 lags in our empirical analyses in the
present chapter.
35Boivin et al. (2008, p.87).
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2.4 Results
Having explained the details of the preliminary analyses, in the following four parts of
the section we present the empirical findings of the chapter. First, we investigate the
impact of a common monetary policy shock across four largest economies of the EA by
estimating a country-level FAVAR model for each country by the one-step method. We
base the analysis on the impulse response functions of 20 key macroeconomic variables to
a 25-basis-point contractionary policy shock. Second, in order to examine the impact of
area-wide factors, we follow the panel approach used by Boivin et al. (2008) and estimate
a single FAVAR model with a 508-variable panel of country-level data sets. Third, using a
rolling windows approach we study the changes, if there are any, in the impact of common
monetary policy shocks across countries over time and especially due to the 2007-8 global
financial crisis. Finally, following the Boivin and Ng (2006) technique, we prescreen our
data sets and replicate the previous analyses in the same order with smaller-scale country-
level and panel data sets.
2.4.1 Country-Level Approach
The empirical findings obtained from the estimation of our FAVAR model with country-
level data sets are displayed in Figure 2.4.1. We present in these figures the impulse
responses of a set of key macroeconomic variables for the four largest EA economies to a
common contractionary monetary policy shock for a horizon of up to four years. For the
sake of comparability of the impulse-response plots across countries, the confidence inter-
vals are excluded from the figures. Instead, they are presented separately in Appendix M.
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Figure 2.4.1: Cross-Country Heterogeneity - Country-Level Estimations
Note: The impulse responses for the EA as an aggregate, estimated in Chapter 1, are repeated in the
figure in order to have consistency with the panel approach in Section 2.4. where the impulse responses
are estimated and presented for the aggregate EA data for the first time in the thesis. It is also of interest
to compare country-specific and area-wide impacts of (contractionary) monetary policy shocks in the EA.
The Bayesian estimations in Figure 2.4.1 are based on 10,000 Gibbs sampling iterations,
the first 2,000 of which are discarded. The impulse response estimates are reported in
SD terms.
Broadly speaking, despite some “puzzles” in monetary aggregates, our results are
largely consistent with the convention on the impact of a surprise monetary tightening
on the economy. We emphasise the word “puzzle” because we believe that these so
called contradictory responses might be a noteworthy sign of important differences in the
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transmission of single monetary policy shocks across the main economies of the EMU.
The details of the results are as follow.
Let us start with the real activity measures, the majority of which decline quali-
tatively similarly across countries following a contractionary common monetary policy
shock.36 Our common finding with Smets and Wouters (2003) and McCallum and Smets
(2007) in Chapter 1 that the strongest impact of a contractionary monetary policy shock
is on investment in the EA as an aggregate is also present in our country-level estima-
tions. In addition to investment, as in our area-wide estimations in the previous chapter,
country-specific employment levels are also affected by the shock stronger than other
macroeconomic variables. Our findings on statistical significance of the results in Ap-
pendix M.1.1 suggest that the contractionary impact of the shock on investment and
employment, in addition to IP, is statistically significant. The responses of consumption
and construction, on the other hand, are generally statistically insignificant.
The labour market indicators, i.e. real ULC and nominal wages, indicate some differ-
ences across countries. We observe from the estimations that whilst real ULC increases
strongly in France, in the other countries it either increases less strongly (Italy) or initially
rises and then decreases (Germany and Spain), highlighting the possibility of ‘structural’
differences across countries.37 Furthermore, when we look at the responses of nominal
wages we note that except for initial rises in France and Italy, the medium- and long-term
responses are all negative but quantitatively different across countries. Regarding the
statistical significance of the results, we find that almost all responses estimated by our
36The only serious exception is the final consumption expenditure in France which responds in the
opposite direction. For the post-1999 period, Boivin et al. (2008) also find that French consumption
increases after the rise in the monetary policy variable. Contrary to our results, Boivin et al. obtain this
finding not only for France but also for Germany, Italy and Spain.
37See p.129 for details on structural differences across countries.
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one-step FAVAR approach are statistically significant except those for Italy.
When we compare the country-level labour market dynamics to the area-wide re-
sponses in Chapter 1, we observe the findings to be consistent.38 We mentioned earlier
that the area-wide impulse responses are included in Figure 2.4.1. As we can see from
the figure, the increases in the ULC of the four largest EA economies lead the area-wide
figure to rise as well. When the ULC in Germany and Spain displays negative responses
period 25 onwards, whilst the responses of that in France and Italy turn towards their
pre-shock levels, the area-wide ULC gets back to its level prior to the contractionary
monetary policy shock. Similarly, the responses of the national nominal wages are in line
with our area-wide findings in Chapter 1.
Using a two-step FAVAR approach, McCallum and Smets (2007) investigate cross-
country heterogeneity in European real wages for the period 1986Q1-2005Q4. They find
that contractionary monetary policy shocks increase real wages in France for the whole
horizon investigated, i.e. 16 quarters. McCallum and Smets also estimate an initial
rise and then decrease in German, and strong fall in Italian and Spanish real wages.
The authors justify their findings by highlighting some statistics39 from the Inflation
Persistence (IPN) and Wage Dynamics (WDN) networks in which Italy and Spain “appear
to have the lowest frequency of price adjustment among the (four largest EA countries
and Belgium) or, in other words, the highest price stickiness.”40
Following Normandin (2006), McCallum and Smets (2007) highlight that one can use
the sign of the real wage responses as an indication of the relative importance of labor-
38See Section 1.4.1, p.43.
39Such as the cumulative share of the real GDP response in the total nominal GDP response after
16 quarters, the cumulative share of the employment response in the total wage compensation response
after 16 quarters, frequency of monthly price changes, and average wage contract duration. See Table 2
in McCallum and Smets (2007, p.14).
40McCallum and Smets (2007, p.14).
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market frictions to those in the goods- and financial-markets. Although real wages are
missing in our data sets, i.e. as a single series, we follow the comments in McCallum and
Smets (2007)41 and compare the impulse responses of nominal wages and the prices on
the basis of the common wisdom described in Table 2.4.1.
Table 2.4.1: Real Wage Responses
Nominal Wages∗ Prices∗ Comparison Real Wages
Rise Rise ∆W > ∆P Rise
Rise Rise ∆W < ∆P Fall
Rise Fall - Rise
Fall Rise - Fall
Fall Fall |∆W| > |∆P| Fall
Fall Fall |∆W| < |∆P| Rise
∗Rise (fall) stands for positive (negative) responses in Wages and CPI in
Figure 2.4.1.
Comparing the wage and price responses period by period, we obtain the following
conclusions on the potential impulse responses of real wages. First, we estimate that
real wages continuously drop in Germany, Spain and EA-17 for four years following the
monetary tightening. Second, we observe that real wages in France initially rise for one
and a half years. When it comes to Italy, finally, our estimations suggest continuous rise
in the wages for four years. Following McCallum and Smets (2007), this may suggest that
nominal wage stickiness is more important relative to price stickiness in France and Italy
than in Germany and Spain, a finding in line with the IPN and WDN statistics cited
above.
We mentioned earlier about the mixed conclusion of the literature on the transmission
of monetary policy shocks across countries. As we can see, our empirical findings on the
41“The nominal wage per employee responds somewhat faster and by more than the GDP deflator.
As a result, the real wage per employee drops following the monetary policy shock” (p.10).
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impact of the policy shocks on real wages are somewhat different from the ones obtained by
McCallum and Smets (2007). If we look at Boivin et al. (2008), we observe findings on the
dynamics of wages in the EA which slightly differ from our and McCallum and Smets’s
results. Among these empirical findings, however, there is a very important common
conclusion worth highlighting. The empirical evidence in the literature does suggest that
the transmission of monetary policy shocks in the EMU is not homogeneous across real
wages of the member states. We believe that this common conclusion, supported by
our empirical findings, highlights, importantly, that there may be structural differences
across the (four largest) economies of the EA. For instance, labour cost and productivity
growth rates, skill composition of national workforces, outturn for productivity, rigidities
in wage and price setting, differences in the size of worker flows, the level of employment
protection, institutional features of national labour markets, and barriers to domestic and
foreign competitions are among the structural differences across the EA labour markets
studied in the literature.42
Having explained the impact of common monetary policy shocks on cross-country real
activities and labour markets, let us look at their effects on country-level prices. Our
results suggest that in the medium term consumer prices respond negatively to common
monetary tightening. It is also observed that the responses of the national producer prices
to the tightening are always negative, except that in Spain where producer prices slightly
increase in the first 5 months following the shock. According to the estimates, which
are all found to be statistically significant, both consumer and producer prices respond
qualitatively homogeneously, where the responses of the latter are almost identical, across
42See ECB (2012c); IMF (2012); Jaumotte and Morsy (2012) among others in the IPN and WDN.
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the largest EA economies. We discussed in Chapter 143 the negative responses of the prices
in the EA as an aggregate. As we observe here, our country-level findings are consistent
with and explain the area-wide responses to common monetary policy shocks.
Unlike our one-step FAVAR results, Boivin et al. (2008) observe puzzling impulse
responses in German price levels. Following their claim that “the price rise in Germany
is ... difficult to rationalise” (p.95), the authors propose the possibility that innovations
in their artificial EA interest rate may not properly identify surprise monetary shocks
for Germany. In order to test robustness of the puzzles, Boivin et al. identify monetary
policy shocks for Germany as surprise increase in her short-term interest rate. Their
new set of responses suggest almost no puzzle for Germany.44 When we replicate this
exercise by replacing the REFI by German 3M Euribor rate in our two-step estimations
for Germany,45 we observe not only puzzles in prices but also relatively stronger responses
of other variables disappearing almost entirely. We believe that this also highlights the
importance of the Bayesian FAVAR approach similar to its estimations in Chapter 1 being
insensitive to the period when the crisis hit the economies most significantly.46
One of the main findings of Boivin et al. (2008) is that monetary union has led the
exchange rate channel to becoming more powerful in the EA. That is to say, comparing
their full sample estimates (1980Q1-2007Q3) to those for the post-1999 period (1999Q1-
2007Q3), Boivin et al. observe EA REER appreciating considerably more in the latter
period than the former. Our Bayesian FAVAR estimations support this finding in the
literature by suggesting appreciations in REERs in all countries47 except Spain where the
43Section 1.4.1, p.43.
44See Boivin et al. (2008) Appendix B.
45Available upon request.
46See Chapter 1, Section 1.4.2, part Interpolation of the Crisis Period (2008Q4).
47Quantitatively differently across countries and either statistically significantly (Germany),
marginally significantly (France) or insignificantly (Italy).
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exchange rate persistently depreciates following a common contractionary monetary policy
shock. The appreciations in German, and French and Italian REERs are, respectively,
always and marginally significant according to our estimations. The estimates for Spain,
however, are statistically significant only for the period 30 onwards. As we noted in
Chapter 1, comparison of our country-level one- and two-step estimations48 also suggests
that the latter method, the one used by Boivin et al. (2008), estimates considerably
stronger REER responses relative to the former.
Following the declines in real activities and the appreciations of the REERs, we observe
from Figure 2.4.1 that countries’ exports and imports respond negatively to the surprise
increase in the policy interest rate. In line with the “export-engine” status of Germany
in the EA, our estimations suggest the impact of the shock to be stronger on the German
export figures relative to other countries and the EA as an aggregate, among which the
responses of exports are almost identical. As we can see from the results, on the other
hand, the imports respond relatively homogeneously across the economies.
When we replicate the practice in Table 2.4.1 on real wages49 for net trade, we observe
a more heterogeneous impact of the shock. To illustrate, according to our estimations,
whereas Spanish and German net trade figures display mixed responses, that in France
(Italy) almost always increase (decrease).50 Given the majority of our estimates show
increases in net trade of the four largest economies of the EA, it becomes unsurprising
that net trade in the EA as a whole increases continuously for 48 periods following a
common contractionary monetary policy shock. Despite our empirical finding, one can
48The two-step estimations are not reported here but available upon request.
49Because the logic is exactly the same, we did not repeat the same table Nominal Wages and Prices
replaced by Exports and Imports, respectively.
50French (Italian) net trade decreases (increases) in period(s) 1-6 (1).
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expect the monetary tightening to increase the interest rates, as we present below, which
thereby reduce the trade balance by appreciating the currency. Depending on the relative
elasticities of exports and imports together with the quantity and cost effects of the cur-
rency changes,51 however, it might be possible to observe increases in net trade following
a monetary tightening.
When a surprise hike in the benchmark policy rate of the ECB hits the economies, their
short- and long-term interest rates respond expectedly homogeneously. The French and
Italian government bond yields are estimated, statistically significantly, by our one-step
FAVAR method to differ from that of other countries. In other words, whereas bond yields
in Germany and Spain increase for four years following a contractionary shock, that in
France and Italy follow the short-term interest rates and display negative responses from
period 20 onwards. As we will see in the following subsection, however, when we consider
area-wide factors, i.e. more cross-country information, in our FAVAR system, the short-
and long-term interest rates respond identically across countries and consistently between
the term structure.
Similar to interest rates, highly correlated stock markets respond quite homogeneously
to exogenous interest rate shocks. Our results suggest that the impact of the shock
on the markets are persistent in all countries and the whole area itself. Furthermore,
confidence indicators also display qualitatively similar responses across countries. One
important finding worth highlighting is that in the medium term following the shock,
whereas German confidence decreases the most among the economies, it takes relatively
longer for the Italian consumers to decrease their confidence.
We highlighted earlier the importance of the comparison of our empirical results to
51See Rose (1991) for the Marshall–Lerner condition.
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that in Boivin et al. (2008) due to the parallel methodologies and the EA countries
investigated. If we compare our findings summarised above to those in Boivin et al.
(2008), we observe a broad agreement on (i) the homogenous responses of prices across
the four largest economies of the EA, (ii) the appreciation in REER of all countries under
investigation except Spain, (iii) larger responses of the German export figures, and (iv)
homogeneous impact of contractionary monetary policy shocks to national imports.
Among the indicators presented in Figure 2.4.1, there is one category left to be inter-
preted, i.e. the monetary aggregates. One of the main findings of Chapter 1 was that time
variation in the responses of monetary aggregates of EA-17 was considerably larger than
other key indicators investigated. When it comes to the cross-country impacts of common
monetary tightening, monetary aggregates very importantly display the most heteroge-
neous responses across four largest EA economies. That is to say, the impact of common
monetary policy shocks is not only the most time variant on EA-17 monetary aggregates
but also is most heterogeneous across the countries. It is important to highlight the con-
sistency of the latter finding with Boivin et al. (2008) who claim that “national monetary
aggregates (of Germany, France, Italy, Spain, Belgium and the Netherlands) ... show
more heterogeneous responses to monetary policy shocks than most other macroeconomic
variables” (p.118).
We highlighted in Chapter 152 that a cautious approach to monetary aggregates es-
pecially in the post-crisis period is of necessity due to strong monetary responses of the
Eurosystem to the global financial crisis. When it comes to cross-country heterogeneity in
the responses of monetary aggregates, we still believe that such an approach is important.
It is also important to note, however, that both Boivin et al.’s (2008) and our pre-crisis
52See Section 1.4.2, p.55 for details.
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estimations53 still suggest heterogeneous behaviour in the monetary aggregates of the
four largest EA economies. Therefore, we believe that it is of importance to highlight the
following empirical findings on the monetary aggregates together with our justifications.
In particular, our one-step FAVAR estimations suggest that following an exogenous
monetary tightening in the post-1999 period, the broad money supply, i.e. M3, increases
for four years in Italy, whilst it initially increases and then persistently falls in Germany,
France and Spain. The impulse responses we estimated for Germany and Spain are
statistically significant. When we analyse the impact of the policy shock on M1, deposits
and credits, the main result does not change that the responses are noticeably more
heterogeneous across countries than other macroeconomic variables under investigation.
As we can clearly see from Figure 2.4.1 and Appendix M.1.1, whilst responses of monetary
aggregates of other countries are statistically significantly positive (M1: Italy, Deposits:
Germany, Credits: France), Spanish M1, deposits and credits persistently and statistically
significantly decrease as a result of a common contractionary monetary policy shock.
We discussed the impacts of the policy shocks on the area-wide monetary aggregates
in the previous chapter of the thesis.54 We observe from our country-level estimations
that (i) the liquidity puzzles in the German and Italian M1 lead to increases in the area-
wide narrow money supply, (ii) the broad money supply in the area as a whole displays
highly similar responses to that in the four largest member states, (iii) the (medium-term)
negative responses of (German and) Spanish deposits account for that of the area-wide
deposits, and (iv) despite the positive responses of credits in Germany and France to
monetary tightening, credits in the whole area closely follows, surprisingly, the negative
53See Section 2.4.3 below for details.
54Section 1.4.1, p.46.
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responses of the credit level in Spain.
According to Boivin et al. (2008), our common empirical finding that national mon-
etary aggregates are the most heterogeneous macroeconomic variables “may reflect the
pervasive differences in the national habits and in the availability of savings instruments
across countries of the EA” (p.96). In a more recent study, investigating the post-launch-
of-euro period, Setzer et al. (2010) claim that “cross-country heterogeneity in monetary
dynamics can be explained to a large extent by asymmetries in house price developments
on top of different income developments” (p.21). Hughes Hallett and Piscitelli (2002) list
a number of key factors rationalising asymmetries in European monetary aggregates. To
name a few, “although the overall stock of money is controlled by the ECB’s interest rate,
the distribution of the demand for money will vary in each country according to local
conditions” (p.82). “Variations in the demand for money across countries (therefore) will
cause differences in activity levels, differences in the supply of, and demand for credit”
(p.93), well supported by our heterogeneous credit responses. As potential sources of
the money demand variations, Hughes Hallett and Piscitelli (2002) investigate the factors
of the interest and the income elasticities of money. They claim that, first, “evidently,
differing interest elasticities in the monetary transmission mechanism do produce some
differences in performance under a common monetary policy, but those differences are
relatively small” (p.77). Second, more effective short-run income elasticities may vary,
according to Hughes Hallett and Piscitelli (2002, p.92), because of differences in (i) the
velocity of money; (ii) the way financial markets work; (iii) the ownership of assets and
their use as collateral; and (iv) the flexibility of markets (“the speed with which income
changes monetary conditions”).
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Following our empirical findings and the rationalisations above, we think it is crucial
to highlight, finally, another general point made by Hughes Hallett and Piscitelli (2002,
p.82). When we discuss heterogeneity across European countries, it maybe possible to
blame the EMU for two aspects. One, there is the problem of “incomplete convergence”
making a single policy inappropriate and costly due to different initial conditions. Second,
there are some “costs caused by differences in monetary responses once a shock or policy
change hits the system (asymmetric transmissions).” According to the Hughes Hallett
and Piscitelli’s exercise where the initial conditions of the countries are equalised in their
model, asymmetric transmissions generate unequal starting points for the next period,
making “unequal starting points” the main part of the “problem”.
In our opinion, however, the combination of these heterogeneous monetary aggregates
with the homogeneous impulse responses of real activities and consumer prices, estimated
in this chapter across countries, raises an important point. On the one hand, “cultural and
economic diversity is a specific feature of the euro area”.55 This, among other rationali-
sations cited above, makes it highly likely to observe empirical cross-country difference in
the EA. On the other hand, the primary objective of the Eurosystem’s monetary policy is
to maintain price stability in the whole EA. Given the fact that average annualised infla-
tion rate of the EA since 1999 is 2.07%,56 we believe that the heterogeneous responses of
national monetary aggregates might have done no harm to the transmission of the policy
changes to national, and indirectly to area-wide, price levels.
In order to further investigate the question of (asymmetric) transmission of common
monetary policy shocks in the EA, the rest of the section contains the results of our panel
55Moutot et al. (2008, p.31).
56As of February 2013.
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approach, time variation and Boivin and Ng (2006) pre-screening analysis.
2.4.2 Panel Approach
The panel FAVAR approach of the chapter, as we described in Section 2.2.1, is to replicate
the previous cross-country analysis by using area-wide factors, instead of country-specific
ones, estimated by the Bayesian method from a panel of the individual data sets under
investigation. We mentioned earlier that our panel approach is of importance in the sense
that it tests the robustness of not only our country-level findings but also the results
obtained by the two-step panel approach of Boivin et al. (2008) applied to the same EA
economies.57 We also believe that this panel, i.e. area-wide, approach provides the thesis
with a link to the previous chapter where the area-wide effects of monetary policy shocks
are investigated again with area-wide factors but estimated not from a panel of countries
but from aggregate macroeconomic indicators.
Figure 2.4.2 presents our estimation results obtained using a panel of 508 variables
from the individual data sets.58 Thanks to the merits of the FAVAR technique, the impulse
responses are obtained from the one-time estimation of our computer-intensive model for
the whole data set. The results are then grouped and compared accordingly. Different
from the country-level approach, in order to make the Gibbs process converge we base
the one-step estimations in Figure 2.4.2 on 15,000 Gibbs draws, first 3,000 of which are
discarded. Because the general dynamics of the key macroeconomic variables have been
described in detail, here we only focus on the robustness of the previous findings to our
57As we described in Chapter 1, Section 1.2, the one- and two-step FAVAR methods differ in terms of
the estimation of the factors with (one-step) and without (two-step) taking the dynamic structure of the
state-space model into account.
58Note that the panel consists of the country-level and EA-17 data sets except duplicated variables.
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Figure 2.4.2: Cross-Country Heterogeneity - Area-Wide Estimation
panel approach.
First of all, with investment and employment being the most affected, the impact of
the shock on real activity is observed to be as homogeneous, if not more, as suggested by
our country-level estimations. The impulse responses of consumption and construction,
however, suggest more differences across countries. We believe this finding importantly
supports the previously highlighted ideas of Hughes Hallett and Piscitelli (2002) and
Setzer et al. (2010) that variations in the demand for money and asymmetries in house
price developments can account for cross-country heterogeneity in European monetary
dynamics.
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Broadly speaking, the panel approach suggests results qualitatively quite similar to
the country-level approach for real ULC, nominal wages, prices, REERs, trade figures and
stock markets. It is important to note that the slight price puzzles, i.e. CPI puzzles in
Figure 2.4.1, for EA, Germany and Spain all disappear when more area-wide information
is used in the model.
Not surprisingly, the more area-wide information is included into the model, the more
homogeneously the interest rates are estimated to respond to common monetary tighten-
ings. In line with the country-level approach, we still observe Italian (German) consumer
confidence being the least (most) negatively affected relative to other countries. We even
find that the shock leads to statistically significant increase in the indicator. Although
there is no clear clarification, statistically significant increases in consumption and con-
struction in addition to that in M1 and M3 may support this finding.
Regarding the monetary aggregates, finally, there is no doubt that the effects of the
shock are still most heterogeneous on these variables. To illustrate, we observe from our
panel estimations that whereas M1 and M3 in Italy and M1 in EA-17 increase statistically
significantly, decreases in German and French broad money supplies are also estimated by
the same method to be statistically significant. We believe that this important common
finding between our one-step and Boivin et al.’s (2008) two-step FAVAR approaches is
crucial in the sense that it highlights the necessity of further research, besides our ratio-
nalisations above, on the reasons behind such asymmetric responses of common monetary
policy shocks across the largest member states of the EA.
In the Introduction of the chapter, we mentioned the methodological sensitivity of the
general conclusion of the literature on cross-country effects of monetary policy shocks. As
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we have explained above in detail, however, our empirical analysis clearly shows that the
findings in the chapter are not only robust to the country-specific and panel approaches,
but also in line with the EA aggregates in Chapter 1.
2.4.3 Time Variation
It is so far assumed in the empirical analyses of the chapter that the parameters of the
FAVAR models are constant over the entire sample. In this section, however, we use
a simple technique of rolling windows in order to analyse the potential changes in the
previous findings over time and especially due to the 2007-8 global financial crisis. In
addition to the contribution of the country-specific and panel approaches above to the
aggregate-level findings in Chapter 1, we believe that the question of time variation in
cross-country heterogeneity is also of importance.
Given the computational intensity of the one-step FAVAR technique, we eliminate the
panel approach here and focus on country-level estimation results only. For the same
reason, we base our results on four key macroeconomic variables in this subsection. These
variables are (i) IP to observe time variations in real activity; (ii) CPI to check whether
one of the main findings of Chapter 1, that the prices, strongly puzzling during the pre-
crisis period, respond negatively to the contractionary monetary policy shock when it
hits the economy in the post-crisis period, applies to the national price levels; and (iii)
given the important finding of this chapter on the dynamics of monetary aggregates across
countries, M1 and M3 series. The empirical results displayed in Figures 2.4.3 to 2.4.6 and
summarised below depend on rolling FAVARs estimated with the initial sample of 1999
- June 2007 and 6-month rollings. As noted earlier, the Gibbs samplings are based on
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5,000 draws initial 2,000 of which are discarded.
Let us start with the rolling estimates of the impact of a contractionary monetary
policy shock on national IP indices. It was observed for the full sample in Figure 2.4.1
that the impact of the shock on IP is relatively homogeneous across member states. Our
rolling estimations in Figure 2.4.3 clearly suggest that, however, this homogeneity is not
robust to the time period from which the estimates are obtained. To illustrate, while
we observe qualitatively similar responses across countries when the estimations include
the crisis period, i.e. windows Sep00-Dec08 onwards, a more heterogeneous impact of
the shock, both qualitatively and quantitatively, is clear in the pre-crisis period, i.e. first
three rolling estimations. This finding is supported by the statistical significance of the
results that both the asymmetric responses across countries in the first two windows,
and the ones in the third window seriously different from one country to another and
are all statistically significant. When we start to include some observations from the
crisis period, not only do the statistically significant increases in IPs of Spain and France
disappear, but the responses also become more similar across countries. If there is any
cross-country difference estimated during the crisis period, however, that is the impact
of the shock on Spanish production level relative to other nations. As we can see from
Figure 2.4.3, December 2009 onwards, inclusive, the contractionary effects of the shock on
IP in Spain are much worse than that in other countries.59 We believe that this finding
is of importance and in line with our findings in the next chapter of the thesis on the
heterogeneous impacts of the Great Recession and sovereign debt crisis in the EA across
core and peripheral member states.60
59As we can see from Appendix M.1.3, negative impacts of the shock on IPs in all countries are
statistically significant.
60See Chapter 3, Section 3.6.
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Figure 2.4.3: Rolling Windows - Country Level - IP
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Figure 2.4.4: Rolling Windows - Country Level - CPI
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Figure 2.4.5: Rolling Windows - Country Level - M1
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Figure 2.4.6: Rolling Windows - Country Level - M3
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Rolling estimations in Figure 2.4.4 investigate the impact of the shock on national
price levels over time. Before considering the cross-country heterogeneity, it is worth
highlighting that puzzling responses of the prices in France, Spain and Italy may be
the main reason why we observed such puzzles in EA-17 rolling estimations in Chapter
1.61 Especially in window Mar00-Jun08, in all countries, except for Germany, we observe
prices increasing almost four years following the monetary tightening. During the crisis
period, however, the policy shock leads to statistically significant drops in national price
levels. When comparing the impulse responses across countries, we obtain the following
conclusions. First, a common shock during the crisis period makes price levels of the four
largest economies decrease sometimes considerably more than that of the whole EA. This
difference is also observed across the economies themselves. To illustrate, in windows
Sep01-Dec09, Sep02-Dec10, and Mar03-Jun11, national prices decrease twice as much, if
not more, as the area average. Among the member states, additionally, we also observe
considerably stronger decreases in German and Spanish price levels. As we noted earlier,
such differences in country-level prices then contribute to time-varying asymmetries in
national real wages.
In Chapter 1, area-wide rolling estimations suggested that there was time variation
in the impact of the common shocks on monetary aggregates over the pre- and post-
crisis periods. According to Figures 2.4.5 and 2.4.6, similar variations are observed for
the individual countries. Investigation of the impulse responses across countries also
shows that variations are not only over time but also across countries. We observe, on
the one hand, Italian and German narrow money supplies (M1) contributing statistically
significantly to the liquidity puzzles observed in the area average for the post-crisis period.
61Similar to the area-wide puzzles, however, country-level ones are also statistically insignificant.
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Although, M1 in Italy rises statistically significantly in the pre-crisis period as well, the
negative responses from other nations62 cause the area-wide M1 to respond negatively to
the contractionary monetary policy shock. On the other hand, when there are narrow
money liquidity puzzles in EA-17, Germany and Italy, French and especially Spanish
money supplies decrease statistically significantly during the crisis-period.
Rolling estimations of the impulse responses of M3 in Figure 2.4.6 also support the
previous finding of the study that the transmission of common monetary policy shocks
is most heterogeneous across national monetary aggregates. Over time we observe some
asymmetries such as the following. On the one hand, we observe statistically significant
increases in Spanish M3, following a shock hitting the EA during the pre-crisis period,
turning into still significant, even with narrower confidence intervals, decreases during the
post-crisis period. On the other hand, Italian M3 responses are almost always positive and
statistically significant63, and German broad money supply decreases (increases) before
(after) the crisis.
The empirical results presented so far in the chapter construct the main findings
obtained with the full country-level and area-wide data sets. In the following subsection,
we now turn to the final aim of the chapter which is to further investigate the impact of
the pre-screening technique in a structural context.
2.4.4 Pre-screening Analysis
Our structural Boivin and Ng (2006) pre-screening analysis in Chapter 164 contributed to
the literature by showing that the technique works very well not only in real time fore-
62Statistically significant only in Spain.
63Decreases in the window Sep03-Dec11 are not significant.
64See Section 1.2.4 for details of the technique.
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casting but also the policy analysis contexts. Our results highlighted that the technique
(i) suggests factor estimates doing no worse than the ones extracted from the full data
set, and (ii) especially in the Bayesian FAVAR model, significantly reduces the factor of
computer intensity, making the application of the approach more feasible.
In this chapter, we build upon those findings by applying the technique to the question
of cross-country analysis. That is to say, given our results about the asymmetries in the
transmission of common monetary policy shocks across the largest economies of the EA,
we reduce the size of five data sets and test whether the BN technique does any harm or
good on the main cross-country findings.
Pre-screening the correlations among idiosyncratic errors of the data using the BN
technique provides us with smaller scale versions of the country-level and panel data sets.
As a result of the test, we have 71 variables for Germany, 72 for France, 67 for Italy, and
66 for Spain. On average we eliminate 54% of the whole data set. Accordingly, the panel
data now contains 290 area-wide macroeconomic variables. Appendix K presents the
eliminated variables and their correlation coefficients with other variables. As we did in
Chapter 1, we also determine the variables idiosyncratic errors of which are most correlated
with our main variables so as to eliminate those instead of the main ones. Table 2.4.2
presents the variables dropped from the data sets instead of the key indicators. The rest
of the subsection consists of two parts as cross-country heterogeneity and time variation.
Cross-Country Heterogeneity
The cross-country impulse responses estimated with the post-BN country-level and panel
data sets are displayed in Figures 2.4.7 to 2.4.8. Slightly different from the previous
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Table 2.4.2: Pre-screening Exclusions Instead of the Main Variables
Variables Most Correlated
DE FR IT ES
IP 8 8 8 -
Consumption - 93 - 107
Construction - 7 - -
Investment - 8 - 107
Employment 111 111 111 111
Real ULC 113 - - -
Wages 115 115 115 -
CPI 26 26 26 23
PPI 78 35 35 35
REER 101 101 101 101
Exports (19) (20)* (20)* (20)* (20)*
Imports (20) (19)* (19)* (19)* (19)*
3M Euribor 40 40 40 40
10Y Yield 42 42 42 42
M1 62 62 68 68
M3 (63) 62 62 - 62
Deposits (67) (63)* 68 (70)* (70)*
Credits (70) 72 72 (67)* (67)*
Stock Market 51 54 56 56
Confidence - - 94 75
- Not suggested as the most correlated variable.
* Because two main variables are most correlated
with each other, no variable is eliminated.
subsections, we look at the results as a whole and highlight the similarities/differences to
the pre-BN ones.
If we start with the impact of a common contractionary monetary policy shock on
real activity, we observe the following points. First of all, qualitatively similar declines in
the country-level activities are still present in the results. The post-BN panel approach
estimates show much more homogeneity across IP indices. The one-step method still
captures the previous finding that the most contractionary impact of the common shock
is on the Spanish IP. The previous divergent responses of consumption in France and
construction in Italy are also robust to the size of the data sets.
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Figure 2.4.7: CC. Heterogeneity - Post-BN - Country Level
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Figure 2.4.8: CC. Heterogeneity - Post-BN - Area Wide
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Furthermore, country-specific estimations for Italy highlight a significant finding. As
we can see from Figure 2.4.7, the results with less information suggests that following
a contractionary monetary policy shock, not only employment and nominal wages, but
also consumer prices increase in Italy. When we include more information via the panel
approach, however, we observe negative responses of these variables to the shock. The
responses of the prices are even found to be statistically significant in the more-informative
panel approach. We believe that this empirical finding does highlight (i) the importance
of “necessary” information in monetary (FA)VAR approaches,65 and (ii) the possibility
that BN can be misleading in the structural context, combination of which suggests the
necessity of further research on BN analysis in structural models.
A consideration of impulse responses estimated for labour market indicators and prices
of other countries suggests that our previous results are qualitatively robust to the pre-
screening technique. Including Italy, all countries’ trade figures, interest rates, stock mar-
kets and consumer confidences also support this conclusion. REERs, however, display
some differences relative to full-data estimations. Whereas the differences are quanti-
tative for all countries except Spain, post-BN responses suggest a stronger effect of the
shock on exchange rates, depreciation in Spanish REER disappears when we include less
information into the model. This makes our post-BN results on REER, i.e. country-level
and panel, consistent with Boivin et al. (2008) in a sense that countries’ REERs strongly
appreciate following a common monetary tightening.
Finally, when we look at the effects of a contractionary monetary policy shock on
national monetary aggregates estimated with post-BN data sets, we very importantly
65See Sims (1992); Bernanke and Blinder (1992); Cushman and Zha (1997); Bernanke et al. (2005),
among others.
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observe that the monetary aggregates, especially M1 and M3, are still relatively the most
heterogeneous variables. Significant differences across national narrow money supplies are
also present in the post-BN estimations with country-level and panel data sets.
Time Variation
The rolling estimations with post-BN data sets are presented in Appendix N. Overall,
the estimations suggest consistency with the full-data rolling results in the sense that (i)
the contractionary impact of the shock on Spanish IP is considerably more than other
members especially in the post-crisis period, (ii) consumer prices puzzle only in the period
prior to the crisis,66 (iii) monetary aggregates respond heterogeneously not only across
countries but also over time, i.e. the responses are relatively less heterogeneous during
the pre-crisis period.
As in Chapter 1, this kind of consistency across the results highlights the importance
of the pre-screening technique for the structural analyses in terms of significant time
saving with the Bayesian one-step method. We believe that this finding and the BN
pre-screening technique makes cross-country analysis with the one-step method, which
provided more statistically significant results relative to the two-step, more attractive
and less time-consuming.
2.5 Robustness
This section first presents the convergence of the Gibbs samplings on which the empirical
results are based in the chapter. Further the confidence intervals of the impulse responses
66Still statistically insignificantly though.
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eliminated from the analyses above for the sake of comparability across countries are
discussed in the section.
2.5.1 Convergence
Convergence of the full-sample and rolling Bayesian estimations, i.e. pre- and post-BN,
are presented in Appendix O. The technique followed is the one used in Chapter 1 where
the first and second halves of the median of the retained Gibbs samplings draws are
plotted on each other, and observed for deviations between the halves. As we can see
from the test results, convergence is satisfied in all Gibbs sampling procedures of the
one-step estimations in the chapter.
2.5.2 Confidence Intervals
Appendix M presents the confidence intervals of the impulse response estimates eliminated
from the text for the purposes of comparability across countries. As we highlighted
with the results earlier, the majority of the impulse responses are estimated statistically
significantly by the one-step FAVAR technique. Similar to our finding in Chapter 1,
the statistical significance of the impulse responses estimated by the one-step approach
outperforms that by the two-step FAVAR method.67
2.6 Conclusion
The questions of cross-country heterogeneity and time variation in the EA are investigated
in this chapter of the thesis. Similar to the previous chapter, (one-step Bayesian) FAVAR
67The two-step confidence intervals of the same set of analyses in the chapter are available upon
request.
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approach, rolling windows and Boivin and Ng (2006) pre-screening techniques are the
techniques used in this chapter. Using a 4×120-variable novel data set for the largest
four economies of the EA, i.e. Germany, France, Italy, Spain, we have investigated the
cross-country asymmetries of and time variation in the transmission of common monetary
policy shocks for the period 1999-2011.
We have argued that the responses of the real activity measurements are almost all
negative and relatively homogeneous across countries. The strongest impact of the shock
is estimated to be on national investment and total employment indicators. Consistent
with Boivin et al. (2008), we observe prices also responding similarly across countries.
Our one-step FAVAR approach contributes to the literature by estimating qualitatively
homogeneous and statistically significant declines in the national price levels of the largest
EA economies.
Our common finding with Normandin (2006), McCallum and Smets (2007) and Boivin
et al. (2008) that the transmission of common monetary policy shocks in the EMU is
not homogeneous across national real wages highlights that there may be cross-country
heterogeneity in the labour-, goods- and financial-frictions in the member states of the
EA. The net-trade exercise performed in the chapter also suggests asymmetric nature of
the common policy shocks.
We have highlighted in the chapter that according to our rolling estimations, whilst
the impact of the shock on real activity measurements is heterogeneous across countries
prior to the 2007-8 global financial crisis, when the real economies are hit by the crisis,
we observe more homogeneous contractionary impact of the shock. The rolling windows
from December 2009 onwards, however, clearly suggest that despite relatively similar
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impact of the shock across other countries, Spanish IP is the one most severely affected
by the monetary tightening, suggesting the importance of country-specific factors during
the financial crisis period such as extraordinary unemployment rates and significantly low
levels of retail and investment figures in Spain.68
Moreover, we have pre-screened our country-level data sets using the technique pro-
posed by Boivin and Ng (2006). In addition to our contribution in Chapter 1, we believe
that this structural and cross-country pre-screening analysis in this chapter is also of
importance for the literature. We observe from the analysis that pre-screening makes
cross-country analysis with the computationally burdensome one-step FAVAR approach
more convenient. On the other hand, however, our country-level estimations for Italy
highlight the importance of “necessary” information in monetary (FA)VAR approaches.
These findings, we believe, make it clear that further structural applications of the BN
technique in the literature is needed.
The main contribution of this chapter of the thesis is to show with a novel and most
recent data set and various empirical approaches that the responses of the national mon-
etary aggregates are strongly more heterogeneous across the four largest economies of the
European monetary union than most other macroeconomic variables. We also provide
the literature with the empirical evidence that the responses of EA monetary aggregates
are not only strongly heterogeneous across countries but also over time during the single
monetary policy era of the EMU. We consider these empirical findings as crucial in order
to investigate whether or not “the euro area monetary transmission process is (genuinely)
uneven across countries, in a way that could complicate the conduct of the single mone-
68See Section 3.6 in the next chapter of the thesis.
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tary policy.”69 In light of our analysis of the Eurosystem’s unconventional monetary policy
actions in the next chapter of the thesis, we have raised the issue of heterogeneous trans-
mission of the policy actions across (heterogeneous) country-specific channels. Therefore,
we believe that the main findings of the present chapter contribute to the literature by
providing empirical observations on an important aspect of the monetary transmission
mechanism in the EA.
Finally, we have argued in the chapter that the overall conclusion of the literature
on the asymmetries in the transmission of monetary policy in the EA is not robust to
changes in empirical methodology and data. We believe our essay contributes to the
literature significantly in the sense that it both supports the general conclusion of some
studies cited in the text, and also provides empirical findings quite robust across changes
in the methodology such as country-specific and panel estimations, time variation, and
data pre-screening.
Following our empirical results obtained with the Bayesian one-step FAVAR approach,
in the next chapter we further investigate the question of cross-country analysis of the
EA using the panel VAR technique of Gambacorta et al. (2012), and in the context of
unconventional monetary policy at the zero lower bound during the global financial crisis.
69Angeloni and Ehrmann (2003, p.6).
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APPENDIX K
DATA DESCRIPTION
Details of our country-level data sets are as below. The transformation (Tr.) codes are
1 - no transformation; 2 - first difference; 5 - first difference of logarithm. The variables
denoted as “1” (“0”) in column 4 are assumed to be slow- (fast-) moving. Data details in
brackets apply to the following same category series unless otherwise stated. Following
our BN pre-screening analysis, column τˆ ∗1 presents the correlation coefficients between the
residuals of the series and the ones listed in column j1.
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No. Description Tr. S/F Source
EA-17 DE FR IT ES
τˆ ∗1 j1 τˆ
∗
1 j1 τˆ
∗
1 j1 τˆ
∗
1 j1 τˆ
∗
1 j1
1 IP Total (2005=100) 5 1 OECD 0.91 8 0.86 8 0.92 8 0.86 8 0.56 9
2 IP-Intermediate Goods 5 1 Eurostat 0.64 8 0.43 8 0.77 8 0.48 8 0.71 9
3 IP-Energy 5 1 Eurostat 0.54 7 0.28 102 0.19 102 0.23 7 0.19 57
4 IP-Capital Goods 5 1 Eurostat 0.70 8 0.63 1 0.83 8 0.48 8 0.44 9
5 IP-Durable Consumer Goods 5 1 Eurostat 0.43 8 0.30 52 0.32 109 0.24 29 0.47 8
6 IP-Non-Durable Consumer Goods 5 1 Eurostat 0.32 5 0.28 8 0.51 8 0.53 8 0.52 8
7 IP-Mining And Quarrying 5 1 Eurostat 0.54 3 0.26 34 0.66 10 0.23 3 0.29 117
8 IP-Manufacturing 5 1 Eurostat 0.91 1 0.86 1 0.92 1 0.86 1 0.87 9
9 IP-New Orders 5 1 Eurostat 0.77 8 0.81 8 0.88 8 0.48 8 0.87 8
10 Construction Production Index 5 1 Eurostat 0.29 2 0.25 2 0.66 7 0.25 69 0.47 15
11 Unemployment Rate (%) 1 1 Eurostat 0.79 12 0.93 12 0.72 12 0.84 12 0.97 12
12 Youth Unemployment Rate 1 1 Eurostat 0.79 11 0.93 11 0.72 11 0.84 11 0.97 11
13 Unemployment Total (1000 persons) 5 1 Eurostat 0.41 39 0.46 112 0.33 42 0.25 40 0.51 79
14 Retail Sale of Food, Bev. & Tobaccoa 5 1 Eurostat 0.52 17 0.47 17 0.80 17 0.28 17 0.62 17
15 Retail Sale of Non-Food Products 5 1 Eurostat 0.72 17 0.78 17 0.74 17 0.87 17 0.75 17
16 Retail Sale of Textiles 5 1 Eurostat 0.68 15 0.65 15 0.71 15 0.81 15 0.41 17
17 Retail Trade 5 1 Eurostat 0.72 15 0.78 15 0.80 14 0.87 15 0.75 15
18 Passenger Car Registration (2005=100) 5 1 OECD 0.24 113 0.32 114 0.21 88 0.23 1 0.33 15
19 Exports Totalb 5 1 Eurostat 0.67 20 0.64 20 0.65 20 0.64 20 0.31 20
20 Imports Total 5 1 Eurostat 0.67 19 0.64 19 0.65 19 0.64 19 0.31 19
21 Total Reserves Including Gold (Mil. Euro) 5 1 ECB 0.56 60 0.43 105 0.34 105 0.45 105 0.30 101
22 HICP All-Items (2005=100) 5 1 Eurostat 0.83 26 0.76 26 0.93 26 0.93 26 0.67 23
23 Overall Index Exc. Energy and Unp. Food 5 1 Eurostat 0.53 27 0.85 27 0.61 22 0.86 22 0.67 22
24 HICP-Energy And Unprocessed Food 5 1 Eurostat 0.89 25 0.92 25 0.86 25 0.76 25 0.81 25
25 HICP-Liquid Fuels 5 1 Eurostat 0.89 24 0.92 24 0.86 24 0.76 24 0.81 24
26 HICP-Goods 5 1 Eurostat 0.83 22 0.83 24 0.93 22 0.93 22 0.49 23
27 HICP-Services 5 1 Eurostat 0.53 23 0.85 23 0.47 23 0.32 92 0.37 85
28 HICP-Non-Energy Ind. Goods, Durable 5 1 Eurostat 0.25 85 0.25 15 0.32 23 0.32 59 0.31 75
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No. Description Tr. S/F Source
EA-17 DE FR IT ES
τˆ ∗1 j1 τˆ
∗
1 j1 τˆ
∗
1 j1 τˆ
∗
1 j1 τˆ
∗
1 j1
29 HICP-Non-Energy Ind. G., Non-durable 5 1 Eurostat 0.22 22 0.28 23 0.28 23 0.42 34 0.24 94
30 PPI-Industry 5 1 Eurostat 0.79 35 0.53 78 0.87 35 0.81 35 0.89 35
31 PPI-Intermediate and Capital Goods 5 1 Eurostat 0.37 83 0.40 82 0.33 107 0.49 30 0.53 83
32 PPI-Durable Consumer Goods 5 1 Eurostat 0.40 95 0.33 62 0.33 96 0.23 19 0.23 111
33 PPI-Non-Durable Consumer Goods 5 1 Eurostat 0.35 25 0.27 76 0.41 64 0.34 31 0.38 26
34 PPI-Mining and Quarrying 5 1 Eurostat 0.29 31 0.40 30 0.30 33 0.42 29 0.27 18
35 PPI-Manufacturing 5 1 Eurostat 0.79 30 0.55 25 0.87 30 0.81 30 0.89 30
36 Crude Oil (West Texas Int., $/BBL) 5 0 WSJ 0.53 25 0.53 89 0.60 25 0.57 25 0.57 25
37 CRBc Spot Index (1967=100) 5 0 CRB 0.34 49 0.39 101 0.37 101 0.30 101 0.38 75
38 ECB Commodity Price Index (2000=100) 5 0 ECB 0.57 105 0.54 105 0.57 105 0.57 105 0.52 101
39 3M Euribor (%) 1 0 Datastream 0.98 40 0.97 40 0.98 40 0.97 40 0.96 40
40 6M Euribor 1 0 Datastream 0.98 39 0.97 39 0.98 39 0.97 39 0.97 41
41 1Y Euribor 1 0 Datastream 0.96 40 0.95 40 0.96 40 0.96 40 0.97 40
42 5Y Government Bond Yield 1 0 Datastream 0.83 43 0.87 43 0.92 43 0.94 43 0.92 43
43 10Y Government Bond Yield 1 0 OECD 0.83 42 0.87 42 0.92 42 0.94 42 0.92 42
44 Spread 3M-REFI 1 0 Calculated 0.91 45 0.91 45 0.91 45 0.91 45 0.84 45
45 Spread 6M-REFI 1 0 Calculated 0.95 46 0.94 46 0.94 46 0.94 46 0.93 46
46 Spread 1Y-REFI 1 0 Calculated 0.95 45 0.94 45 0.94 45 0.94 45 0.93 45
47 Spread 5Y-REFI 1 0 Calculated 0.82 48 0.94 48 0.92 48 0.94 48 0.92 48
48 Spread 10Y-REFI 1 0 Calculated 0.82 47 0.94 47 0.92 47 0.94 47 0.92 47
49 Euro Stoxx 50 (Points) 5 0 Eurostat 0.58 51 0.64 51 0.82 54 0.75 56 0.85 56
50 Share Price Index-Basic Materials 5 0 Datastream 0.44 56 0.51 49 0.65 49 0.39 39 0.44 51
51 Share Price Index-Industrials 5 0 Datastream 0.71 54 0.64 49 0.77 49 0.67 49 0.59 49
52 Share Price Index-Consumer Goods 5 0 Datastream 0.42 50 0.32 49 0.63 49 0.54 56 0.35 107
53 Share Price Index-Health Care 5 0 Datastream 0.33 56 0.37 54 0.43 49 0.41 52 0.32 107
54 Share Price Index-Consumer Services 5 0 Datastream 0.71 51 0.51 22 0.82 49 0.65 49 0.53 49
55 Share Price Index-Telecommunication 5 0 Datastream 0.51 54 0.37 49 0.49 54 0.58 51 0.67 49
56 Share Price Index-Financials 5 0 Datastream 0.52 51 0.51 25 0.80 49 0.75 49 0.85 49
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No. Description Tr. S/F Source
EA-17 DE FR IT ES
τˆ ∗1 j1 τˆ
∗
1 j1 τˆ
∗
1 j1 τˆ
∗
1 j1 τˆ
∗
1 j1
57 Share Price Index-Technology 5 0 Datastream 0.54 49 0.44 54 0.72 49 0.29 33 0.32 87
58 Share Price Index-Utilities 5 0 Datastream 0.57 49 0.27 35 0.59 51 0.61 49 0.65 49
59 Currency in Circulation (Mil. Euro) 5 0 Eurostat 0.41 85 0.27 85 0.47 61 0.32 28 0.30 106
60 Capital And Reserves 5 0 Eurostat 0.56 21 0.32 70 0.24 108 0.45 67 0.31 61
61 Money Stock: M1 5 0 ECB 0.72 68 0.77 62 0.81 62 0.99 68 1.00 68
62 Money Stock: M2 5 0 ECB 0.82 63 0.87 63 0.81 61 0.80 61 0.61 63
63 Money Stock: M3 5 0 ECB 0.82 62 0.87 62 0.59 62 0.64 62 0.61 62
64 Deposits with Agreed Maturity up to 2Y 5 0 Eurostat 0.54 95 0.57 68 0.56 62 0.45 73 0.62 80
65 External Assets 5 0 Eurostat 0.83 66 0.53 66 0.76 66 0.32 66 0.31 112
66 External Liabilities 5 0 Eurostat 0.83 65 0.53 65 0.76 65 0.32 65 0.25 38
67 Total Deposits of Residents Held At MFI 5 0 Eurostat 0.55 95 0.50 63 0.43 68 0.80 70 0.64 70
68 Overnight Deposits 5 0 Eurostat 0.72 61 0.69 61 0.48 61 0.99 61 1.00 61
69 Repurchase Agreements 5 0 Eurostat 0.37 93 0.23 32 0.47 63 0.40 73 0.31 63
70 Credit to Total Residents Granted by MFI 5 0 Eurostat 0.49 71 0.47 72 0.42 72 0.80 67 0.64 67
71 Loans to General Govt. Granted by MFI 5 0 Eurostat 0.54 67 0.35 67 0.27 67 0.76 67 0.25 24
72 Loans to Other Residents Granted By MFI 5 0 Eurostat 0.50 120 0.47 70 0.42 70 0.56 70 0.55 61
73 Debt Securities of EA Residents 5 0 Eurostat 0.66 20 0.29 70 0.24 96 0.48 42 0.30 42
74 Central Bank Claims on Banking Inst. 5 0 Eurostat 0.35 66 0.29 65 0.29 59 0.20 106 0.25 102
75 Economic Sentiment Indicator (Index) 5 0 Eurostat 0.83 80 0.76 80 0.86 77 0.75 80 0.88 79
76 Construction Confidence Indicator (%) 1 0 Eurostat 0.94 84 0.95 84 0.90 84 0.75 84 0.84 84
77 Industrial Confidence Indicator 1 0 Eurostat 0.82 82 0.79 82 0.86 75 0.82 82 0.63 81
78 Retail Confidence Indicator 1 0 Eurostat 0.60 93 0.55 75 0.59 43 0.64 11 0.86 80
79 Consumer Confidence Indicator (2005=100) 5 0 OECD 0.70 75 0.73 75 0.53 75 0.60 94 0.88 75
80 Services Confidence Indicator (%) 1 0 Eurostat 0.83 75 0.76 75 0.83 75 0.75 75 0.86 78
81 Employment Expec. for the Months Ahead 1 0 Eurostat 0.78 77 0.72 77 0.72 77 0.63 77 0.63 77
82 Production Expec. for the Months Ahead 1 0 Eurostat 0.82 77 0.79 77 0.80 77 0.82 77 0.62 77
83 Selling Price Expec. for the Months Ahead 1 0 Eurostat 0.78 77 0.67 77 0.67 95 0.72 77 0.55 77
84 Assessment of Order Books 1 0 Eurostat 0.94 76 0.95 76 0.90 76 0.75 76 0.84 76
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No. Description Tr. S/F Source
EA-17 DE FR IT ES
τˆ ∗1 j1 τˆ
∗
1 j1 τˆ
∗
1 j1 τˆ
∗
1 j1 τˆ
∗
1 j1
85 Price Trends Over The Next 12 Months 1 0 Eurostat 0.52 81 0.41 84 0.63 95 0.74 43 0.48 95
86 IP-USA (2005=100) 5 1 OECD 0.26 40 0.32 95 0.43 40 0.39 82 0.36 39
87 IP-UK 5 1 OECD 0.24 69 0.27 65 0.21 22 0.20 7 0.32 57
88 IP-JP 5 1 OECD 0.33 23 0.30 26 0.40 70 0.22 23 0.41 22
89 CPI-USA 5 1 OECD 0.54 25 0.53 36 0.60 25 0.59 25 0.58 25
90 CPI-UK 5 1 OECD 0.38 79 0.40 75 0.45 30 0.40 24 0.47 78
91 CPI-JP 5 1 OECD 0.26 79 0.29 89 0.29 89 0.31 79 0.28 89
92 US Federal Funds Target Rate (%) 1 0 FED 0.54 80 0.50 95 0.52 11 0.51 97 0.54 97
93 UK Bank Of England Base Rate 1 0 BoE 0.68 76 0.80 11 0.65 81 0.47 96 0.57 110
94 JP Overnight Call Money Rate 1 0 BoJ 0.50 95 0.56 40 0.52 48 0.62 11 0.68 80
95 10Y Bond Yield USA 1 0 OECD 0.78 96 0.66 48 0.76 96 0.69 96 0.69 96
96 10Y Bond Yield UK 1 0 OECD 0.78 95 0.68 48 0.76 95 0.69 95 0.69 95
97 10Y Bond Yield JP 1 0 OECD 0.48 46 0.52 76 0.54 12 0.51 92 0.54 92
98 Share Price Index-USA (Dow 30, Points) 5 0 Reuters 0.86 99 0.86 99 0.86 99 0.87 99 0.85 99
99 Share Price Index-UK (FTSE 100, Points) 5 0 Reuters 0.86 98 0.86 98 0.86 98 0.87 98 0.85 98
100 Share Price Index-JP (Nikkei 225, Points) 5 0 Reuters 0.56 98 0.54 98 0.55 98 0.57 98 0.56 98
101 US Dollar-Euro (Monthly average) 5 0 Eurostat 0.93 105 0.87 105 0.91 105 0.92 105 0.83 105
102 Pound Sterling-Euro 5 0 Eurostat 0.64 105 0.58 105 0.63 105 0.63 105 0.60 105
103 Swiss Franc-Euro 5 0 Eurostat 0.32 99 0.36 98 0.38 98 0.34 98 0.34 104
104 Japanese Yen-Euro 5 0 Eurostat 0.66 105 0.63 101 0.64 101 0.66 105 0.63 101
105 REER (1999=100) 5 0 Eurostat 0.93 101 0.87 101 0.91 101 0.92 101 0.83 101
106 Capacity Utilisation Rate (%)∗ 1 1 ECB 0.50 77 0.73 77 0.50 12 0.51 81 0.52 77
107 Gross Domestic Productd ∗ 5 1 Eurostat 0.91 113 0.96 113 0.85 113 0.84 113 0.66 108
108 Final Consumption Expenditure∗ 5 1 Eurostat 0.79 107 0.30 47 0.43 93 0.65 107 0.66 107
109 Gross Fixed Capital Formation∗ 5 1 Eurostat 0.70 107 0.63 107 0.59 8 0.44 49 0.61 107
110 Employment Total (1000 persons)∗ 5 1 Eurostat 0.97 111 0.98 111 1.00 111 0.90 111 0.87 111
111 Employees Total∗ 5 1 Eurostat 0.97 110 0.98 110 1.00 110 0.90 110 0.87 110
112 Self Employed Total∗ 5 1 Eurostat 0.45 110 0.58 76 0.60 43 0.26 70 0.43 110
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No. Description Tr. S/F Source
EA-17 DE FR IT ES
τˆ ∗1 j1 τˆ
∗
1 j1 τˆ
∗
1 j1 τˆ
∗
1 j1 τˆ
∗
1 j1
113 Real Labour Prod. per Person Employede∗ 5 1 ECB 0.91 107 0.96 107 0.85 107 0.84 107 0.68 111
114 Real Unit Labour Cost∗ 5 1 Eurostat 0.69 116 0.84 113 0.61 113 0.64 113 0.38 109
115 Earnings per Employee (Current, Euro)∗ 5 1 Oxd. Econ. 0.91 116 0.97 116 0.85 116 0.88 116 0.65 113
116 Wages and Salaries (Current, Bil. Euro)∗ 5 1 Oxd. Econ. 0.91 115 0.97 115 0.85 115 0.88 115 0.49 115
117 Current Account (Net, Mil. Euro, World)∗ 2 1 OECD 0.39 116 0.39 114 0.48 115 0.34 25 0.77 119
118 Capital Account∗ 2 1 OECD 0.44 51 0.16 53 0.36 58 0.19 34 0.51 119
119 Financial Account∗ 2 1 OECD 0.52 21 0.31 115 0.21 6 0.35 25 0.77 117
120 ECB Official Refinancing Operation Rate (%) 1 0 Eurostat 0.90 39 0.85 39 0.89 39 0.88 39 0.91 39
a (2005=100), b (vis-a-vis World, Trade value, Mil. Euro), c Commodity Research Bureau, d (Chained at Market Prices, Mil. 2000 Euro), e (2000=100)
An asterisk (*) denotes the variable is originally available in quarterly frequency.
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APPENDIX L
MODEL SPECIFICATIONS
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L.1 Explanatory Power of Factors
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Figure L.1.1: All Variables - Country Level
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Figure L.1.2: Main Variables - Country Level
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Figure L.1.3: All Variables - Area Wide
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Figure L.1.4: Main Variables - Area Wide
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APPENDIX M
CONFIDENCE INTERVALS
This appendix presents the confidence intervals of the impulse responses analysed in the
text. The dashed lines in the figures are the 16th and 84th quantiles of the Gibbs draws.
M.1 Pre-BN Analysis
M.1.1 Country-Level Approach
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Figure M.1.1: Confidence Intervals - Country-level: Germany
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Figure M.1.2: Confidence Intervals - Country-level: France
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Figure M.1.3: Confidence Intervals - Country-level: Italy
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Figure M.1.4: Confidence Intervals - Country-level: Spain
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M.1.2 Panel Approach
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Figure M.1.5: Confidence Intervals - Area-wide: EA
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Figure M.1.6: Confidence Intervals - Area-wide: Germany
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Figure M.1.7: Confidence Intervals - Area-wide: France
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Figure M.1.8: Confidence Intervals - Area-wide: Italy
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Figure M.1.9: Confidence Intervals - Area-wide: Spain
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M.1.3 Time Variation
Germany
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Figure M.1.10: Rollings - CL - IP: Germany
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Figure M.1.11: Rollings - CL - CPI: Germany
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Figure M.1.12: Rollings - CL - M1: Germany
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Figure M.1.13: Rollings - CL - M3: Germany
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Figure M.1.14: Rollings - CL - IP: France
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Figure M.1.15: Rollings - CL - CPI: France
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Figure M.1.16: Rollings - CL - M1: France
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Figure M.1.17: Rollings - CL - M3: France
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Italy
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Figure M.1.18: Rollings - CL - IP: Italy
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Figure M.1.19: Rollings - CL - CPI: Italy
174
0 10 20 30 40
0
0.5
1
Mar99−Jun07
0 10 20 30 40
0
1
2
Sep99−Dec07
0 10 20 30 40
0
1
2
Mar00−Jun08
0 10 20 30 40
0
1
2
Sep00−Dec08
0 10 20 30 40
0
0.5
1
1.5
Mar01−Jun09
0 10 20 30 40
0
1
2
Sep01−Dec09
0 10 20 30 40
0
1
2
Mar02−Jun10
0 10 20 30 40
0
1
2
Sep02−Dec10
0 10 20 30 40
5
10
15
Mar03−Jun11
0 10 20 30 40
−1
0
1
2
Sep03−Dec11
Figure M.1.20: Rollings - CL - M1: Italy
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Figure M.1.21: Rollings - CL - M3: Italy
175
Spain
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Figure M.1.22: Rollings - CL - IP: Spain
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Figure M.1.23: Rollings - CL - CPI: Spain
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Figure M.1.24: Rollings - CL - M1: Spain
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Figure M.1.25: Rollings - CL - M3: Spain
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M.2 Post-BN Analysis
M.2.1 Country-Level Approach
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Figure M.2.1: Post-BN - CL: Germany
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Figure M.2.2: Post-BN - CL: France
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Figure M.2.3: Post-BN - CL: Italy
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Figure M.2.4: Post-BN - CL: Spain
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M.2.2 Panel Approach
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Figure M.2.5: Post-BN - AW: EA
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Figure M.2.6: Post-BN - AW: Germany
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Figure M.2.7: Post-BN - AW: France
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Figure M.2.8: Post-BN - AW: Italy
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Figure M.2.9: Post-BN - AW: Spain
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M.2.3 Time Variation
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Figure M.2.10: Post-BN - Rollings - CL - IP: DE
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Figure M.2.11: Post-BN - Rollings - CL - CPI: DE
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Figure M.2.12: Post-BN - Rollings - CL - M1: DE
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Figure M.2.13: Post-BN - Rollings - CL - M3: DE
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Figure M.2.14: Post-BN - Rollings - CL - IP: FR
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Figure M.2.15: Post-BN - Rollings - CL - CPI: FR
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Figure M.2.16: Post-BN - Rollings - CL - M1: FR
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Figure M.2.17: Post-BN - Rollings - CL - M3: FR
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Figure M.2.18: Post-BN - Rollings - CL - IP: IT
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Figure M.2.19: Post-BN - Rollings - CL - CPI: IT
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Figure M.2.20: Post-BN - Rollings - CL - M1: IT
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Figure M.2.21: Post-BN - Rollings - CL - M3: IT
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Figure M.2.22: Post-BN - Rollings - CL - IP: ES
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Figure M.2.23: Post-BN - Rollings - CL - CPI: ES
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Figure M.2.24: Post-BN - Rollings - CL - M1: ES
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Figure M.2.25: Post-BN - Rollings - CL - M3: ES
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APPENDIX N
POST-BN ROLLING REGRESSIONS
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Figure N.0.1: Rolling Windows - Post-BN - CL - IP
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Figure N.0.2: Rolling Windows - Post-BN - CL - CPI
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Figure N.0.3: Rolling Windows - Post-BN - CL - M1
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APPENDIX O
CONVERGENCE OF GIBBS SAMPLINGS
O.1 Country-Level and Panel Approaches
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Figure O.1.1: Convergence: Panel
2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010
−1
0
1
Factor 1
2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010
−2
−1
0
1
Factor 2
2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010
−1
0
1
Factor 3
2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010
−2
−1
0
1
Factor 4
Figure O.1.2: Convergence: Germany
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Figure O.1.3: Convergence: Italy
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Figure O.1.4: Convergence: Spain
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Figure O.1.5: Convergence: France
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Figure O.1.6: Convergence - Post-BN: Panel
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Figure O.1.7: Convergence - Post-BN: Germany
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Figure O.1.8: Convergence - Post-BN: France
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Figure O.1.9: Convergence - Post-BN: Italy
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Figure O.1.10: Convergence - Post-BN: Spain
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O.2 Time Variation
Because the number factors are varying across rolling windows estimated for other coun-
tries, we present the pre-BN convergence plots only for France. Convergence is obtained
for other countries in a similar way for France.
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Figure O.2.1: Convergence - Rollings: France
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Figure O.2.2: Convergence - Rollings - Post-BN: Germany
200
2000 2002 2004 2006
−0.5
0
0.5
1
Window: 1 − K: 1
2000 2002 2004 2006
−1
−0.5
0
0.5
Window: 1 − K: 2
2000 2002 2004 2006
−0.5
0
0.5
1
Window: 2 − K: 1
2000 2002 2004 2006
−1
−0.5
0
0.5
Window: 2 − K: 2
2002 2004 2006 2008
−0.5
0
0.5
Window: 3 − K: 1
2002 2004 2006 2008
−1
0
1
Window: 3 − K: 2
2002 2004 2006 2008
−1
−0.5
0
0.5
Window: 4 − K: 1
2002 2004 2006 2008
−2
−1
0
Window: 4 − K: 2
2002 2004 2006 2008
−1.5
−1
−0.5
0
0.5
Window: 5 − K: 1
2002 2004 2006 2008
−1.5
−1
−0.5
0
0.5
Window: 5 − K: 2
2002 2004 2006 2008
−1.5
−1
−0.5
0
0.5
Window: 6 − K: 1
2002 2004 2006 2008
−1.5
−1
−0.5
0
0.5
Window: 6 − K: 2
2004 2006 2008 2010
−1.5
−1
−0.5
0
0.5
Window: 7 − K: 1
2004 2006 2008 2010
−2
−1
0
Window: 7 − K: 2
2004 2006 2008 2010
−1.5
−1
−0.5
0
0.5
Window: 8 − K: 1
2004 2006 2008 2010
−2
−1
0
1
Window: 8 −  K: 2
2004 2006 2008 2010
−1.5
−1
−0.5
0
0.5
Window: 9 − K: 1
2004 2006 2008 2010
−2
−1
0
Window: 9 − K: 2
2004 2006 2008 2010
−1.5
−1
−0.5
0
0.5
Window: 10 − K: 1
2004 2006 2008 2010
−2
−1
0
Window: 10 − K: 2
20 0 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010
−1
0
1
Factor 1
2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010
−2
−1
0
1
Factor 2
2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010
−1
0
1
Factor 3
2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010
−2
−1
0
1
Factor 4
 
 
First half Second half
Figure O.2.3: Convergence - Rollings - Post-BN: France
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Figure O.2.4: Convergence - Rollings - Post-BN: Italy
202
2000 2002 2004 2006
−0.5
0
0.5
Window: 1 − K: 1
2000 2002 2004 2006
−1
−0.5
0
0.5
Window: 1 − K: 2
2000 2002 2004 2006
−0.5
0
0.5
1
Window: 2 − K: 1
2000 2002 2004 2006
−1
−0.5
0
0.5
Window: 2 − K: 2
2002 2004 2006 2008
−1.5
−1
−0.5
0
0.5
Window: 3 − K: 1
2002 2004 2006 2008
−0.5
0
0.5
Window: 3 − K: 2
2002 2004 2006 2008
−2
−1
0
Window: 4 − K: 1
2002 2004 2006 2008
−1
−0.5
0
0.5
Window: 4 − K: 2
2002 2004 2006 2008
−2
−1
0
Window: 5 − K: 1
2002 2004 2006 2008
−0.5
0
0.5
Window: 5 − K: 2
2002 2004 2006 2008
−1.5
−1
−0.5
0
0.5
Window: 6 − K: 1
2002 2004 2006 2008
−2
−1
0
Window: 6 − K: 2
2004 2006 2008 2010
−2
−1
0
Window: 7 − K: 1
2004 2006 2008 2010
−1
0
1
Window: 7 − K: 2
2004 2006 2008 2010
−2
−1
0
Window: 8 − K: 1
2004 2006 2008 2010
−0.5
0
0.5
1
Window: 8 −  K: 2
2004 2006 2008 2010
−2
−1
0
Window: 9 − K: 1
2004 2006 2008 2010
−1
−0.5
0
0.5
Window: 9 − K: 2
2004 2006 2008 2010
−2
−1
0
Window: 10 − K: 1
2004 2006 2008 2010
−1
−0.5
0
0.5
Window: 10 − K: 2
2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010
−1
0
1
Factor 1
2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010
−2
−1
0
1
Factor 2
2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010
−1
0
1
Factor 3
2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010
−2
−1
0
1
Factor 4
 
 
First half Second half
Figure O.2.5: Convergence - Rollings - Post-BN: Spain
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CHAPTER 3
THE EFFECTS OF UNCONVENTIONAL
MONETARY POLICY ACROSS EURO AREA
ECONOMIES
3.1 Introduction
As a result of the subprime mortgage crisis in the US, in August 2007, there was growing
turmoil in the global financial markets (See Figure 3.1.1). A number of European banks
publicly announced their direct and indirect exposures to the US subprime mortgage
market, which automatically led to severe losses and liquidity shortages in the European
banking system.
Like other big central banks worldwide, the Eurosystem1 urgently responded to the
developments in the markets with several “unconventional” measures, “unprecedented in
nature, scope and magnitude”.2 As summarised by Nagel (2012, p.14), “the aim of these
measures [was] to sustain financial inter-mediation in the euro area, foster the flow of credit
to enterprises and households, and support the monetary policy transmission mechanism.”
1The Eurosystem is composed of the ECB and the national central banks (NCBs) of those countries
that have adopted the euro as their legal tender.
2ECB (2011, p.90).
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Figure 3.1.1: Volatility in Financial Markets
Chicago Board Options Exchange Market Volatility Index (VIX, %, SA) - Source: Datastream
Note: VIX indices measure the stock market volatility expectations in the next 30 days using a forward
looking approach based on option prices. The indices are quoted in percentage points, and higher values
stand for higher expected movements, in percentage points, over the next 30-day period. For details see
Whaley (2009).
Borio and Disyatat (2009) highlight that it is the choice of market(s) targeted by these
policies that is ‘atypical’ or ‘unprecedented’, and it is this choice that makes the policies
unconventional. For example, according to Borio and Disyatat, the target of the central
banks’ unconventional policies has been term money market rates, long-term government
bond yields and various risk spreads.3 Figure 3.2.1 displays the balance sheet policies
of the Eurosystem which started in August 2007 with the extra liquidity provided on an
ad hoc basis, and followed by, in December 2007, the liquidity support in dollars to the
European banking sector.
On the other side of the Atlantic, the Business Cycle Dating Committee of the Na-
tional Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) determined that the peak in economic ac-
3See Section 3.1.1 for the transmission mechanism of unconventional monetary measures.
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tivity occurred in December 2007, following the expansion that began in November 2001.
Following the collapse of Lehman Brothers in September 2008, financial turmoil turned
into a global financial crisis, the so called ‘Great Recession’.
‘The virtual breakdown of the money market’, as stated by the ECB,4 caused short-
term interest rates to increase to ‘abnormally high levels’ (See Figure 3.1.2). During this
period of great uncertainty, banks increased their liquidity reserves, removed risky assets
from their balance sheets, and tightened loan conditions. Unsurprisingly, the crisis began
to spread to the real economy.
In October 2008, the ECB started to carry out weekly refinancing operations with
a fixed-rate tender procedure with full allotment.5 As described by the ECB (2012a),
the Bank “effectively took the place of the money market” in the EA. The ECB also
responded to the crisis in the form of the Covered Bond Purchase Programme started in
June 2009. In order to help revive the market in covered bonds, the ECB used one of
its monetary policy instruments so called ‘structural operations’, and started to purchase
“certain assets that are eligible as collateral”.6
In May 2010, the ECB introduced the Securities Markets Programme (SMP) in order
to “address the malfunctioning of securities markets and restore an appropriate monetary
policy transmission mechanism.”7 The programme allowed the ECB and the NCBs to in-
tervene in certain debt securities markets, mostly government bond markets, as described
in ECB (2012a).
Following the rise in tensions in the European financial markets in the second half of
4See ECB (2012a).
5i.e. “the interest rate is set in advance and the ECB provides as much liquidity as the banks request,
provided they offer collateral of sufficient quality” (ECB, 2012a).
6ECB (2012a).
7Ibid.
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Figure 3.1.2: Interest Rates (EA, %)
Source: Eurostat
2011, mainly due to the developments in default probabilities on the sovereign debt, the
ECB announced two longer-term refinancing operations (LTRO), with a maturity of 36
months and full allotment, to be conducted on 21 December 2011 and 29 February 2012.
Furthermore, the Bank reduced the reserve ratio to 1% (from 2%) as of 18 January 2012.
Within these measures, the ECB allowed the NCBs to accept additional bank loans as
collateral. According to ECB (2012a), “the responsibility entailed in the acceptance of
such credit claims [were] borne by the national central bank authorising their use.”
After the collapse of Lehman Brothers, the Federal Reserve (Fed) and the Bank of
England (BoE) balance sheets initially developed similarly to that of the Eurosystem.
Whereas the Fed introduced the Term Auction Facility, the BoE set up the Asset Purchase
Facility Fund in order to provide sufficient liquidity to their financial sectors. During the
crisis, these central banks, similar to the Eurosystem, performed various unconventional
monetary policy measures, while their policy rates were rapidly lowered towards their
207
lower bounds.
In the absence of the ECB’s (and other central banks’) responses to the crisis, there
would certainly have been (i) risks of bank failures, given the liabilities of the banks reach-
ing maturity in 2012; (ii) extra sales of sovereign bond holdings, which would significantly
increase the pressure on the sustainability of (especially peripheral) sovereigns; and (iii)
significant reductions in bank lending.8 Given this worst-case scenario, there is no doubt
that, in general, the central banks’ responses to the crisis achieved their ultimate targets
of functioning financial intermediations, credit flows, and monetary policy transmission
mechanism. As stated by Mishkin (2012), “[i]ndeed, ..., aggressive nonconventional mon-
etary policy during the recent financial crisis helped prevent the Great Recession from
turning into a Great Depression and also helped the economy avoid a deflationary episodes
as occurred during the Great Depression era” (p.672). As we summarise in Table 3.1.1,
this is the common finding of the literature on the effectiveness of unconventional mone-
tary policy actions of the central banks worldwide.
“While there was a high degree of commonality in central banks’ response to the crisis,
[as highlighted by Gambacorta et al. (2012, p.6)] there was also a considerable degree of
heterogeneity in the design of central bank balance sheet policies”. In other words, while
the policies typically led the central banks’ balance sheets to increase, their compositions
varied across economies. To illustrate, while lending to the financial sector and large-
scale purchases of private sector and government securities account for the expansion of
the Fed and BoE’s balance sheets, the Eurosystem’s unconventional monetary policy, as
summarised above, primarily focused on lending to financial institutions.9 Therefore, as
8See Davies (2011).
9See Gambacorta et al. (2012, p.6).
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Table 3.1.1: The Global Financial Crisis and Unconventional Monetary Policy
Study Approach Country/Sample Conclusion
Bernanke et al. (2004b) Event study and VAR
models
US, JP - 1982M6-2004M8 Significant impact of Fed statements on shaping
public expectations of future policy actions. No
significant impact of Bank of Japan communica-
tions on one-year ahead expectations.
Meier (2009) Event study UK - 2009M2-2009M6 Economically significant effects of the Bank of
England’s first round of asset purchases.
Giannone et al. (2011) Bayesian VAR model EA as an aggregate
• 1991M1-2008M8
• 1999M1-2010M3
• ‘Policy’ and ‘no policy
scenarios’ for the period
Sep 2008 - Mar 2010
ECB’s unconventional monetary policy measures
“supported financial intermediation, credit expan-
sion and monetary policy transmission in the euro
area in the face of financial crisis, as was intended”
(p.6).
Peersman (2011) Structural VAR model EA as an aggregate -
1999M1-2009M12
Compared to a traditional interest rate innova-
tion, an expansionary shock to the monetary base
or central bank balance sheet displays a more
sluggish pass-through effect on economic activity
(hump-shaped) and consumer prices (permanent).
Gagnon et al. (2011) Event studies and time
series regressions
US, UK, JP - 85M1-
08M6/08M12-10M3
Central bank asset purchases mainly affect bond
yields and other asset prices by reducing term or
Joyce et al. (2011a) VAR & GARCH-M
models
UK - 1990M12-2009M12 risk premia through portfolio balance effects.
Joyce et al. (2011b) Review of QE UK
D’Amico and King (2012) Fixed-effects panel US - 17 Mar - 30 Oct 2009
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Study Approach Country/Sample Conclusion
Krishnamurthy and
Vissing-Jorgensen (2011)
Event studies and time
series regressions
US - 1926-2008 / 26 Aug
10 - 02 Nov 10
Fed’s large-scale asset purchases (LSAPs) were
successful in reducing medium and long-term
Swanson (2011) High-frequency event
studies
US - 2 Feb - 6 Apr 1961 interest rates.
Hamilton and Wu (2012) Term-structure model
of risk-averse arbi-
trageurs
US - 1990M1-2011M1
Giannone et al. (2012) Bayesian VAR model EA as an aggregate
• 1990M1-2011M4
• ‘Policy’ and ‘no policy
scenarios’ for the period
Aug 2007 - Apr 2011
Relative to a ‘no policy scenario’, ECB’s response
to the crisis is associated with:
• higher bank loans to households and, in partic-
ular, to non-financial corporations
• a significant improvement on economic activity.
Borio and Zhu (2012) Review of ‘risk-taking
channel’ of mone-
tary transmission
mechanism
“To the extent that risk perceptions and risk tol-
erance become more pervasive influences on be-
haviour, the direct and indirect impact of mone-
tary policy on expenditures through its nexus with
risk-taking may well grow” (p.248).
Neely (2012) Portfolio balance
model and event-
study methodologies
AU, DE, CA, JP, UK, US
- 1985M2-2010M4
US LSPAs had substantial effects on long-term
interest rates and the spot value of the dollar.
De Santis (2012) Cointegration, dy-
namic OLS and
structural VAR model
AT, DE, BE, GR, ES, FI,
FR, IE, IT, PT, NL - 1
Sep 08 - 4 Aug 11
Factors which accounts for sovereign spreads in
the EA: (i) an aggregate regional risk factor; (ii)
the country-specific credit risk, (iii) the spillover
effect from Greece.
Abbreviations: AT-Austria, AU-Australia, BE-Belgium, CA-Canada, DE-Germany, GR-Greece, ES-Spain, FI-Finland, FR-France,
IE-Ireland, IT-Italy, JP-Japan, NL-Netherlands, PT-Portugal, UK-United Kingdom, US-United States.
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we can see from Figure P.0.1, securities account for the majority of the assets of the Fed
and BoE whilst lending has been the main item of the Eurosystem balance sheet during
the crisis period. Country-specific effects of the policies are as summarised in Table 3.1.1.
Gambacorta et al. (2012) contribute to the literature on the investigation of the ef-
fectiveness of unconventional monetary policy by applying a cross-country approach to
eight advanced economies.10 The authors investigate the impact of exogenous shocks to
central bank assets on the dynamics of output and prices using a structural panel VAR
model over the crisis period (Jan 2008 - Jun 2011). The main finding of the paper is
that following an expansionary unconventional monetary policy shock, output and prices
temporarily and statistically significantly increase in the countries. Gambacorta et al.
(2012) also observe homogeneous responses of the economic activity and prices across the
countries.
In this chapter, we follow the methodology of Gambacorta et al. (2012), described in
Section 3.3, in order to investigate the effects of unconventional monetary policy actions
of the Eurosystem across thirteen countries of the EA (EA-13). In particular, we esti-
mate a four-variable11 structural panel VAR model for Austria, Belgium, Finland, France,
Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Slovenia, and
Spain, for the crisis period from January 2008 to September 2012.12 To our knowledge,
this paper is the first to investigate the effectiveness of expansionary unconventional mon-
etary policy shocks across EA economies, and to do so using a panel VAR technique.
Our mean group estimations suggest that, in line with the literature summarised in
10Canada, EA, Japan, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States.
11Output, prices, market volatility, central bank assets.
12Among seventeen states of the EA, Cyprus, Estonia, Malta and Slovakia are excluded because these
countries adopted euro within the sample period of the analysis. We only focus on the countries which
had experienced the structural transformation from independent monetary policy to monetary union
before the beginning of our sample period.
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Table 3.1.1, both output and prices increase statistically significantly as a result of an
expansionary monetary policy shock during the crisis period. We observe the responses
of output to be transitory, lasting for 15 periods following the shock, while that of prices
are stronger and much more persistent. Furthermore, our country-level results highlight
that whereas prices rise relatively homogeneously across countries of the interest, economic
activities display important heterogeneity. In particular, following an expansionary shock
to NCB total assets, we observe core countries’ (e.g. Germany, France, the Netherlands)
economic activities increasing for up to three years whilst that of the peripheral countries
(e.g. Greece, Portugal, Spain) contracting persistently.
According to the main findings of Chapter 2, we raised the issue of heterogeneous trans-
mission of (un)conventional monetary policy actions across the EA economies through
(heterogeneous) channels.13 Given the support of the empirical findings of the present
chapter to that argument, we believe it is important to describe the theoretical aspects of
the monetary transmission mechanism. The following subsection contains these details.
3.1.1 Monetary Transmission Mechanism
According to traditional textbooks, e.g. Mishkin (2012), (expansionary) monetary policy
is expected to affect the aggregate demand through three basic mechanisms: traditional
interest rate channel, asset price channels, and credit view. Given the emphasis of our
paper on unconventional monetary measures, we summarise the asset price channel, and
the credit view.14,15
13See Section 2.6, p.154.
14This part follows Mishkin (2012, Chapter 26).
15For details of other channels such as ‘traditional interest rate effects’, ‘exchange rate effects on net
exports’, ‘cash flow channel’, and ‘unanticipated price level channel’, see Mishkin (2012, p.665).
212
First, expansionary monetary policy is expected to increase share prices which will have
a positive impact on Tobin’s q16 and the value of consumers’ financial wealth. Following
the q theory of Tobin (1969) and the life-cycle hypothesis of Ando and Modigliani (1963),
higher share prices will lead to higher investment spending and consumption due to,
respectively, higher q of businesses and higher lifetime resources of consumers.
Second, the credit view suggests that financial frictions in credit markets (i.e. ad-
verse selection and moral hazard) lead to two types of monetary transmission channels:
bank lending and balance sheets of firms and households. According to the bank lending
channel, expansionary monetary policy, which increases bank reserves and bank deposits,
leads to higher bank loans. Due to the importance of bank loans for borrowers in financing
their activities, this increase in loans leads investment (and possibly consumer) spending
to rise, hence improve the economic activity.
The other credit channel, i.e. the balance sheet channel, highlights the importance
of financial frictions in credit markets. There is no doubt that a decline in the net
worth of business firms increases the possibility of adverse selection and moral hazard
problems. Lower net worth of businesses, on the one hand, means less collateral for
lenders’ loans (adverse selection). On the other hand, lower levels of net worth raises the
moral hazard problem due to higher incentives for risky investment projects caused by
lower equity stakes. Given the importance of adverse selection and moral hazard problems
in credit markets, balance sheet channel suggests that higher share prices, following an
expansionary monetary policy, lead to increase in the net worth of firms which lowers
financial frictions and increases lending. As a result, investment and aggregate demand
16Tobin (1969) defines q as the ratio between the market value of capital and its replacement cost,
and proposes that “[t]he rate of investment - the speed at which investors wish to increase the capital
stock should be related, if to anything, to q ...” (p.21).
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increase in the economy.
The final balance sheet channel through which monetary policy can affect the aggre-
gate demand is related to liquidity effects on consumer durable and housing expenditures.
According to Mishkin (2012, p.669), “if consumers expect a higher likelihood of finding
themselves in financial distress, they would rather hold fewer illiquid durable or housing
assets and more liquid financial assets.” Therefore, an increase in consumer cash flow,
arising from the improvement of financial assets, decreases the probability of financial
distress, which increases the expenditure on durables and housing, and hence the aggre-
gate demand. Furthermore, the increase in the demand for housing leads to higher house
prices which itself also creates positive wealth effects on the aggregate demand. Besides
this wealth effect, as highlighted by Hofmann (2003) and Goodhart and Hofmann (2008),
there is also a collateral effect of house prices which suggests better borrowing capacity,
given the fact that houses are commonly used as collateral for loans, and enhanced house-
hold spending. On the construction side, according to Goodhart and Hofmann (2008),
residential investment is the main channel of house-price fluctuations to economic ac-
tivity. The authors name this effect as ‘the Tobin q for residential investment’ which
suggests higher housing construction due to increase in the value of housing relative to
its construction cost.
The descriptions above mainly apply to conventional monetary policy of lowering
short-term (nominal) interest rates.17 However, the transmission mechanism of uncon-
ventional monetary policy does not significantly differ from the conventional channels.
17Mishkin (2012) highlights the emphasis of interest-rate transmission mechanism on the real interest
rate, and claims that “the key is the phenomenon of sticky prices, the fact that the aggregate price adjusts
slowly over time, so that expansionary monetary policy, which lowers the short-term nominal interest
rate, also lowers the short-term real interest rate” (p.663).
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To illustrate, as we cited earlier, Borio and Disyatat (2009) emphasise that the choice of
market targeted by the central bank is “atypical” or “unprecedented”. “It is this choice
that makes the policies ‘unconventional’, not the overall approach of seeking to influence
specific elements of the transmission mechanism other than the policy rate.”18 Borio and
Disyatat claim that “the main channel through which they [unconventional measures]
affect economic activity is by altering the balance sheet of private sector agents [portfo-
lio balance sheet channel], or influencing expectations thereof [signalling channel]” (p.2).
That is to say, the unconventional measures affect interest rates (e.g. term money market
rates, long-term government bond yields) by changing the supply of assets held by the
private sector19 and “by lowering expectations of future short rates or by reducing the
term premium on longer term bonds.”20
Besides the portfolio balance sheet and signalling channels, Borio and Zhu (2012) stress
“a [possible] missing link in the transmission mechanism” called the ‘risk-taking channel’.
According to Borio and Zhu, easier funding conditions and fewer risky assets in portfolios
“may reduce perceived risks and induce higher risk-taking”.21 Borio and Zhu claim that
“to the extent that risk perceptions and risk tolerance become more pervasive influences
on behaviour, the direct and indirect impact of monetary policy on expenditures through
its nexus with risk-taking may well grow” (p.248). Given the safe haven status of core EA
countries, and significant defaults risks and bailouts of the peripheral sovereigns in the
EA, we believe that the risk channel is of importance for the explanation of cross-country
heterogeneity observed in our empirical analysis.22
18Borio and Disyatat (2009, p.5).
19Given the ‘imperfect substitutability’ strand of the literature on the asset side of private sector
balance sheet. See Brainard and Tobin (1968).
20Fender (2012, p.209).
21Borio and Disyatat (2009, p.14).
22See Sections 3.4 - 3.6.
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Our investigations of the monetary transmission mechanism and the developments in
various EA macroeconomic indicators during the crisis, clearly suggest that (i) neither
asset price and portfolio balance sheets channels nor the signalling channel functioned
well in the periphery, especially in Greece; (ii) despite significant increases in central
bank assets, sharp decreases in peripheral sentiment, bank lending and the money supply
prevented the transmission of the policy measures into the real economy; and (iii) the
risk-taking channel, i.e. “persistence-enhancing mechanism”23, played its enhancement
(diminishment) role for the core (periphery) during the Great Recession.24
3.1.2 Structure of the Chapter
The rest of the chapter is organised as follows. Section 3.2 presents the data under in-
vestigation. The methodology of the chapter is described in Section 3.3. Section 3.4
contains the empirical findings of the chapter which we test for various model variations
and extensions in Section 3.5. We link the empirical findings of the chapter to the ac-
tual heterogeneity between core and periphery in Section 3.6. Section 3.7 concludes the
chapter.
3.2 Data
The data set of the chapter is a balanced panel of monthly macroeconomic time series for
thirteen EA economies spanning the period from January 2008 to September 2012.25 The
countries under investigation are Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece,
23See Borio and Zhu (2012, p.237).
24For details see Section 3.6.
25A balanced panel could be gathered for this sample when the chapter was written.
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Figure 3.2.1: Total Assets of the Eurosystem
Outstanding amounts at the end of the periods (Billions of Euro, SA)
Note: ECB’s Response to the Crisis (red lines): Aug 07 - Extra liquidity on an ad hoc basis, Dec
07 - Swap agreement with the Fed, Oct 2008 - Extraordinary liquidity measures, Jun 09 - Purchase
programme for covered bonds, May 10 - Securities Markets Programme (SMP), Dec 11 - LTRO.
Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Slovenia, and Spain.
Our benchmark four-variable panel VAR model consists of economic activity, price
level, financial market volatility and central bank balance sheet. We proxy these variables
using, respectively, IP, CPI, VIX and central bank total assets/liabilities. All series are
corrected for missing observations, if any, and adjusted for outliers and seasonal behaviour
using Demetra+ package. Table 3.2.1 presents the details of the data set.
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Table 3.2.1: Data Set
Series Type/Unit Source
Benchmark Model
Industrial Production Volume Index, 2005=100 Eurostat
CPI Index, 2005=100 Eurostat
VIX Index, % Datastream
Total Assets End of period, Millions of Euro NCBs
Model Extensions
Base Money End of period, Millions of Euro ECB SDW
Eurosystem Assets End of period, Millions of Euro ECB SDW
GDP Volume Index, 2005=100 Eurostat
REFI End of period, % per annum Eurostat
Government Exp. Chained Volume, Millions of Euro OECD/NCB
Public Debt End of period, Millions of Euro Eurostat
MFI Private Lending End of period, Millions of Euro NCB
NEER Index, 1999Q1=100 ECB SDW
Gold Price Euro per troy once Datastream
Bond Yield End of period, % per annum ECB SDW
Unemployment Rate Monthly average, % Eurostat
3.3 Methodology
The estimation methodology of the chapter closely follows Gambacorta et al. (2012).26,27
The panel VAR approach is based on the following reduced-form model:
Xt = βXt−1 + ut (3.3.1)
where Xt is a vector of endogenous variables, i.e. Xt = [ip, cpi,VIX, ta]
′, all of which,
except the VIX index, enter the system in a log-level form.28
26We are grateful to the authors for sharing the replication files of their paper.
27Our special thanks also go to Charles Rahal for his great efforts in our collaborative work on the
methodology and the estimation procedure of the chapter.
28See Sims et al. (1990) for the benefits of estimation of VARs in levels in terms of implicit cointegrating
relationships in the data.
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3.3.1 System of Equations
In the first step of the estimation procedure, we group the equations of each variable
across countries and then estimate them as a system of seemingly unrelated regression
(SUR) models in order to account for the cross-country correlations in the residual series
of each variable. The SUR estimator (βˆ) is given by:
βˆ =
(
X ′t−1(Σˆ
−1 ⊗ I)Xt−1
)−1 (
X ′t−1(Σˆ
−1 ⊗ I)Xt
)
(3.3.2)
where E[u′u] = Σ is the covariance matrix of these regressions, estimated as:
Σˆ =
1
T
T∑
t=1
uˆtuˆt
′ (3.3.3)
3.3.2 Bootstrapping
Having the cross-country correlations accounted for, we secondly simulate the system
of equations using bootstrapping technique, which again uses the aforementioned SUR
methodology to group each variable together across countries. We then compute the
eigenvalues of the companion matrices of country-specific bootstrap VARs in order to
check the dynamic stability of the system.
3.3.3 Structural VAR
In order to obtain a structural re-parameterisation of the system, let us start with the
reduced-form representation (3.3.1). If we assume that A represents the contemporaneous
relationships between the variables, and B represents the correlations across the structural
shocks (εt), then the ’true’ structure of the model becomes:
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AXt = ΓXt−1 +Bεt (3.3.4)
If we pre-multiply (3.3.4) by A−1, we obtain:
Xt = A
−1ΓXt−1 + A−1Bεt (3.3.5)
which implies β = A−1Γ in (3.3.1). As we cited in Chapter 1, it is common in the literature
to follow Bernanke (1986) and assume orthogonality between the structural shocks, and
normalise them to have a unit variance, i.e. E[εtε
′
t] = I. Therefore, from (3.3.1) and
(3.3.5), the relationship between the reduced-form errors and the structural shocks can
be shown as:
ut = A
−1εt or Aut = εt (3.3.6)
We discussed in Chapter 1 the alternative identification schemes in the literature,29
one of which is a recursive ordering of the variables in a VAR system.
Recursive Identification
Following Fry and Pagan (2007), the recursive structure of the system allows us to obtain
the estimates of A, e.g. by OLS, expressed as:
uˆt = Aˆ
−1εˆt (3.3.7)
Given the number of estimable parameters in Aˆ, this system is not presently identified.
For the general case, assume we call S the matrix which contains the estimated standard
deviations of the structural shocks (εt) on the diagonals and zeros elsewhere. Therefore,
uˆt = Aˆ
−1SS−1εˆt = Tηt (3.3.8)
29See Section 1.2.3, p.25.
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where T = Aˆ−1S, and ηt = S−1εˆt with unit variance. Given the recursive structure of the
system, T is lower triangular, similar to A. Suppose we can find a square matrix Q such
that Q′Q = QQ′ = I,30 then;
uˆt = TQ
′Qηt = T ∗η∗t (3.3.9)
where T ∗ = TQ′ and η∗t = Qηt. This transformation allows us to generate new estimated
shocks, such as those to central bank total assets (η∗t ), again with an identity covariance
matrix due to the fact that:
E[η∗t η
∗
t
′] = QE[ηtη′t]Q
′ = I (3.3.10)
From (3.3.9) and (3.3.10), we obtain:
Σˆ = E[uˆtuˆt
′] = T ∗T ∗′ (3.3.11)
In order to recover η∗ from (3.3.10), one possibility is to assume a Cholesky decompo-
sition of Σˆ. Therefore, we generate a set of shocks (η∗t ) with a covariance matrix identical
to ηt, but which will have a different impact upon ut, and also on Xt. According to Fry
and Pagan (2007, p.6), “it is this ability to create a large number of candidate shocks
that is the basis of sign restriction methods”, which we describe below.31
Impulse Responses
Having identified a system with a recursive structure as above, the impulse response
functions can be obtained from the following MA representation of the system:
30See the part Generating Orthogonal Matrices below.
31See the part Sign Restrictions.
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[A− ΓL]Xt = εt
Xt = C(L)εt
Xt = C0εt + C1εt−1 + . . .+ Csεt−s (3.3.12)
C(L) = [A− ΓL]−1 (3.3.13)
C0 = A
−1
C0 represents the contemporaneous response, and we interpret the matrix Cs within
the MA representation as:
Cs =
∂Xt+s
∂εt
(3.3.14)
The element {i, j} of Cs represents the impact of a (one standard deviation) shock
which hits the jth variable at time t on the ith variable of the system at t+ s.
Sign Restrictions
The general idea of identification of VAR systems through sign restrictions is to generate
candidate impulse responses which are then accepted or rejected based on the underlying
economic theory. Following from the general discussion of recursive-structure VAR models
and the calculation of impulse response functions, we describe the details of the sign
restriction scheme as below.
Generating Orthogonal Matrices: We mentioned earlier that it is necessary to gener-
ate orthogonal Q matrices such that Q′Q = QQ′ = I. According to Fry and Pagan (2007),
one way in which we can generate Q involves re-ordering the variables, still within a re-
cursive framework. However, this does not exhaust all of the possible ways of combining
the shocks while retaining the orthogonal structure. We follow the Givens transformation
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as per Gambacorta et al. (2012), as opposed to the QR decomposition which is obtained
through a series of Householder transforms. We specify the Q matrix as:
Q3,4 =

1 0 0 0
0 1 0 0
0 0 cos(θ) − sin(θ)
0 0 sin(θ) cos(θ)
 (3.3.15)
From the equality that cos2(θ) + sin2(θ) = 1, we obtain Q3,4Q
′
3,4 = Q
′
3,4Q3,4 = I4.
Taking a quasi-Bayesian approach, θj draws are taken to be uniformly distributed over
(0, pi), where j represents the jth bootstrap draw. As we further describe below, in each
bootstrap draw, the approach generates new candidate impulse responses which are then
tested whether they satisfy the sign restrictions.
If we combine Q′3,4 with the lower triangular T matrix in (3.3.9), we obtain T
∗ as
follows:
T ∗ = TQ′3,4 =

t1,1 0 0 0
t2,1 t2,2 0 0
t3,1 t3,2 t3,3 0
t4,1 t4,2 t4,3 t4,4
 ∗

1 0 0 0
0 1 0 0
0 0 cos(θ) sin(θ)
0 0 − sin(θ) cos(θ)

=

t1,1 0 0 0
t2,1 t2,2 0 0
t3,1 t3,2 λ3,3 λ3,4
t4,1 t4,2 λ4,3 λ4,4
 (3.3.16)
where,
λ3,3 = t3,3 ∗ cos(θ) λ4,3 = t4,3 ∗ cos(θ)− t4,4 ∗ sin(θ)
λ3,4 = t3,3 ∗ sin(θ) λ4,4 = t4,3 ∗ sin(θ) + t4,4 ∗ cos(θ)
and T is the Cholesky decomposition.
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Identification by a Combination of Zero and Sign Restrictions
We have mentioned earlier that in this chapter of the thesis, we follow Gambacorta et al.
(2012), and employ a mixture of zero and sign restrictions to identify exogenous shocks
to NCB total assets in the EA, which we call unconventional monetary policy shocks.
As suggested by Christiano et al. (1999) and Gambacorta et al. (2012), in order to
isolate the (un)conventional monetary policy shocks, we need identifying restrictions to
estimate the parameters of the feedback rule which relates the monetary authority policy
actions to the state of the economy.
Our identification scheme is based on the following set of assumptions. First, it is
assumed that the policy shocks have a lagged impact on output (ip) and prices (cpi).
That is to say, following the recursive structure of the system,32 the contemporaneous
response of the variables to the policy shocks is restricted to be zero. Second, we assume
an expansionary shock to central bank balance sheet not to increase stock market volatility
(VIX ). “This restriction is needed in order to disentangle exogenous innovations to the
central bank balance sheet from their endogenous response to financial turmoil, and from
financial market disturbances.”33 Third, we explained in the Introduction of the chapter
the immediate responses of the central banks to mounting uncertainty in global financial
markets. We also highlighted the mitigating power of the balance sheet policy actions on
the markets. As such, it is assumed in the scheme that the central bank assets increase in
response to exogenous rise in the market volatility whilst the contemporaneous impact of
the policy interventions on the markets is different from zero. Following these assumptions,
we summarise our identifying restrictions in Table 3.3.1.
32See below for details.
33Gambacorta et al. (2012, p.10).
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Table 3.3.1: Identification Restrictions
Output Prices VIX Central Bank Assets
0 0 ≤0 >0
Given the focus of the chapter on unconventional monetary policy shocks, as it is
common in the VAR literature, we order the policy variable, i.e. central bank total assets
(ta) last in the system. The main assumption here is that the monetary policy is the most
endogenous variable to the system; that policymakers observe shocks to other variables
when determining their optimal response. Therefore, the ordering of the system is
Xt = [ip, cpi,VIX , ta]
′ (3.3.17)
We have derived in (3.3.16) the relationship between the reduced-form and structural
shocks as:
uˆt =

t1,1 0 0 0
t2,1 t2,2 0 0
t3,1 t3,2 λ3,3 λ3,4
t4,1 t4,2 λ4,3 λ4,4
 ∗ η∗t (3.3.18)
If we combine the identifying restrictions summarised above with the matrix in (3.3.18),
it turns out that the elements of the fourth column are restricted as below:
λ3,4 = t3,3 ∗ sin(θ) ≤ 0
λ4,4 = t4,3 ∗ sin(θ) + t4,4 ∗ cos(θ) > 0
Following from the MA representation of the impulse responses functions (3.3.14), the
identifying sign restrictions are imposed on the elements {3, 4} and {4, 4} of the matrices
C0 and C1. That is to say, in order for a bootstrap draw to be kept in the estimations,
an expansionary shock to central bank assets must have a positive impact on the assets,
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whilst the response of the market volatility to the shock must be negative for the horizon
of one period (i.e. contemporaneous + 1) for all countries in the panel simultaneously.
Otherwise the procedure discards the draw as it does not satisfy the restrictions imposed
by economic theory. To display the impulse responses, finally, we order the draws in an
ascending order (1,2,...,#draws) and use this order to compute the median and quantiles
(i.e. 16th and 84th) for confidence intervals of the impulse responses.
3.4 Results
Having explained the methodological details of the chapter, this section contains the
findings of our empirical analysis. Figures 3.4.1 - 3.4.4 present the benchmark estimation
results obtained with a four-variable panel VAR model. The estimations34 are based on
10,000 bootstraps, and the results are displayed, in standard deviation (SD) units, with
the 16th and 84th percentiles of the draws. In order to have a successful decomposition
for all individual countries in the panel about 15 draws, on average, are needed.
In Figure 3.4.1, we display the weighted average of the country-level impulse responses
for the variables of the system.35 Our mean group estimations suggest that, first, following
an expansionary shock to NCB assets, during the Great Recession period, real output of
EA-13 countries increases, statistically significantly, for a year. From period 16 onwards,
the median impulse responses suggest that there is a slightly contractionary effect of the
shock on the area-wide real activity.
34Obtained with Regression Analysis of Time Series (RATS) package, version 8.1.
35The impulse responses are weighted according to the following shares of the individual central bank
assets in the aggregate assets of the thirteen NCBs: Germany (25.7%), France (20.1%), Italy (14.2%),
Spain (10%), Netherlands (5.8%), Ireland (5%), Belgium (4.2%), Greece (4.1%), Luxembourg (3.4%),
Austria (3.1%), Portugal (2.3%), Finland (1.6%), Slovenia (0.4%).
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Figure 3.4.1: Weighted Average of Country-Level Responses
The dashed lines are the 16th and 84th percentiles of 10,000 bootstraps.
Second, consumer prices display statistically significant and persistent increase as a
results of the expansionary policies of the NCBs. Qualitatively similar results are obtained
by Gambacorta et al. (2012) with a panel VAR of eight developed countries, where the EA
is taken into account as an aggregate. Our results suggest that the empirical evidence on
prices in the EA responding persistently to exogenous balance sheet policies is robust to
the consideration of cross-country correlations either within the EA itself or among other
advanced economies. When cross-country correlation is omitted, according to the country-
specific structural VAR models of Peersman (2011), although statistical significance of the
responses is lost for the first twelve months following the shock, EA consumer prices still
display positive and persistent responses to unconventional policy actions in medium term.
Third, the average impulse responses of the VIX index of the EA suggest that the
tensions in financial markets continuously decrease for almost 20 months as a result of the
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exogenous rise in total assets of the NCBs. Following a one SD shock, finally, NCB assets
instantly and strongly increase before they gradually decline for three years. In addition to
mean group results, Figures 3.4.2 - 3.4.4 present our individual country estimations, where
the first subplots display the average country-level responses of the particular variable.
If we start with the impact of an expansionary shock to NCB assets on the real econ-
omy, we observe the following. First, the majority of the economies in the EA respond
positively to the unconventional monetary policy measures implemented by the NCBs. As
we can see from Figure 3.4.2, although there is some extent of homogeneity across these
countries, the economies of Finland, Luxembourg and Slovenia respond relatively stronger
than that of other countries. Relative to the area-wide average, real activity in Germany
and Italy also respond stronger in the first ten months following the shock. The estima-
tions suggest that the positive impact of the shock lasts, on average, for twenty periods.
These country-level estimations of the chapter are in line with the general conclusion of
the literature on the effectiveness of central bank balance sheet policies, summarised in
Table 3.1.1.
Secondly, according to Figure 3.4.2, not all countries in the EA experience positive
impacts of the Eurosystem unconventional policy actions. In line with debates on the
heterogeneity between core and peripheral countries in the EA,36 our country-level esti-
mations suggest that economic activity in the periphery, especially in Greece, statistically
significantly declines following an exogenous increase in NCBs’ total assets. Whereas we
observe both initially positive and only slightly negative responses of Italian, Portuguese
and Spanish (increase in the first ten periods only) economic activities, the Greek economy
responds to the expansionary policy shock negatively. Our model estimates the contrac-
36See, among others, Economist (2012); Feldstein (2012); IMF (2012).
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Figure 3.4.2: Impulse Responses of Output
The dashed lines are the 16th and 84th percentiles of 10,000 bootstraps.
tion in Greece to be strong, relative to medium-term decline in other peripheral economies,
statistically significant, and persistent for three years following the policy expansion.
Before we try to suggest possible explanations for the heterogeneous results across
European countries, we look at the responses of country-level prices to the exogenous
shocks to NCB total assets. Figure 3.4.3 shows that (i) the impact of the shock on
consumer prices in Belgium, Ireland and the Netherlands are statistically not different
than zero; (ii) prices in all other countries respond statistically significantly to the shock;
(iii) price level in Germany increases relatively less than all other countries; (iv) price
levels in Italy and France increase around the level of the aggregate responses (EA-13);
and (v) the impact of the unconventional monetary policy on the rest of the countries’
price levels is much more stronger. To illustrate, consumer prices in Greece and Spain
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Figure 3.4.3: Impulse Responses of Prices
The dashed lines are the 16th and 84th percentiles of 10,000 bootstraps.
increase almost three times more than those in the German economy. It also takes longer
for the prices in these peripheral economies (including Italy) to return to their pre-shock
levels.
Finally, we display the responses of the NCB assets to the exogenous shocks in Figure
3.4.4. Overall, the NCB balance sheets display qualitatively similar responses across
countries. Other than the differences in contemporaneous jumps of the variables, however,
the only considerable difference is the impact of the shock on NCB of Ireland and Portugal.
As we can see from the figure, it takes considerably longer for the total assets of the Central
Bank of Ireland and Banco de Portugal to return to their pre-shock levels. On the one
hand, these two peripheral countries, and some extent Spain, share the burden of the
sovereign debt crisis in the EA with Greece. However, on the other hand, we observe in
230
0 10 20 30
0
2
4
6
8
10
Euro Area 13
0 10 20 30
0
2
4
6
8
10
Austria
0 10 20 30
0
2
4
6
8
10
Belgium
0 10 20 30
0
2
4
6
8
10
Finland
0 10 20 30
0
2
4
6
8
10
France
0 10 20 30
0
2
4
6
8
10
Germany
0 10 20 30
0
2
4
6
8
10
Greece
0 10 20 30
0
2
4
6
8
10
Ireland
0 10 20 30
0
2
4
6
8
10
Italy
0 10 20 30
0
2
4
6
8
10
Luxembourg
0 10 20 30
0
2
4
6
8
10
Netherlands
0 10 20 30
0
2
4
6
8
10
Portugal
0 10 20 30
0
2
4
6
8
10
Slovenia
0 10 20 30
0
2
4
6
8
10
Spain
0 10 20 30
0
2
4
6
8
10
Euro Area 13
0 10 20 30
0
2
4
6
8
10
Austria
0 10 20 30
0
2
4
6
8
10
Belgium
0 10 20 30
0
2
4
6
8
10
Finland
0 10 20 30
0
2
4
6
8
10
France
0 10 20 30
0
2
4
6
8
10
Germany
0 10 20 30
0
2
4
6
8
10
Greece
0 10 20 30
0
2
4
6
8
10
Ireland
0 10 20 30
0
2
4
6
8
10
Italy
0 10 20 30
0
2
4
6
8
10
Luxembourg
0 10 20 30
0
2
4
6
8
10
Netherlands
0 10 20 30
0
2
4
6
8
10
Portugal
0 10 20 30
0
2
4
6
8
10
Slovenia
0 10 20 30
0
2
4
6
8
10
Spain
Figure 3.4.4: Impulse Responses of NCB Assets
The dashed lines are the 16th and 84th percentiles of 10,000 bootstraps.
the impulse responses of output that neither Ireland nor Portugal display as contractionary
responses as Greece and Spain. In addition to other country-specific factors, examined
in Section 3.6, we think that the responses of Irish and Portuguese central banks to the
shock might have prevented their economic activities from responding negatively in our
empirical model.
The assumption above on NCBs behaving differently in a monetary union depends on
the decentralised structure of the implementation of monetary policy in the Eurosystem.
As described by Moutot et al. (2008), the NCBs are independent with regard to their
operational tasks despite being an integral part of the Eurosystem. That is to say, main
refinancing, longer-term refinancing, fine-tuning reverse and structural reverse operations,
outright transactions, foreign exchange swaps, and collection of fixed-term deposits are
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all executed in the Eurosystem in a decentralised manner by the NCBs. Briefly, mone-
tary policy in the Eurosystem is based on a centralised decision-making system by the
Governing Council which consists of the governors of the NCBs of the EA countries and
the six members of the Executive Board.37
Before we try to rationalise our empirical results in Section 3.6, we test robustness of
the findings to model variations and extensions in the following section.
3.5 Robustness
The variations and extensions to our benchmark model are as follows.38 First, we replace
the NCB assets in the system of equations with common variables39 of the Eurosystem
base money and total assets.
Second, we replace IP with monthly interpolation estimates of real gross domestic
product (GDP).40
Third, as we can see from Figure 3.5.1, when we calculate the optimal lag length of the
country-specific VARs (i.e. 13 VARs) with selection criteria, we find that BIC estimates a
lag length of one to be the optimal specification for all the countries under investigation.
Not for all but for a majority of the systems a lag length of one is found to be optimal by
other criteria. A lag length of two (if we ignore AIC and FPE which are clearly affected
by the maximum lag length used in the tests), is also suggested by some other information
criteria, and we therefore test the robustness of our empirical results to VAR(2).
37See Articles 12.1 and 14.3 of the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and ECB (2011),
and Chapters III and IV of the Maastricht Treaty for further details of the Eurosystem.
38To limit computational time, the robustness estimations are based on 5,000 bootstraps.
39The same variable is used in each equation of the system.
40Monthly GDP series are estimated using Chow and Lin (1971) interpolation technique with IP
volumes as related series.
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Figure 3.5.1: Lag Length Selection
Fourth, we extend the sign restriction horizon from one to five periods, and the model
itself with various series such as the ECB’s benchmark policy rate, public debt,41 volume of
general government expenditure, government bond yields, MFI lending to private sector,
nominal effective exchange rate, gold price42 and unemployment rate.
Figure 3.5.2 presents the impulse response functions of output with the robustness
tests.43 As a result of the robustness checks, our benchmark results turn out to be robust
to model variations and extensions. That is to say, we still observe two sets of output
responses across countries. On the one hand, we have core countries’ economic activities
which respond positively and statistically significantly to an exogenous expansionary bal-
ance sheet policy. Economic activity in peripheral economies, on the other hand, display
(statistically) significant decline during the crisis period despite the expansionary balance
41The model is extended with REFI and public debt following Gambacorta et al. (2012).
42Gold prices and foreign exchange rates enter the balance sheets of the Eurosystem central banks,
i.e. via the items gold and gold receivables, and claims in foreign currency, which respectively account
for, on average, 8% and 24% of the ECB’s total assets during the period 2007-11.
43For the sake of comparability of the median responses, confidence intervals of the impulse responses
have been removed from the figure. The confidence intervals, available upon request, display qualitatively
similar conclusions as in Figure 3.4.2.
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Figure 3.5.2: Robustness Checks on the Impulse Responses of Output
sheet policies of the Eurosystem.
Although robustness checks are overall consistent with the benchmark estimation re-
sults, some caution is required for the test which identifies unconventional monetary policy
shocks as innovations to the Eurosystem total assets. As strong responses of output in
almost all periphery, and even in France, suggest, using an area-wide variable as large
as Eurosystem total assets in a panel approach like ours might increase the impact of
the shock substantially. As we can see from Figure 3.5.2, this condition may generate
contradictory impulse responses, at least relative to our benchmark and other various
robustness estimations. Therefore, we believe that this finding supports our choice of
identifying unconventional monetary policy shocks using NCB assets instead of area-wide
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aggregate measures.
We can also apply the same cautious approach to the robustness checks using the
Eurosystem base money. When we compare the base money to the total assets of the
NCBs, we observe that the former is significantly higher than the latter, except for the
largest four economies of the EA which account for 70% of the aggregate NCB total assets.
In addition to these robustness checks, finally, we test the impact of governor change at
the ECB which occurred towards the end of our sample, i.e. November 2011. In particular,
we follow Leduc et al. (2007) and estimate our panel VAR model with an exogenous binary
dummy variable which takes the value of zero (0) for the period of Jean-Claude Trichet’s
presidency at the ECB in our sample (January 2007 - October 2011) and one (1) for the
period onwards when Mario Draghi became the governor of the ECB (November 2011 -
September 2012). Because the estimations with the dummy variable are almost identical
with our benchmark results on output and prices,44 the impulse responses are excluded
from Figure 3.5.2.
The following section investigates key macroeconomic indicators in core and peripheral
economies of the EA in order to shed light on these robust but contradictory responses
of national economic activities to expansionary monetary policy shocks.
3.6 The Periphery Puzzle
We presented in the previous two sections the contradictory responses of economic ac-
tivities across core and periphery to exogenous increases in central bank balance sheets.
In particular, the negative responses of real activities in Greece and Spain, especially,
44Both the median and percentile estimates.
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were the most surprising findings of the chapter. Let us call this finding ‘the periphery
puzzle’ of the analysis, because we believe it is less surprising to observe statistically zero
responses of economic activities in the periphery to expansionary balance sheet shocks
during the crisis period than statistically significant negative responses.
In this section, we try to shed some light on the periphery puzzle by investigating
the developments in core and peripheral economies of the EA during the Great Recession
period. Figure 3.6.1 displays various key macroeconomic indicators for the EA as an
aggregate, and selective core and peripheral countries.
In Section 3.1.1, we described the transmission mechanism of monetary policy, the
main channels of which, in the context of unconventional monetary policy, are (i) the
balance sheet channel transferring the impact of monetary policy into the real economy
through improvement of net worth of businesses, financial frictions, lending, investment
and durable consumption conditions, (ii) the signalling channel through which an expan-
sionary monetary policy leads aggregate demand to increase mainly by improving private
sector agents’ expectations and their investment and consumption activities, and (iii) the
risk-taking channel which highlights the importance of risk for the transmission of pol-
icy actions to the real economy by taking into account the ‘pervasive influences’ of risk
perceptions and risk tolerance on agents’ behaviours.
Having these channels in mind, let us look at Figure 3.6.1. A number of observations
are worth highlighting. First, the global financial crisis, unsurprisingly, led share prices
to decline substantially. According to the asset price and the balance sheet channels, this
means lower net worth of and lending to firms, decrease in consumption, investment and
hence aggregate demand. When we add unconventional policy actions of the Eurosystem
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Figure 3.6.1: Core and Periphery in the Crisis Period
January 2007=100, except interest and unemployment rates.
Sources: Eurostat and NCBs. All series are seasonally adjusted.
into the picture, however, we observe that the interventions, e.g. June 2009 - covered
bonds purchase programme and May 2010 - Securities Markets Programme, not only
stopped the sharp decline in share prices but also helped the markets recover some of the
loss. To illustrate, despite the sovereign debt crisis, there is a clear upward trend in the
markets from February 2009 to June 2011. The recovery is most visible in the German
financial markets. We believe that one can interpret these observations as signs of the
working of the transmission channels, i.e. portfolio balance sheet channel, described above
for those countries experiencing the positive impacts of the policy actions.
Figure 3.6.1 also highlights the fact that, however, these interpretations do not apply
to Greece where the financial markets almost continuously declined in the sample period
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under investigation. As we can see from the graph, the loss in the Greek markets was more
than 80% between January 2007 and September 2012. We believe that it is not difficult
to rationalise the developments in the markets given severe fiscal problems including
default on the sovereign debt, bailout packages obtained from the Troika,45 skyrocketed
government bond yields and unemployment figures, and the following social unrest in
Greece. It is more important in the context of our paper to highlight that despite the
clear separation of the increase in total assets of Bank of Greece relative to other NCBs,
the interventions were not successful in creating the desired wealth and net worth effects
on the private sector agents.
Although the overall conclusion does not differ from the one outlined above, we briefly
investigate the other indicators as well. We highlighted in Section 3.1.1 the role of bank
loans in the transmission mechanisms. As the second row of Figure 3.6.1 clearly dis-
plays, the Greek economy faced the highest private sector lending rates, among the main
economies of the core and periphery. The combination of the highest lending rates with
the lowest level of economic sentiment made loans to Greek non-financial corporations to
steadily decline by 68% from January 2009 onwards. On the liability side of the bank-
ing sector balance sheets, deposits also declined sharply in Greece whilst they constantly
increased in other countries. Joyce et al. (2012) similarly observe that following stresses
within the EA, “steady and very substantial outflow of euro deposits” occurred from the
peripheral countries into banks in other EA countries.
The last financial indicator in Figure 3.6.1 is the broad money supply of the economies.
In line with loans and deposits, whereas the money stock in the EA and the individ-
ual countries steadily increase during the crisis period, country-specific developments in
45The European Commission, the ECB and the International Monetary Fund (IMF).
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Greece led to significant fluctuations in the money supply.
It is important to note here that “[c]redit policy46 derives much of its effectiveness from
interposing the central bank (and hence indirectly the government) between private sector
lenders and borrowers and, in so doing, improving credit flows.”47 As we can see from the
developments in the Greek banking sector, it is hard to identify such improvements.
When we look at the real sector indicators, clear heterogeneity across the core and
periphery emerge. If we proxy aggregate demand with deflated wholesale retail trade, on
the one hand, we observe that transmission of Eurosystem balance sheet policies has been
successful in the EA as a whole, France, Germany and, to some extent, Italy. On the other
hand, retail figures in periphery, especially in Greece and Spain, have displayed significant
declines during the global financial crisis period, hardly surprising with so many people
unemployed in the region.
The textbook descriptions in Section 3.1.1 made it clear that investment is the leading
indicator of the effectiveness of expansionary monetary policy measures. As we present in
Figure 3.6.1 and Table 3.6.1, whereas it is possible to observe such positive relationship
between real activity and the policy actions in Germany and France, the crisis and country-
specific factors had substantial contractions in investment and IP in the periphery, despite
extraordinary monetary policies of the Eurosystem.
To sum up, the empirical finding of our panel VAR approach that unlike the EA as a
whole and the majority of individual countries in the panel, real activities of peripheral
countries, especially Greece and Spain, respond negatively to an expansionary shock to
46Borio and Disyatat (2009) categorise central bank balance sheet policies into four groups as credit
policy, quasi-debt management policy, bank reserves policy, and exchange rate policy. According to this
classification, Eurosystem’s unconventional actions during the crisis period are classified as credit policy.
47Borio and Disyatat (2009, pp.14-5).
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Table 3.6.1: Core and Periphery in the Crisis Period
Gross Fixed Capital Formationa
EA-13 FR DE GR IT PT ES
-11.95 -5.15 -0.61 -38.33 -13.74 -14.31 -28.56
Industrial Productionb
-9.05 -12.92 1.81 -32.18 -22.13 -17.38 -29.09
Percentage changes afrom 2007Q1 to 2011Q1, bfrom Jan2007 to Sep2012.
FR-France, DE-Germany, GR-Greece, IT-Italy, PT-Portugal, ES-Spain.
Source: Author’s calculations.
central bank balance sheet, turns out to be in line with the actual developments in the
key macroeconomic indicators of these countries.
We earlier cited Borio and Zhu (2012) about the role of risk-taking channel in the mon-
etary transmission mechanism which “should be expected to act purely as a ‘persistence-
enhancing’ mechanism, qualitatively akin to a kind of ‘financial accelerator’.”48 Although
we follow Borio and Zhu on the point that the risk-taking channel is not the most impor-
tant channel of monetary policy, we do believe that it is worth being considered among
the factors above explaining the heterogeneity observed in our empirical results and the
actual indicators across core and periphery. Our observations above, we believe, clearly
suggest that despite the common unconventional monetary measures by the Eurosystem,
country-specific risk factors made the transmission mechanism in the periphery run out
of the “persistence-enhancement”.
De Santis (2012) lists ‘aggregate regional risk factor’, ‘the country-specific credit risk’
and ‘the spillover effect from Greece’ as three factors which “can explain the recorded
developments in sovereign spreads”. The author highlights that whereas the German
Bund has benefited from the “safe haven status” during the crisis, sovereign solvency
risk and rating agencies’ downgrades, in periphery especially, might account for sovereign
48Borio and Zhu (2012, p.237).
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spreads in the EA. Furthermore, Meier (2009, p.9) states that “unconventional monetary
policy can be effective to the extent that ... it directly reduces risk premia or outright
quantitative restrictions in financial markets.” Combination of these arguments with the
risk-taking channel of Borio and Zhu (2012) may suggest that enhanced (diminished)
persistence, falling (rising) financial and political risks in core (periphery) have played
a noteworthy role in positive (negative) impulse responses we have obtained for the real
activities of the EA economies.
3.7 Conclusion
In this chapter of the thesis we have investigated the effectiveness of unconventional
monetary policies of the Eurosystem on the economic activities and price levels of thirteen
EA countries during the global financial crisis. The main contribution of the chapter is
the country-level investigation of the balance sheet policies in the EA using the panel
VAR methodology of Gambacorta et al. (2012).
Our area-wide mean group estimations are in line with other studies on the EA as an
aggregate. That is to say, an expansionary shock to central bank balance sheets, when the
interest rates are at the zero lower bound, leads economic activity to increase temporarily,
while increasing the price level permanently. When we look at the effectiveness of the
policy measures on the country-level basis, on the other hand, our estimations suggest
empirical findings worth highlighting.
The paper supports Gambacorta et al. (2012) in the sense that the panel approach is
capable of detecting cross-country heterogeneity present in the data. In particular, we find
that whilst the expansionary balance sheet policy shocks lead to statistically significant
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increases in core countries’ economic activities, the responses of the periphery, i.e. Greece
and Spain, are statistically and economically negative.
Our investigation of the developments in key macroeconomic indicators in core and
peripheral economies of the EA highlights the fact that country-specific factors played
a significant role in disrupting the transmission mechanism of unconventional monetary
policies to individual economic activities. To illustrate, during the crisis, we have, on
the one hand, the core, i.e. Germany, benefiting from the ‘safe haven’ status which
attracted considerable deposit shifts within the EA especially from Greece. On the other
hand, periphery suffered not only from significant losses in the financial sector but also
considerably low levels of demand and investment conditions.
To be sure, our empirical observations do not, and cannot, suggest that the uncon-
ventional monetary policy measures were the cause of significant damages in peripheral
economic activities. We believe that in the absence of these policies, we could have ex-
perienced far worse impacts of the crisis not only on peripheral Europe but also across
the world. Our empirical practice highlights that, however, despite these effective policy
actions, which target the whole EA in the case of the Eurosystem, it is still possible to
observe contractionary responses of country-level economic activities. Therefore, future
research is of crucial importance in order to investigate the “one-size-fits-all” aspects of
the monetary policy in the EA having experienced the aftermath of the global financial
crisis. In addition to event-study analysis with relatively large Bayesian VAR techniques,
incorporation of structural differences and country-specific financial turmoils and defaults
risks into dynamic stochastic general equilibrium context, might be the next steps for us
to further investigate the cross-country heterogeneity in the EA.
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APPENDIX P
COMPOSITION OF CENTRAL BANK BALANCE
SHEETS
Figure 2 - Central bank assets and liabilities (trillions of respective currency units)
(1) Total assets/liabilities. For Norges Bank total financial assets/liabilities. (2) Securities held outright. (3) For the Fed: Repurchase agreements, term auction credit, other loans and Commercial Paper Funding Facility. (4) 
Defined as the sum of currency in circulation and banks' deposits with the central bank. For the Eurosystem, including the deposit facility; for the Riksbank, including the deposit facility and Riskbank certificates. (5) Including 
US dollar liquidity auctions. (6) Securities issued by euro area residents, in euros. (7) Bonds and other securities acquired via market transactions and securities holdings of Bank of England Asset Purchase Facility Fund. The 
accounts of the Fund are not consolidated with those of the Bank. The Fund is financed by loans from the Bank which appear on the Bank’s balance sheet as an asset. (8) Outstanding amount of US dollar liquidity auctions. (9) 
Defined as JGS and corporate bonds.
Sources: Datastream; national data.
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CONCLUSION
We started Chapter 1 of the thesis by saying “there is no doubt that measuring the
interaction between monetary policy and the evolution of the entire economy is of crucial
importance for good policy-making.” In light of the detailed aspects of the transmission
of the single monetary policy across the EA economies studied in this thesis, we believe
that the following policy implications are of importance for the ECB and other policy
makers.
First, the empirical findings of the thesis on cross-country heterogeneity in the EA
highlighted the importance of structural differences across countries. As described in
the Economic Survey for Euro Area 2012 by the OECD, product, labour and financial
markets, housing and taxation are among the main policy areas to be reformed in order
to rebalance the EA economies. We believe that these reforms are also of importance in
order to cure cross-country heterogeneity in the monetary transmission mechanism in the
EA.
Second, the estimated heterogeneous responses between the core and peripheral EA
countries during the global financial crisis question the effectiveness of the unconventional
Eurosystem policy measures. As supported by the area-wide findings of the thesis, there
is a general consensus in the literature on the effectiveness of the policy actions for the
EA as an aggregate. However, as our country-level investigation importantly highlighted,
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it is difficult to observe the same conclusion for the individual member states. We there-
fore conclude that it is of importance to further investigate structural differences in the
responses of the central banks worldwide to the crisis. We believe that more country-level
oriented policies could result in better conditions in the EA countries most distressed by
the Great Recession. For instance, according to Ciccarelli et al. (2013), who highlight
the economical and statistical significance of the non-financial borrower balance sheet
channel in the EA, “the current policy may still be insufficient if not targeted to increase
credit availability for small firms (due to the firm channel) especially in the countries
under financial stress” (p.27). Given the concentration of the EA product markets on the
small and medium enterprises (SMEs), we believe that, similar to Ciccarelli et al., more
SME-oriented policy measures by the Eurosystem could significantly stimulate economic
activity in especially the peripheral EA.
Finally, the combination of the general conclusion of this thesis on the considerable
heterogeneity in the EA and the recent significant effects of the problems in even tiny
economies like Cyprus on the whole EA importantly suggests that the “no exit” aspect
of the Economic and Monetary Union is worth detailed investigation for the long-term
success of this unique project.
In order to describe the conclusions of the thesis on which these policy implications
are based on, the following summarises the whole study. This thesis investigates the
transmission mechanism of the single monetary policy in the EA. Using an aggregate
data set for the EA, Chapter 1 investigates time variation in the impacts of contractionary
shocks to policy rate of the ECB using PC and Bayesian FAVAR methods. Chapter 2 is an
exploration of cross-country heterogeneity in the transmission of the policy shocks across
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the four largest economies of the EA. The techniques again consist of Bayesian FAVAR
estimation, rolling windows and Boivin and Ng (2006) pre-screening techniques. Chapter
3 investigates the global financial crisis period with a focus on the effects of unconventional
monetary policy actions of the Eurosystem across thirteen individual countries, estimated
by a panel VAR technique.
Chapter 1 provides results for a contractionary monetary policy shock in the EA that
are largely consistent with conventional wisdom. Our comparison of the results estimated
by the PC (two-step) and the Bayesian (one-step) FAVAR techniques suggests that in ad-
dition to qualitatively similar results across the methods, there are considerable gains from
the computationally burdensome Bayesian technique such as smoother impulse response
functions and statistical significance of the estimates. Our rolling windows analysis shows
that the most time-variant responses to monetary policy shocks are for consumer prices
and monetary aggregates in the EA as an aggregate. The analysis also estimates that the
contractionary impact of the monetary tightening on the economic activity is stronger
during the global financial crisis than the pre-crisis period. In line with the responses
of real activity, the cost of labour displays faster and stronger increases when there is a
contractionary shock in the post-crisis period. In other words, the strong contractions
in real output during the crisis period also leads to stronger increases in the real ULC.
Looking at impulse responses and rolling windows obtained with a limited data set de-
termined by the pre-screening technique of Boivin and Ng (2006), our structural FAVAR
analysis shows that factors extracted from as few as 67 series might do no worse, and as
our Bayesian estimations suggest, might do better than ones extracted from 120 series.
The main conclusion of Chapter 2 is to show, with a novel updated data set and various
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empirical approaches, that the impacts of common monetary policy shocks in the EA on
national monetary aggregates are more strongly heterogeneous across European economies
than most other macroeconomic variables. Our empirical finding is of importance in the
sense that it supports the general conclusion of Hughes Hallett and Piscitelli (2002); Boivin
et al. (2008); Setzer et al. (2010) on the heterogeneity in the monetary aggregates across
the EA economies. Our rolling windows approach also finds that monetary aggregates are
not only most heterogeneous across countries but also over time during the single monetary
policy era of the EMU. This finding of the paper highlights the significance of the question
of whether or not there exists a genuinely uneven monetary transmission mechanism in
the EA, “in a way that could complicate the conduct of the single monetary policy”, as
highlighted by Angeloni and Ehrmann (2003, p.6). Given the unconventional monetary
actions by the Eurosystem during the Great Recession, studied in Chapter 3, the main
conclusion of Chapter 2 also emphasises the possibility of heterogeneous transmission
of the policy actions across the EA economies through (heterogenous) country-specific
channels.
In line with the literature, our Bayesian FAVAR approach also suggests heterogenous
impacts of the monetary policy shocks on country-level real wages, highlighting the pos-
sibility of cross-country heterogeneity in the labour-, goods- and financial-frictions in the
EA. Furthermore, we show in the chapter that the strongest impact of a contractionary
monetary policy shock is estimated to be on national investment and total employment
indicators. Similar to IP and consumer prices, the responses of investment and employ-
ment displayed homogeneous responses across the four largest economies of the EA. When
we look at the post-crisis period, however, we observe heterogeneity across countries. To
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illustrate, according to the rolling windows analysis, the Spanish real activity displayed
severe contractions in the post-crisis period relative to the core countries, suggesting the
importance of country-specific factors during the crisis.
According to the empirical analysis in Chapter 3, on the one hand, the area-wide esti-
mations of the effects of unconventional monetary policy suggest, in line with other studies
on the EA as a whole, temporary (permanent) increases in economic activity (consumer
prices). On the other hand, country-level impulse responses display serious heterogeneity
across core and peripheral economies. In particular, Chapter 3 concludes that whilst the
expansionary balance sheet policy shocks lead to statistically significant increases in core
countries’ economic activities, the responses of the periphery, i.e. Greece and Spain, are
statistically and economically negative. When we investigate the developments in key
macroeconomic indicators in core and peripheral economies during the Great Recession
period, we observe that country-specific factors such as defaults risks and bailouts played
a significant role in disrupting the transmission mechanism of unconventional monetary
measures of the Eurosystem to individual economic activities.
We believe that the combination of common monetary policy and diverse cultural and
fiscal structures of the EA economies provides a unique laboratory for the analysis of
cross-country heterogeneity and changes over time. Therefore, our results mark the way
forward for a research agenda that may provide important insights into the cross-country
dynamics of the EA.
First, the incorporation of structural differences in preferences, technology levels and
frictions constraining private agents across countries into a multi-country DSGE frame-
work is of utmost importance for us to further investigate and rationalise the empirical
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findings of the thesis. Within this structural context, the interaction between monetary
and fiscal policies, and country-specific financial turmoils and default risks are also of
importance to obtain more realistic analysis of cross-country heterogeneity in the EA. In
line with our one-step FAVAR analysis in Chapter 2, these structural studies will pro-
vide important contributions to the two-country structural model by Boivin et al. (2008)
applied to the EA economies.
Second, we cited Setzer et al. (2010) in Chapter 2 who claim that asymmetries in
house price developments can explain, to a large extent, the heterogeneity in monetary
dynamics across EA economies. In addition to Setzer et al.’s money demand equation
analysis, which incorporates housing wealth and collateral effects, we believe that it is of
importance to further investigate the real estate markets and their possible significance
for heterogeneity in economic and financial structure of the EA. Following the housing
literature, mainly focused on the US and the UK, DSGE, country-specific and panel
structural VAR, heterogeneous-agent VAR (HAVAR), and FAVAR models are among
those which we can use to investigate the question of real estate dynamics and cross-
country heterogeneity in the EA.
Third, as more data become available for European economies, we believe that the
application of TVP-FAVAR models will be possible. Similar to the gaps in the literature
filled by this thesis, the TVP-FAVAR approach is yet to be explored for the EA, especially
in the context of cross-country heterogeneity. As time goes by, the responses across
countries are likely to become less heterogeneous due to forces of convergence. We believe
that TVP-FAVAR analysis will be an important way of testing this hypothesis for the
economies of the EA.
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Fourth, there are macroeconomic indicators such as employment or GDP not available
in monthly frequency. Our thesis provides the literature with empirical findings on these
key indicators by means of Chow and Lin (1971) interpolation techniques. In order
to provide robustness tests for our empirical findings, and further investigate the EA
macroeconomic indicators, MIDAS and mixed frequency VAR techniques are important
alternatives for future research.
Fifth, we highlighted the necessity of a cautious approach to the findings of our FAVAR
approaches due to strong portfolio shifts and cross-border movements in the EA during
the global financial crisis period. In light of these important aspects of the crisis on the
monetary dynamics, we consider it important to incorporate more detailed unconventional
monetary measures into future FAVAR data sets.
Finally, given the significance of the Great Recession for the peripheral European
economies, it is of importance to further analyse “the periphery puzzle” of our thesis,
discussed in detail in Chapter 3. That is to say, we need more empirical investigations of
country-level impacts of unconventional monetary policy actions in the EA in order to shed
more light on contradictory and heterogeneous responses of peripheral economic activities.
For example, the event-study methodologies of Meier (2009); Giannone et al. (2011, 2012),
among others, are important alternatives to our panel VAR approach in Chapter 3. The
application of the methodologies to the question of cross-country heterogeneity in the EA
will contribute to the literature by investigating the ‘policy’ and ‘no-policy’ scenarios for
core and peripheral economies of the EA.
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